OPINION
WEISBERGER, Chief Justice.This case comes before us on appeals and cross-appeals from all parties to this litigation, save for the plaintiff intervenor, the Attorney General, from a declaratory judgment entered in the Superior Court along with a denial of a request by the Governor for injunctive relief. We reverse the declaratory judgment and affirm the denial of injunctive relief for reasons which will be set forth below. The facts of the case as found by the trial justice and the *188context in which the case began are as follows.
From 1744 until the adoption of a Constitution by the people of Rhode Island in 1843, the General Assembly authorized and supervised a number of lotteries for the purpose of funding a number of public improvements. The lottery was supervised by the General Assembly, certain of whose members were appointed to serve as managers for some of the lotteries, but by the 1820s the General Assembly began to delegate the supervision of lotteries to professional managers. Following the ratification of the Rhode Island Constitution in 1843, new lotteries were prohibited and the use of this method of funding public improvements ended. During the pre-con-stitutional era, the Legislature regulated every facet and every detail of every lottery that it created.
In 1973, the Constitution of Rhode Island was amended to lift the ban on state-run lotteries. The Constitution, as amended, set forth the following language in article 6, section 15:
“All lotteries shall be prohibited in the state except lotteries operated by the state and except those previously permitted by the general assembly prior to the adoption of this section, and all shall be subject to the prescription and regulation of the general assembly.” (Emphasis added.)
In 1974, soon after the 1973 amendment was ratified, the General Assembly enacted a statute that was codified as G.L.1956 § 42-61-1. This statute created a commission that was authorized to manage the lottery. The statute creating the Lottery Commission contained the following language.
“[The commission] shall consist of nine (9) members * * * three (3) of whom shall be members of the senate, not more than two (2) from the same political party to be appointed by the majority leader; three (3) of whom shall be members of the house of representatives, not more than two (2) from the same political party to be appointed by the speaker of the house; and three (3) of whom shall be representatives of the general public to be appointed by the governor.” Section 42-61-l(a).
The trial justice in his factual findings set forth in detail the powers that were delegated by the statute to the Lottery Commission:
“a. Lotteries:
1. The type of lotteries to be conducted;
2. The price of tickets with respect to lotteries;
3. The number and size of prizes on winning tickets;
4. The manner of selecting winning tickets;
5. The manner of payment of prizes to the holders of winning tickets;
6. The frequency of the drawings or selections of winning tickets;
7. The number and types of locations at which tickets may be sold;
8. The method to be used in selling tickets;
9. The licensing of agents to sell tickets;
10. The license fee to be charged to agents;
11. The manner in which the proceeds of the sale of tickets are maintained, reported and/or otherwise accounted for;
12. The manner and amount of compensation to be paid to sales agents necessary to provide for the adequate availability of tickets to prospective buyers and for the convenience of the general public;
13. The apportionment of the total annual revenue accrued from the sale of tickets and from all other sources for the payment of prizes to the holders of winning tickets;
14. For payment of costs incurred in the operation and administration of the *189Lottery, including the expense of the Commission and the cost resulting from any contract or contracts entered into for promotional advertising, consulting, or operational services;
15. Or for the purchase or lease of facilities, lottery equipment, and materials; and for the repayment of monies appropriated to the .lottery fund;
16. The manner, standards and specification for a process of competitive bidding for Commission purchase and contracts, and;
17. The sale of commercial advertising space on the reverse side or in other available areas upon lottery tickets provided that all net revenue derived from the sale of the advertising space shall be deposited immediately into the state’s general fund.
“b. VLTs: [video lottery terminals]
1. The licensing of technology providers capable of interfacing with a central communications systems controlled by the Commission (the award of a license to technology providers must satisfy the requirements of the State Purchasing Laws);
2. Accounting procedures for determining net terminal income from lottery terminals and unclaimed prizes and credits;
3. The type of video lottery game to be conducted;
4. The price to play each game and the prizes or credits to be awarded;
5. Financial reporting procedures for lieense[d] video lottery retailers and control procedures in the event that any of these retailers should become insolvent;
6. Insurance and binding by (i) licensed video lottery retailers and (ii) technology providers;
7. The licensing of licensed video lottery retailers;
8. Contracting with technology providers;
9. A provision requiring that all VLTs be linked under a central communications system to provide auditing program information as approved by the Lottery, and;
10. Any other matter necessary for VLTs or for the convenience of the public.1
“[The commission] * * * has exercised, and does exercise such power.
“The legislation creating the lottery provides for the position of director. The director of lotteries under the applicable statute is appointed by the Governor, subject, however, to confirmation by the Commission, and further, the director of lotteries is removable only by the Commission. By statute, the director of lotteries is vested with certain responsibilities and authority. A review of those statutes specifically § 42-61-4 and § 42-61.2-4 clearly confirm the testimony of Director Aubin to the effect that he works for the nine members of the Commission (see testimony of Director Aubin, page 58, line 3, et seq. August 19,1999).
“The lottery generated gross revenue in its most recent full fiscal year in the amount of $740,720,000 with net revenues of approximately $639,000,000. Of the gross revenue $548,100,000 represented VLT sales and $192,620,000 represented lottery sales. After deducting all expenses and the payouts to ‘successful’ lottery and VLT players, and taking into account earnings on investment of lottery funds (handled by the General Treasurer) in the amount of $510,000, the revenue to the state general funds was approximately $135,000,000.
“The lottery is a major business enterprise.”
*190It is undisputed that the statute that created the Lottery Commission and delegated to it the foregoing specific powers was enacted by both Houses of the General Assembly and signed by the Governor in office at that time. The Lottery Commission operated continuously from 1974 until the present under the management of directors appointed by the Governor and approved by the commissioners. A previous director was John P. Hawkins, who also served for a time as the first chairman of the commission. Mr. Hawkins was succeeded by Gerald S. Aubin. Both Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Aubin testified in the Superior Court concerning their duties and the nature of the commission’s operation. Another witness was Professor Patrick T. Conley, a noted historian who has written extensively on the constitutional and political history of the State of Rhode Island from its Colonial beginnings to modern times. The trial justice based his findings of fact upon this testimony, as well as extensive documentary evidence presented by the parties.
The present litigation arose as a result of a dispute between the Governor and the commission in respect to the authorization of an increase in the number of video lottery terminals (VLTs) to be allowed at Newport Grand Jai Alai and Lincoln Greyhound Park, which was owned by Burrill-ville Racing Association, Inc. On April 26, 1999, the Lottery Commission voted five to four to authorize this increase despite the opposition of the Governor, who appeared at a meeting of the commission to oppose the proposal to increase the number of VLTs. Those commissioners who voted in favor of the expansion were members of the Legislature who had been appointed either by the Speaker of the House of Representatives or by the Majority Leader of the Senate. Those voting against the additional VLTs were the three persons appointed by the Governor, who were joined by one member of the Legislature.
Shortly after the vote was recorded, but before the additional authorized machines were installed, the Governor brought this action for declaratory judgment and sought injunctive relief against the implementation of the commission’s vote. In the course of the litigation, the owners and operators of the Newport Grand Jai Alai and of Lincoln Greyhound Park were added as defendants in this action. The Senate and the House of Representatives intervened as parties defendant. The Governor was joined as a party plaintiff— intervenor by the Attorney General. The parties agreed that pending a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the commission would refrain from implementing its vote to increase the number of VLTs. A preliminary injunction was issued by a justice of the Superior Court. This preliminary injunction was vacated following the issuance of an opinion by this Court in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Commission — Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55 (R.I.1999).
Thereafter, the Superior Court conducted evidentiary hearings during the month of August 1999 and received memoranda of law from each of the parties plaintiff and defendant in this litigation. During the course of the litigation, the Lottery Commission implemented its April 26, 1999 vote, and the Superior Court denied the Governor’s further request for a preliminary injunction.
At the conclusion of the litigation, the trial justice found as a fact and held as a matter of law that plaintiffs’ argument based upon separation of powers must fail. He based this holding upon our opinion in Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. State, 667 A.2d 280, 281 (R.I.1995), wherein we held that exclusive authority over lotteries is and always has been vested in the General Assembly either by Royal Charter or by Constitution. We went on to hold, as recognized by the trial justice, that the Executive Department had no claim to any constitutional power with respect to lotteries and further that the Governor lacked any implied powers with respect to lotteries. The trial justice went *191on to state: “Accordingly, this Court is constrained to and does find that the plaintiffs’ traditional separation of powers argument must fail.”
The trial justice then proceeded to craft a somewhat ingenious doctrine that held in substance that an administrative agency composed of a majority of legislators could not manage and regulate the lottery without submitting each rule or regulation for approval to both Houses of the Legislature (bicameralism) and presenting each such rule or regulation to the Governor for his assent or veto (presentment). The trial justice observed with complete accuracy: “There is no question * * * that in connection with actions and votes at the Lottery Commission, none of the foregoing occurs.” This theory was derived by analogy from the United State Supreme Court’s opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). We shall analyze this case in detail later in this opinion. We believe that it has no persuasive effect upon our determination of the issues raised in this litigation.
He then determined that the Lottery Commission, in exercising legislative power without the constraints of bicameralism and presentment, unconstitutionally had delegated its power to this commission by virtue of the fact that it was composed of a majority of members appointed by the House Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader. Having found that this delegation of power to this commission as so composed was unconstitutional, he entered declaratory judgment to that effect, but denied the Governor’s request for injunctive relief and stayed his judgment until July 1, 2000, in the expectation that this Court would have reviewed his decision before that time. We later extended the stay until further order of this Court.
We must respectfully disagree with the decision of the trial justice insofar as he held that the delegation of power to this commission was unconstitutional. We do agree with the trial justice that, based on our holding in Narmgansett Indian Tribe, the regulation of the lottery by the General Assembly did not violate the principle of separation of powers under the Rhode Island Constitution. The trial justice was completely correct in finding as a fact and holding as a matter of law that the Constitution placed the regulation of state-run lotteries entirely in the hands of the General Assembly without giving any role to the Governor. Such participation as was accorded to the Governor was given by reason of legislative delegation of such power so that the Governor was authorized to appoint three members of the commission and also to nominate the director subject to the approval of the members of the commission. This role was conferred by the Legislature and not by the Constitution.
Delegation of Power to the Commission
This Court has held on numerous occasions that “limited portions of the legislative power, if confined in expressly defined channels, may be vested by the general assembly in other bodies which it authorized to act as its agents or auxiliaries in carrying out its constitutional duties.” Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council of Rhode Island, 434 A.2d 266, 270 (R.I.1981) (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 88 R.I. 202, 205, 145 A.2d 87, 89 (1958)). In Milardo, we synthesized orn-ease law on the subject of delegation of authority by the General Assembly to administrative agencies in the following terms:
“Although we have interpreted our State Constitution to forbid unconditional delegation of legislative power, see City of Warvick v. Warwick Regular Firemen’s Association, 106 R.I. 109, 113, 256 A.2d 206, 209 (1969), we have also recognized the need for administrative expertise in the discharge of certain legislative functions. Davis v. Wood, R.I., 427 A.2d 332, 335-36 (1981); J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116 R.I. 54, 61, 352 A.2d 661, *192665 (1976); see State v. Peloquin, R.I., 427 A.2d 1327, 1330 (1981). Indeed, we have long been mindful of the notion expressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court that
‘the problems which a modern legislature must confront are of such complexity that strict adherence to ideal notions of the non-delegation doctrine would unduly hamper the General Assembly in the exercise of its constitutionally vested powers.’ Adams v. North Carolina Department of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 696-97, 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978).
Cf. South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir.1974) (agency must have flexibility; Congress cannot acquire sufficient information to manage detailed process of enforcement).
“Thus, this court has acknowledged that ‘limited portions of the legislative power, if confined in expressly defined channels, may be vested by the general assembly in other bodies which it authorized to act as its agents or auxiliaries in carrying out its constitutional duties.’ Opinion to the Governor, 88 R.I. 202, 205, 145 A.2d 87, 89 (1958).
“In sum, the delegation of legislative functions is not a per se unconstitutional action. Instead, it is the conditions of the delegation — the specificity of the functions delegated, the standards accompanying the delegation, and the safeguards against administrative abuse— that we examine in determining the constitutionality of a delegation of power. See Davis v. Wood, R.I., 427 A.2d 332, 335-36 (1981); De Petrillo v. Coffey, 118 R.I. 519, 524, 376 A.2d 317, 319 (1977); J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116 R.I. 54, 61, 352 A.2d 661, 665 (1976); Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School District Committee, 116 R.I. 90, 98, 352 A.2d 634, 638-39 (1976); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen’s Association, 106 R.I. 109, 118, 256 A.2d 206, 211 (1969). See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551, 55 S.Ct. 837, 852, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 1591 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (delegation permissible when ‘canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing’); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421, 55 S.Ct. 241, 249, 79 L.Ed. 446, 459 (1935) (despite need for wide range of administrative flexibility, constitutional system requires limitation).
“In Davis v. Wood and J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, both supra, we upheld delegations that provided general directions to the administrative agencies. By enunciating sufficiently intelligible standards, the Legislature had adequately guided the actions of the administrative agencies.” Milardo, 434 A.2d at 270-71.
Applying the foregoing principles to the delegation by the General Assembly to the Lottery Commission of power to control and manage the state-run lottery in all its manifold aspects, we are constrained to conclude that this delegation provided specific and detailed guidelines within which the Lottery Commission should perform its functions. Certainly in the words of Justice Cardozo, the authority of the Lottery Commission has been “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.” It would be hard to conceive of a delegation of authority to an administrative agency that was more specific in its terms and conditions than those provided by the General Assembly in respect to the Lottery Commission.
Moreover, the nature and scope of the duties of the Lottery Commission are such as to demand that the Legislature be permitted to delegate authority to operate such a massive enterprise. To suggest that such an administrative agency could carry out its functions if it were required to submit each rule, regulation, and vote back to the General Assembly for approval by each House and assent by the Governor would be to foredoom the agency to impo*193tence and futility. No administrative agency could exist under such constraints.
We recognize that the trial justice placed this disability upon the commission only because its membership consisted of a majority of legislators appointed by the Speaker of the House and Majority Leader of the Senate. Consequently, having rejected the separation of powers argument presented by the Governor and the Attorney General, the trial justice in effect took the position that no workable commission consisting of a majority of legislators could be delegated an essentially legislative power for the purpose of managing an enterprise that the Constitution specifically entrusted to the General Assembly, as opposed to the Executive Department. If we were to confirm this holding, we would in effect render the ability of the Legislature to delegate its power to a commission nugatory unless the Legislature appointed members of the committee in accordance with the dictates of the Judiciary. We believe that such judicial intervention would frustrate the expressed will of the framers of the constitutional amendment of 1973 as ratified by the people of this state.
Without indulging in a reprise of our analysis of the separation of powers doctrine, which the trial justice has properly held to be inapplicable to this case, we shall observe only that the power to regulate lotteries specifically has been bestowed by the Constitution upon the General Assembly. It is not our function to supervise the General Assembly in its exercise of this power. It is not our function to direct the General Assembly in respect to the wisdom of its method of appointment of members of a commission to which it has delegated the specific management of this enterprise. Neither the Governor nor this Court has been given the power to supervise the General Assembly’s implementation of its authority to regulate lotteries in this state. Certainly it is not the function of this Court to pass upon the wisdom of the operation of the Lottery Commission nor to substitute its judgment in respect to the administration of this enterprise.
We stated in our recent advisory opinion, In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Commission— Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 72-73 (R.I.1999), that it would be necessary for us to determine whether legislators might be appointed to serve on boards and commissions on a case-by-case basis. It was for this reason that we declined to answer questions two and three propounded to us by the Governor.
Applying such an analysis to the case at bar, we must determine from the text of the Constitution that this is a legislative, not an executive, power to implement. The Governor and the Attorney General seem to concede this in their briefs. Consequently, we perceive no basis for holding that the Legislature may not provide by statute for the creation of a commission consisting of a majority of members appointed from both Houses of the General Assembly with or without including representation from gubernatorial appointees. We conclude that there is no inhibition against the delegation of a portion of the General Assembly’s power to such a commission, subject to appropriate guidelines set forth in the enabling legislation.
Our dissenting colleague has written a lengthy and interesting essay on political science. This essay views the structure of the Rhode Island government through the lens of a framer of the Constitution of the United States or as perceived by a member of the convention of 1787 that produced this splendid document. We might find the essay to be persuasive if we were members of a convention assembled to revise the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island. However, this Court is not the equivalent of a constitutional convention. We are not privileged to second-guess those delegates to a constitutional convention who drafted the provision relating to *194the supervision of lotteries in the State of Rhode Island and who reposed the power of supervision and regulation of lotteries in the General Assembly. We are not privileged to second-guess the delegates to the constitutional convention that produced the revised Constitution of 1986. We must accept their work product as it was ratified by the people of this state.
It is not helpful to follow selective quotations from the landmark case of G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324 (1856). However, if our colleague wishes to rely upon the great words of Chief Justice Samuel Ames, he should not depend wholly on what the Chief Justice had to say about the limitations of the Constitution of 1843 upon exercise of the judicial power by the Legislature. It would be much more pertinent if he would consider the observations of Chief Justice Ames concerning the executive power as he determined it to be affected by the then recently adopted Constitution of 1843. Although Chief Justice Ames quoted the Federalist Papers and Alexander Hamilton in relation to the judicial power, he made the following statement in relation to the executive power: “the executive power had been nominal, merely, under the charter; and the constitution extends it very little. No jealousy of it, or of its assumption by the enterprising and all absorbing legislative department of the government, did, or could, exist.” 4 R.I. at 349-51. (Emphasis added.)
The great bulk of the opinion was dedicated to Chief Justice Ames’s establishment of the proposition that the new (1843) Constitution had vested the judicial power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as might be from time to time established by the Legislature. Our dissenting colleague will find very little in Taylor v. Place to support his argument relating to the tripartite separation of powers.
We know that our dissenting colleague regards the Rhode Island Constitution, however erroneously, as a mirror image of the Federal Constitution. Obviously, for reasons that we expounded in detail quite recently in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Commission — Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55 (R.I.1999), we strongly disagree.
Nevertheless, following his mirror image theory, our colleague cites liberally from the majority opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). We acknowledge the holding in Chadha, but strongly believe that it has little persuasive effect upon the instant controversy. Rather than quoting excerpts from the majority opinion, it might be helpful to consider the issue raised by the facts in Chadha.
Chadha was an East Indian who was a native of Kenya and held a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa. The visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported for having remained in the United States longer than his visa permitted. When he appeared before an immigration judge, he admitted that he had overstayed his visa, and he was given an opportunity to file an application for suspension of deportation pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), formerly codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1).
This Act provided in pertinent part that the Attorney General might in his discretion suspend deportation of an alien who had been lawfully admitted and who had been in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years and was able to show that he was of good moral character and whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien.
After hearing, an immigration judge on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha’s deportation be suspended. The immigration *195judge found that he had met the requirements of § 244(a)(1). He, therefore, suspended the deportation proceedings and, in accordance with § 244(c)(1) of the Act, formerly codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1), he forwarded a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law to both Houses of Congress. Under § 244(c)(2) of the Act, formerly codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), either House had the right to veto the Attorney General’s determination that the alien not be deported. If within the time limited by the statute neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives should pass a veto resolution, the Attorney General would then cancel deportation proceedings. After approximately one and one-half years (but within the time limited by the statute) the House of Representatives, pursuant to a resolution recommended for passage by the House Judiciary Committee and after review of 340 cases considered by the committee, determined that Chadha and five others did not meet the statutory requirements. The House then passed without debate or recorded vote, a resolution vetoing the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation.
After seeking an administrative review without success, Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the House of Representatives was without constitutional authority to order Chadha’s deportation and, therefore, directed the Attorney General to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport this alien based upon the House resolution. INS sought review in the Supreme Court by appeal and petition for certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Interestingly enough, INS agreed with the decision of the Ninth Circuit even though it sought review by the Supreme Court.
On this set of facts, a majority of the Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Burger, held that a single House of the Congress could not enact a resolution vetoing an act by the Attorney General based upon power delegated to him by the Congress. The majority held that this was a legislative act that would be valid only if passed by both Houses of the Congress (bicameralism)" and presented to the president for his approval (or if vetoed by the necessary supermajority to override the veto).
It should be carefully noted that this action by the House of Representatives was in the form of a resolution enacted by the full House. It was not an action taken by an administrative agency to which power had been delegated. It should also be noted that by this opinion the Supreme Court invalidated nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress had reserved a legislative veto.
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment. He took the position that Congress had not violated the principle of bicameralism and presentment, but by acting upon the case of an individual, effectively had usurped the judicial power. Therefore, he did not adopt the reasoning of the majority. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959-67, 103 S.Ct. at 2788-92, 77 L.Ed.2d at 350-55 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice White in dissent defended the legislative veto but more significantly pointed out the enormous importance of the numerous administrative agencies that carry out and implement the myriad of powers delegated to them by statute. See id. at 967-1003, 103 S.Ct. at 2792-2811, 77 L.Ed.2d at 355-77 (White, J., dissenting). He observed that the Court’s holding in Chadha ignored the accepted doctrine that legislative authority is routinely delegated to the executive branch, to independent regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups. He quoted Justice Jackson for the proposition that “[t]he rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last [19th] century.” Id. at 983, 103 S.Ct. at 2801, 77 L.Ed.2d at 365-66 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487, *19672 S.Ct. 800, 810, 96 L.Ed. 1081, 1094 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). He pointed out the obvious fact that legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and executive departments without the passage of new legislation. Such rule-making power, when properly exercised, creates a body of law that has all the same force and effect as duly adopted legislation without the necessity of an enactment by Congress and approval by the President.
In the case at bar, the General Assembly enacted a statute by concurrence of both'Houses and approval of the Governor that created the Lottery Commission. Our dissenting colleague undoubtedly will raise the cry that this agency is not independent because it has a majority of members who are legislators. For that same reason although it contains some individuals appointed by the Governor, it is not an executive agency. The short answer to this argument is that nothing in the Rhode Island Constitution prohibits the appointment of legislators or their designees to an administrative agency to which the Legislature has delegated a portion of its power to administer and regulate lotteries in this state. We must also be reminded that the Rhode Island Legislature (unlike the Federal Congress) need not look to the state Constitution as a source of authority by virtue of its historical plenary power (preserved in both the 1843 and 1986 Constitutions). It may exercise any power unless prohibited in this Constitution. See Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 567 A.2d 358, 361 (R.I.1989). The Rhode Island Constitution does not prohibit the appointment of legislators to administrative boards and commissions. These boards and commissions, once appointed pursuant to valid legislative enactments in which the principles of bicameralism and presentment have been fulfilled, then may exercise all the powers that administrative agencies have tradir tionally exercised in both the federal and state systems of government.
It must be emphasized that the trial justice and the parties concede that the Constitution of this state specifically has placed the regulation and supervision of lotteries in the General Assembly and not in the executive. All parties agree that there is no separation of powers issue in this case and the claim of violation of the principle of separation of powers must fail. Consequently, there is no inhibition against the delegation of the General Assembly’s constitutional power to an administrative agency. This issue was not even considered by the majority of the Court in Chadha. Justice White was the only member of the Court who considered the effect of the decision upon administrative agencies. He pointed out unequivocally that the Congress had the power by appropriate legislation to delegate portions of its authority to administrative agencies. The Lottery Commission is an administrative agency created by legislation passed by both Houses of the General Assembly and signed by Governor Philip Noel. Our dissenting colleague expresses some criticism of Governor Noel for having signed such legislation. We do not believe that Governor Noel could be characterized by anyone, including our colleague, as a “shrinking violet.” To suggest that an administrative agency could not exercise its functions without in each case having from the General Assembly specific approval through bicameralism and presentment would be to doom all administrative agencies to impotence. We are not persuaded by Chadha or by text writers that our Constitution mandates such a draconian result.
Just as we stated in the advisory opinion to the Governor on separation of powers, we are not interpreting the Constitution of the United States. We are interpreting a specific provision of the Rhode Island Constitution that squarely placed the power to regulate the state lottery in the hands of the General Assem*197bly. The appointment of certain members of the General Assembly to a commission or administrative agency created by the General Assembly in full compliance with the principle of bicameralism and presentment to manage and oversee the complex operation of the state lottery violates no mandate of our Constitution.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the defendants’ appeal is sustained and the Superior Court declaratory judgment is hereby reversed. The portion of the judgment that denied injunctive relief to the plaintiffs is affirmed. The papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
Justice GOLDBERG did not participate.. The findings of the trial justice relating to specific delegation of power to the Lottery Commission constituted an accurate summary of the powers and duties of the commission as set forth in § 42-61-2 in respect to lotteries and in § 42-61.2-3 in respect to video lottery terminals.