(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I am not convinced that the admission of Dr. Mangas’ opinion on one of the elements in the charge was harmless error under SDCL 23A-44-14, nor am I convinced that a jury would have returned a verdict of guilty absent the admission of the element testimony.
The victim did not testify against her boyfriend (Lybarger). Thus, State perceived a weakness in their case on proving the element of “serious, bodily injury” under SDCL 22-18-1.1. Rather than relying on the small amount of testimony given by the victim during the preliminary hearing, which testimony from the victim did not *107reflect that she had been in fear for her life, limb or health, State elected to use the high-powered testimony of a practitioner of the healing arts as the only direct evidence about the victim’s alleged apprehension of serious bodily injury. The trial judge specifically noted that the testimony on this element was a close call for the fact finder/jury. It is possible that without this expert testimony on the ultimate issue the jury could have found that the victim had, in actuality, sustained a serious bodily injury, but the harmless error rule requires more than a mere possibility. This rule requires this court to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted Lybarger without this improper high-powered expert testimony. I am not so convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Although this defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, this injection of erroneous evidence into the record by State denied Lybarger a fair trial.
I would reverse this conviction and remand the case to the trial court so that a new, fair trial can be had.