dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the order denying appellant’s petition to open default judgment.
Initially, I cannot concur in the majority’s determination that “the alleged conduct by the appellant set forth in the complaint is too tenuous to invoke the jurisdiction of our courts under the Long-Arm Statute.” This conclusion involves a misunderstanding of both the nature of the tortious conduct alleged, as well as the situs of the harm flowing from the alleged conduct.
The majority begins its analysis by asserting that Frances Holden’s complaint does not allege any contact with Pennsylvania, or activities in Pennsylvania, by Diane Hoi*195den that would make it fair or reasonable to subject her to suit in a foreign forum. This ignores the clear gravamen of what Frances Holden is pleading: a tortious interference by Diane Holden with the contractual relationship between Frances and Stanley G. Holden forged in Pennsylvania.
To set forth a cause of action in Pennsylvania for intentional interference with a contractual relationship, four elements must be pled:
(1) the existence of a contractual relation between the complainant and a third party;
(2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, specifically intended to harm the existing relation;
(3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and
(4) the occasioning of actual legal damage as a result of the defendant’s conduct.
See Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 536 A.2d 1337, 1343 (1987); see also Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466, 471 (1979).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines “actual damages” for interference with a contract as follows, at § 774A:
§ 774A. Damages.
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective contractual relation is liable for damages for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective relation;
(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to be expected to result from the interference____
An even cursory glance at Frances Holden’s allegations indicates that a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract is precisely what she has pled: she is alleging that Diane Holden took purposeful action, in the *196form of threats of marital dissolution, with the specific intent of inducing Stanley Holden to breach his Pennsylvania settlement agreement with Frances Holden, thereby causing Frances Holden actual legal damage, including pecuniary loss and emotional distress. This, clearly, is a contact of sorts with Pennsylvania. It therefore remains to be determined whether the allegations, if presumed true, permit our courts to assert jurisdiction over Diane Holden, under the “minimum contacts” test established by International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny.
As noted by the majority, the “minimum contacts” test is not to be applied mechanically, but requires an examination of the facts in each case. In its discussion, the majority places reliance upon, primarily, three Pennsylvania decisions, and concludes that Diane Holden’s actions, at best, have caused “indirect” or “residual” harm to Frances Holden, thereby making any exercise of jurisdiction by Pennsylvania a subversion of fair play and substantial justice. As I find all three decisions relied upon by the majority to be distinguishable, I disagree.
The first, Kenny v. Alexson Equipment Co., 495 Pa. 107, 432 A.2d 974 (1981), concerns an elevator hoist, which was originally sold in Maryland, to a New Jersey retailer, and eventually shipped to Pennsylvania, where it injured a Pennsylvania resident. The Pennsylvania resident brought suit against the New Jersey retailer, who then attempted to join the Maryland seller as an additional defendant, based upon the predecessor statute to the current Long Arm Statute.1 The Supreme Court held that in personam jurisdiction could not be extended to subject the Maryland seller to suit in Pennsylvania.
In its analysis of Kenny, the majority focuses upon the Maryland manufacturer’s failure to maintain an office or do business in Pennsylvania, and analogizes this to Diane Holden’s commission of the complained of interference exclusively within Texas, and concludes that, under Kenny, *197her behavior has at best resulted in indirect extra-territorial harm too attenuated to invoke Pennsylvania jurisdiction. This, however, ignores a crucial part of the Kenny holding:
We therefore hold that when an individual seller, not doing business within the Commonwealth, transacts an isolated sale outside the Commonwealth to an unrelated buyer, the causing of a harmful effect in itself, within the Commonwealth or the mere entry of that single product into the stream of commerce within the Commonwealth, in the absence of purposeful participation by the seller in a continuous distributive chain of such product is insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of due process and such seller cannot be found amenable to in personam jurisdiction pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Long-Arm Statute____
Id., at p. 984. (Emphasis supplied.)
In holding the Maryland seller beyond the jurisdiction of the forum state, the Supreme Court, in its analysis of the seller’s contacts with Pennsylvania, did not rely solely upon the number of contacts (one), or the location of the seller and his business activities (Maryland): it was the lack of any purposeful activity, calculated to impact upon the forum, that was the key to the Court’s holding that the transaction in question had been too attenuated to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.
The issue of purposeful, as opposed to chance or random, activity, is not of little consequence. As our Court noted in Skinner v. Flymo, Inc., 351 Pa.Super. 234, 505 A.2d 616, 621 (1986):
... if the efforts of [an actor] are “purposefully directed toward residents of the forum state, the absence of the actor’s physical contacts with the forum cannot defeat an assertion of personal jurisdiction in that state, (cite omitted). Indeed, even a single act by a foreign defendant within the forum state may support jurisdiction, though that act will not be sufficient if its nature and the quality of the circumstances of its commission create only an “attenuated” affiliation with the forum, (cite omitted) *198Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with “fair play and substantial justice.” (cite omitted).
Factors to be considered include “the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” (cites omitted).
These considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required. On the other hand, where a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable____”
Id., citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (Emphasis supplied.)
In the matter sub judice, Frances Holden is alleging very purposeful activity on the part of Diane Holden, calculated to have a direct impact upon a Pennsylvania resident. She is not averring that, by mere chance or happenstance, Diane’s threats indirectly caused Stanley to harm Frances, but that Diane deliberately made those threats with the specific intent of inducing Stanley to neglect his Pennsylvania contractual obligations, and that the harm to Frances directly resulted from Diane’s purposeful interference.
As the Kenny holding is conditioned in part upon a finding of non-purposeful activity, it would not appear controlling in this case, in the absence of any meaningful evaluation of other factors pertinent to a determination of personal jurisdiction, such as the policy considerations delin*199eated in Skinner, supra.2 As I am of the view that the complaint alleges purposeful activity, in the form of an intentional tort, I believe the remaining question of pertinence to a finding of “minimum contacts” is a determination of the situs of the harm resulting from the intentional tort. It is at this point that a discussion of the latter two decisions relied upon by the majority, is warranted.
The majority cites as analogous to the matter before us, the case of DeFay v. McMeekin, 352 Pa.Super. 409, 508 A.2d 324 (1986). In DeFay, a Pennsylvania resident was injured in a New Jersey automobile accident. The other driver was a New Jersey resident. Upon returning home to recuperate, the Pennsylvania resident filed a negligence suit against the New Jersey resident. In holding that the New Jersey resident did not have sufficient “minimum contacts” with Pennsylvania for our courts to exercise jurisdiction, our Court, citing to Hilferty v. Neesan, 506 F.Supp. 218 (E.D.Pa.1980), noted the following:
... the mere fact that a plaintiff may have some residual pain and suffering while recuperating in the forum state from an accident which occurred entirely out of the state is not the type of harm ‘caused in the Commonwealth’ which is contemplated by the long arm statute____
____The sole contact appellant has with the forum in the instant action is appellee’s suffering of residual harm in the forum. This is not sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of minimal contacts. Thus, under both *200statutory and constitutional analysis, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over appellant at the outset of this action.
DeFay, supra, at p. 326.
DeFay is clearly distinguishable, and in fact supports a finding that the harm to Frances Holden was not residual to the forum, but actually suffered in the forum. In DeFay, the harm to the plaintiff was inflicted by the accident in New Jersey, at the situs of the accident; upon returning home to recuperate, she merely “carried her harm”, so to speak, back to the forum state. Such harm, clearly, was at best residual harm within the borders of Pennsylvania.
By contrast, the harm suffered by Frances Holden did not occur at the situs of. the tort. While Diane Holden’s alleged tortious behavior took place in Texas, the resultant harm included, as set forth in the complaint: (1) the termination of utility services to Frances Holden’s home; (2) the incurring of loan and legal expenses; (3) the loss of alimony; (4) the interruption of the children’s college educations; (5) the loss of insurance protection; and (6) emotional pain and suffering, including harm to reputation. These harms did not take place in Texas; they were incurred by Frances Holden and her children within Pennsylvania. They were not merely “carried home” to Pennsylvania, as were the plaintiff’s injuries in DeFay. Hence, contrary to the majority’s reading, I find DeFay supportive of an extension of in personam jurisdiction in this matter: the case defines residual harm, inter alia, to be that harm which is incurred by a complainant in one state, and brought into the forum solely due to the complainant’s residency in the forum. The harm pled by Frances Holden simply does not fall within the parameters of this definition.
The majority finds another analogous decision in McDaniel v. Joseph, 409 F.Supp. 1003 (W.D.Pa.1976), in which the district court granted a motion to dismiss due to a lack of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. In that case, a Pennsylvania plaintiff filed suit against an Ohio defendant, alleging that the defendant had engaged in meretricious *201relations with the plaintiffs husband. The plaintiff conceded that the relations had occurred in Ohio and West Virginia, and not in Pennsylvania.
However, in holding that the defendant had no “minimum contacts” with Pennsylvania, the court neglected to discuss the nature or situs of the harm alleged in its rationale. In point of fact, the decision is, at best, sketchy on its recounting of the operative facts. In the absence of a more detailed rationale in support of its decision, I fail to find the district court’s disposition in McDaniel to be even marginally persuasive, and find the majority’s reliance upon its holding to be misplaced.3
A more persuasive opinion is that of Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F.Supp. 285 (M.D.Pa.1978), which the majority has found inapplicable sub judice. In Rusack, a Washington, D.C. resident had sent defamatory letters to the plaintiff’s employer in Pennsylvania. In upholding the long-arm jurisdiction of Pennsylvania over the defendant, the court noted that the harm to plaintiff had occurred upon publication of the letters in Pennsylvania, and was thus distinguishable from those situations “where harm is caused outside the state and residual effects are felt inside the state.” Id., at p. 290.
I find Rusack to be directly on point. In both Rusack and the matter before us, the precipitating tortious conduct occurred outside the forum state: the defamatory letters in Rusack were written in, and mailed from, Washington, D.C., while the contractual interference of Diane Holden took place in Texas. In both cases, however, the conduct did not result in harm until its fruits came to rest in Pennsylvania. Rusack was not harmed by the defamatory-letters until they reached Pennsylvania, and Frances Holden did not have a cause of action until she failed to receive *202the appropriate payments, and suffered pecuniary and emotional hardships in Pennsylvania. Unlike the majority, I do not find appellant’s reliance upon the well-reasoned Rusack to be so misplaced.
Based on the foregoing, I feel that Frances Holden has alleged purposeful tortious activity on the part of Diane Holden, intended to disrupt a Pennsylvania contract, and resultingly cause direct harm to a Pennsylvania resident, and has thus satisfied the “minimum contacts” test of International Shoe so as to permit our courts to assert in personam jurisdiction over Diane Holden.
Having resolved the jurisdictional question in appellee’s favor, it is necessary to determine whether appellant has satisfied the criteria for the opening of default judgment. Those criteria are well settled, and require a petitioner to demonstrate: (1) that the petition to open was timely filed; (2) that there exists a reasonable explanation or excuse for default; and (3) that there exists a meritorious defense to the allegations of the complaint. Wolfskill v. Egan, 350 Pa.Super. 223, 504 A.2d 326, 327 (1986). Upon review of the record below, I am in accord with the trial court’s finding that the criteria have not been satisfied, most notably the second criterion pertaining to the excuse for default.
Both below and on appeal, Diane Holden’s excuse for default has been that she relied upon her husband’s attorney to handle the matter for her. However, it has previously been held that a defendant’s belief that his interests are being protected ceases to be justifiable when the defendant is somehow alerted to a possible problem, such as in the receipt of a Rule 237.1 ten-day notice letter. See Autologic, Inc. v. Christinzio Movers, 333 Pa.Super. 173, 481 A.2d 1362, 1363 (1984) (held: purpose of Rule 237.1 requirement of service of ten-day notice letter upon party as well as counsel, is to alert party to potential problem, and permit party to take appropriate action prior to entry of default).
In the matter sub judice, appellant has admitted to both receiving the ten-day notice letter, and to making no attempt to protect her interests prior to the entry of default. *203She cannot now be heard to cry that her deliberate inaction was “reasonable”.
As I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that the second criterion for opening default has not been met, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition to open. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305.
. Provided a showing of "minimum contacts” is made, this situation would appear one in which, under Skinner, Pennsylvania has compelling policy interests in resolving the controversy. Taking the complaint as true, Diane Holden has thoroughly disrupted the performance of a Pennsylvania agreement, intended to resolve matters of alimony, property, and educational support of the Holden children, in a Pennsylvania divorce, thereby bringing financial and emotional hardship upon a Pennsylvania resident. It cannot be seriously averred that Pennsylvania would have no significant interests in assuring that the behavior of non-residents does not nullify Pennsylvania contracts. To aver otherwise would be the equivalent of implying that legally enforceable Pennsylvania contracts may be disregarded at will, as meaningless verbiage, by non-residents.
. Moreover, had the McDaniel court chosen to delineate its rationale, it would not necessarily be dispositive. Decisions of lower federal courts, albeit instructive, are not binding on state courts, even though a federal question is involved. See Cianfrani v. John-Manville Corp., 331 Pa.Super. 1, 482 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1984); Commonwealth v. Rundle, 203 Pa.Super. 419, 201 A.2d 615, 623 (1964).