dissenting:
The appellant, a Philadelphia police officer, was found guilty of one count of obstructing the administration of *370the law,1 three counts of perjury,2 and one count of bribery.3 He raises nine allegations of error. Although I find no merit to eight of those claims, I believe that the lower court erred in including factual allegations printed on the verdict slip. Therefore, I would reverse.
The factual history may be summarized briefly: During the ongoing Pennsylvania Crime Commission investigation of corruption in Philadelphia, an undercover state policeman observed appellant accept a $20.00 pay-off from a gambler in a West Philadelphia taproom. The pay-off was made so that the officer would not interfere with the gambling operation.
Several months later, in September, 1973, appellant and the gambler became suspicious that another undercover agent, who was posing as a gambler, was, in fact, not a gambler. In order to test their suspicions, the appellant swore to a false affidavit in order to obtain a search warrant. The subsequent arrest forced the agent to give up his undercover work.
On December 20, 1974, appellant appeared before an investigating grand jury. When questioned about the warrant, he reaffirmed the truth of the facts which he' had alleged in the affidavit. He also testified that he had not spoken to the West Philadelphia gambler about obtaining the warrant.
Appellant was subsequently indicted on one count of obstructing the administration of the law, three counts of perjury, and four counts of bribery. On August 12, 1975, after a seven day trial, a jury found appellant guilty of the charge of obstruction, the three counts of perjury and one count of bribery. The lower court denied post-trial motions on January 26, 1976. Thereafter, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of three to twenty-three months on the perjury convictions.
*371Prior to commencement of jury deliberations, the lower court prepared the following verdict slip:
Defendant_Indictment_Count_Verdict_
#2381 .. OBSTRUCTING ADMINISTRATION OF LAW OR OTHER GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS SEPTEMBER 27, 1973 ARREST OF ANDY MARINO (SGT. ANDREW MORRESE) CHIPPY'S BAR
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
#2382 .. PERJURY:
FIRST COUNT
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT BEFORE SPECIAL INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY ON DECEMBER 20, 1974 REGARDING TRUTH OF STATEMENT IN OATH BEFORE JUDGE MELTON TO SECURE WARRANT:
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
SECOND COUNT
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT BEFORE SPECIAL INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY ON DECEMBER 20, 1974 REGARDING SPEAKING TO NARCISE PRIOR TO RAID ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1973:
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
#2383 .. PERJURY:
OATH OF DEFENDANT BEFORE-JUDGE MELTON ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1973 THAT HE DID CONDUCT A SURVEILLANCE OF CHIPPY’S BAR ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1973 BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 12:15 P.M. and 1:00 P.M.
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
#2384 .. BRIBERY IN OFFICIAL AND POLITICAL MATTERS :
FIRST COUNT
RECEIPT OF $20.00 FROM NARCISE ON OR ABOUT JULY 30, 1973.
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
SECOND COUNT
RECEIPT OF $20.00 FROM NARCISE ON OR ABOUT SEPT. 7, 1973.
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
*372Defendant_Indictment_Count_Verdict
THIRD COUNT
RECEIPT OF $20.00 FROM NARCISE ON OR ABOUT SEPT. 18, 1973.
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
FOURTH COUNT
RECEIPT OF $50.00 FROM NARCISE ON OR ABOUT OCT. 3, 1973.
GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
When the court showed the verdict slip to counsel, appellant’s attorney stated that “. . . I would object to the verdict report prepared in the instant matter, that in each of the indictments the counts have been set forth with a brief fact situation. For example, 8/23/73, it refers to the September 27 arrest of Sergeant Andrew Marrese. ‘Obstruction Administration of Law or Other Governmental Functions. September 27, 1973. Arrest of Andy Marino (Sgt. Andrew Marrese) in Chippy’s Bar.’ It goes on and sets forth some item of fact from the various counts. I would imagine this is prejudice, to the defendant because of the fact that it presents undue emphasis to the contention of the Commonwealth. It has never been the practice to send the jury sheet out with anything but the Bill of Indictment number plus the bold face type charge that he is charged with. For those reasons, I would object.”
Appellant raises the same issue herein. Initially, Rule 1114, Pa.R.Crim.P., is clear that “[u]pon retiring to deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have a transcript of any trial testimony, nor a copy of any written confession by the defendant, nor a copy of the information and indictment. Otherwise, upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper.” As appellant points out, this verdict slip cannot be considered an exhibit in the case that the jury *373could properly have taken from the courtroom for purposes of deliberation.
The Comment to Rule 1114 provides, in part, that “[t]his Rule substantially changes the former law in many Pennsylvania counties by prohibiting the jury from receiving a copy of the indictment (or information) during its deliberations, see Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 178 Pa.Super. 434, 115 A.2d 826 (1955). . . .” The appellant suggests that the limited recitation of the facts was “tantamount to allowing the bills of indictment and the transcript of testimony to go out with the jury.
The court’s brief description of each count does not clearly fit into either category, on the one hand, the class of items that cannot be considered by the jury, or on the other, an exhibit which can. It is clear that under Rule 1114, the court has no discretion to allow the transcript or the indictment to go with the jury during the deliberations. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 443 Pa. 364, 279 A.2d 179 (1971). Thus, it is necessary to analyze the purpose of Rule 1114 to decide the propriety of the court’s action.
In Commonwealth v. Canales, 454 Pa. 422, 311 A.2d 572 (1973), the lower court permitted notes prepared by a police officer contemporaneously with the appellant’s oral confession, to go to the jury. The Court stated that “ [sjince the officer’s notes in this case should not have been admitted into evidence, they could not qualify as an exhibit. . . . Only exhibits, under Rule 1114 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be given to the jury for use during its deliberations. The trial court’s error in admitting the notes as an exhibit was compounded when the notes were sent out with the jury.
“Moreover, Rule 1114, forbids the sending out of any portion of the trial transcript with the jury. Even before Rule 1114 was adopted, Commonwealth v. Ware, 137 Pa. 465, 479, 20 A. 806, 808 (1890), said that ‘[t]he *374sending out of a part of the testimony to the jury room is without precedent and [was] palpable error.’ The reason for the prohibition is that the presence in the jury room of the physical embodiment of a portion of the trial testimony in written form may have the effect of increasing the probability that the jury will accept that, testimony as credible.” 454 Pa. at 427-28, 311 A.2d at 575. (Emphasis added). The long-standing accepted procedure in Pennsylvania is to allow the lower court to have portions of testimony read to the jury if the jury makes a specific request. Commonwealth v. Ware, supra; Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Pa. 355 (1847); Commonwealth v. Fontaine, 183 Pa.Super. 45, 128 A.2d 131 (1956).
The problem is analogous to the question of permitting note-taking by jurors. Although Pennsylvania is in the minority of jurisdictions which condemns the practice, Annot. 14 A.L.R.3d 831, there are sound reasons underlying the rule: “. . . by taking notes a juror emphasizes to himself and perhaps later to other jurors one feature of the case over other equally important features and thus a resulting distorted view may be gained of the whole picture which is before the jury for deliberation.” Id. at 838. See Thornton v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 112 A.2d 344 (1955). The Supreme Court has held further that the same considerations apply if the court or counsel prepare a memorandum to accompany the jury. Lancaster Redevelopment Authority Appeal, 425 Pa. 36, 227 A.2d 827 (1967).
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Baker, 466 Pa. 382, 353 A.2d 406 (1976), the appellant contended that the lower court erred in sending out special interrogatories with the jury. Although the Supreme Court affirmed,4 it dis*375approved of such practices: “. . .we believe the inherent dangers outweigh the possible benefit to be derived therefrom. Accordingly, we hold that while there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the instant case, we suggest in the future that this practice should not be followed.” 466 Pa. at 397-398, 353 A.2d at 414.5 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Roberts pointed out the infirmity inherent in such a practice: “The court’s procedure in this case could only encourage the jury to ignore the court’s general instructions and to reach a verdict without a complete analysis of the issues involved. . . . Moreover, the jury might have also structured its entire deliberation solely around answering these questions, thus short-circuiting full consideration of all the evidence and the general instructions. These dangers jeopardized defendant’s right to a fair trial.” 466 Pa. at 402, 353 A.2d at 416.
None of the above cited cases is directly on point. Several points, however, are relevant: Rule 1114 does not permit the court to summarize the various charges. Counsel for appellant did not acquiesce in the court’s summaries on the verdict slips. The summaries paired the various counts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, introduced to prove the specific charges; thus the jury’s attention was potentially diverted from all of the facts presented at trial, and focused on the Commonwealth’s case. I conclude that prejudice inheres in such a practice.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
CERCONE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. The Crimes Code, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4902.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701.
. Justice Nix wrote the lead opinion; however, only Chief Justice Jones joined in that opinion. Justices Eagen and O’Brien concurred in the result; Justices Roberts and Pomeroy filed dissenting opinions; Justice Manderino noted his dissent.
. See Copeland v. United States, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 152 F.2d 769 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 841, 66 S.Ct. 1010, 90 L.Ed. 1815.