dissenting.
Because I conclude that the Fire and Rescue Company Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 5-604 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, affords Petition*134ers no immunity, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Section 5-604 grants qualified immunity from civil liability for negligence to fire and rescue companies and their personnel. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Immunity from Civil Liability. — Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except for any willful or grossly negligent act, a fire company or rescue company, and the personnel of a fire company or rescue company, are immune from civil liability for any act or omission in the course of performing their duties.
The Court of Special Appeals held that § 5-604 does not apply to municipal fire and rescue departments. Chase v. Baltimore, 126 Md.App. at 442, 730 A.2d at 247. The Court of Special Appeals was correct. Respondents argue that when § 5-604 is considered in its context within the Maryland Code and its legislative history, it becomes apparent that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in holding that § 5-604 applies to volunteer fire and rescue companies and to private fire companies and their personnel, but not to municipal fire and rescue companies. I agree.
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). In determining the intent of the legislature, we look first to the statutory language, and if that is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, our function is to enforce it according to its terms. See Board of License Comm’rs v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999); Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997). This has become known a"s the “plain-meaning rule.” Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987). The rule is not absolute, however. In this regard, we observed that
While the language of the statute is the primary source for determining legislative intention, the plain meaning rule of *135construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body. The Court will look at the larger context, including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears. Construction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided.
Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992) (citations omitted). A term “may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful application in another context.” Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986). This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.’ ” Stanford v. Maryland, Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). The Court has held that
[w]here the statute to be construed is part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intention is not determined from that statute alone, rather it is to be discerned by considering it in light of the statutory scheme. When, in that scheme, two statutes, enacted at different times and not referring to each other, address the same subject, they must be read together, i.e., interpreted with reference to one another, and harmonized, to the extent possible, both with each other and with the statutory scheme.
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Insurance Com’r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717-18 (1993) (citations omitted).
Although there are times when the statutory language is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of the legislature and further research is not necessary, there are other times when more extensive inquiry is required. See Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 633. The Court has recognized *136that “the purpose, in short, determined in light of the statute’s context, is the key.” Id.1
In this case, contrary to the majority’s view, it is not possible to rely on plain meaning alone in interpreting the statute. First, the term “company” presents an interpretive difficulty. Within this statute, this term is not defined by the Legislature, and the word’s meanings in common usage are multiple. The definitions range from “[a] corporation — or, less commonly, an association, partnership or union — that carries on a commercial or industrial enterprise,” Black’s Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed.1999), to “an assemblage or association of persons or things,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 461 (1963), and, indeed, to “a fire-fighting unit,” id. Nor is usage of the term “company” in connection with fire and rescue activities in the Maryland Code entirely uniform; often it refers specifically to volunteer fire and rescue units, see, e.g., Maryland Code (1975, 1999 Repl.Vol.) § 1-203.1 of the Corporations and Associations Article (creating exemption from recording fees for volunteer fire companies), but sometimes it refers to both volunteer and non-volunteer units, see, e.g., Maryland Code (1978, 1999 Repl.Vol.) § 13-509 of the Education Article (providing for comment by “volunteer and career fire companies” on regulations proposed by the Emergency Medical Services Board).
The meaning of § 5-604 is made even more unclear when § 5-604 is read in conjunction with the Good Samaritan Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 5-603 of *137the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The words “[notwithstanding any other provision of law” in § 5-604(a) do not imply that § 5-604 is not to be read in the context of other statutes, as the majority appears to suggest. These words only mean that if a preexisting provision of law conflicts with § 5-604, then § 5-604 prevails. The words do not abrogate the practice of reading statutes in context.
Reading § 5-604 in conjunction with § 5-603 simply shows that the meaning of § 5-604 is not so plain that it can be interpreted without the assistance of the legislative history. In one respect, the enactment of § 5-604 would have duplicated immunity created by § 5-603, if the Legislature had intended that emergency medical services provided by municipal fire departments be covered by § 5-604. As the Court of Special Appeals stated,
City paramedics and firefighters providing emergency medical care or assistance were already afforded immunity under the Good Samaritan Act [i.e., § 5-603], where applicable. Although the Good Samaritan Act limited the immunity to acts provided “without fee or compensation,” the City of Baltimore did not have authority to charge such fees until 1 July 1989. See Baltimore City Code, Art. 9, § 12A (1995 Supp.).
Chase, 126 Md.App. at 443, 730 A.2d at 248. To this extent, emergency rescue services provided by municipal fire departments were already covered by an immunity statute. In another respect, § 5-604 would have conflicted with § 5-603 if the legislature had intended § 5-604 to cover municipal fire departments. Because § 5-604 grants immunity regardless of whether a fee was charged for services, “its application to municipal fire departments would circumvent the fee restriction imposed by the Good Samaritan Act,” as the Court of Special Appeals observed. Id. at 444, 730 A.2d at 248.
The meaning of § 5-604 thus remains unclear, and it is appropriate to turn to the legislative history in an attempt to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Section 5-604 was *138Senate Bill 731 of the 1983 session of the General Assembly. The legislative history of the statute was recounted well by Judge Rodowsky, writing for this Court in Washington Suburban Sanitary Com’n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 569, 520 A.2d 1319, 1326 (1987). It reveals that § 5-604 was enacted in response to the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gaithersburg-Washington Grove Fire Department, Inc., 53 Md.App. 589, 455 A.2d 987 (1983), that volunteer fire companies are not necessarily governmental entities and therefore may not be covered by governmental immunity, and may be liable to suit. See Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Report on Senate Bill 731, at 2 (1983). As to the history, we said:
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art. § 5-309.1 [recodified at § 5-604] was Senate Bill 731 of the 1983 Session of the General Assembly. The file of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on S.B. 731 reflects that the legislation was a response to Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gaithersburg-Washington Grove Fire Department, Inc., 53 Md.App. 589, 455 A.2d 987, cert. denied, 296 Md. 224 (1983). Utica Mutual was a negligence action brought by a fire insurance company, as subrogee of its insured, against a fire company for alleged negligence in failing properly to extinguish a fire which later reignited leading to a second fire. The circuit court had held that the fire company enjoyed governmental immunity but the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that whether a fire company enjoyed governmental immunity was a question of fact on which the fire company in Utica Mutual had failed to produce sufficient evidence. The intermediate appellate court decided Utica Mutual on February 2, 1983, and on February 3, 1983, a member of the Maryland Senate requested the Department of Legislative Reference to prepare a bill granting immunity to volunteer firefighters. As introduced the bill provided that “[a] volunteer fire company is immune from liability in the same manner as a local government agency for any act or omission in the course of performing its duties if [ ] the act or *139omission is not one of gross negligence.... ” The bill was amended in the course of passage to its present form.
308 Md. at 569, 520 A.2d at 1326.
It is -apparent from this history that in passing § 5-604 the Legislature was responding to Utica Mutual, and intended to displace that decision by extending to non-governmental fire companies and their personnel the immunity that the common law at that time conferred on their governmental counterparts. This logic is perhaps less obvious today than it would have been at the time of the passage of § 5-604, because local governmental immunity was subsequently waived to a significant extent, see, e.g., Downey v. Collins, 866 F.Supp. 887, 889 n. 3 (D.Md.1994); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 107-08, 660 A.2d 447, 465-66 (1995), by the passage of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) in 1987. 1987 Maryland Laws ch. 594 (codified as amended at Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp) §§ 5-301 to 5-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article). The individuals and entities to which § 5-604 extends immunity today have greater immunity than their governmental counterparts, on account of the waiver effect of the LGTCA. But when we look back to the situation that existed at the time of § 5-604’s passage, it is apparent that the point of that enactment was to give nongovernmental firefighters and fire companies the same immunity that then existed for their governmental counterparts. I therefore conclude that the Legislature’s attention was confined to this objective, and that § 5-604 covers non-governmental individuals and organizations only, and does not create immunity for governmental personnel and organizations that would have been duplicative at the time of enactment.
This point is reinforced by the fact that when the Legislature did intend, in § 5-603, to create duplicative immunity for government-employed paramedics, it did so by naming them explicitly. Section 5-603 confers immunity, as noted above, on “[a] member of any State, county [or] municipal ... fire department, ambulance and rescue squad or law enforcement agency.” Section 5-604 contains no comparable language.
*140The majority says that in Washington Suburban Sanitary we “reject[ed] the Fire Company’s argument that [the Fire and Rescue Company Act’s] purpose was to reinstate the governmental immunity volunteer companies enjoyed before the Utica decision.” This is not the proposition we réjected. In Washington Suburban Sanitary we said that “Fire Co. is mistaken in its premise that volunteer fire companies generally enjoyed immunity from liability for negligence as instrumentalities exercising a governmental function.” Washington Suburban Sanitary Com’n, 308 Md. at 570, 520 A.2d at 1326. We went on to point out that Prince George’s County had waived governmental immunity, so that the Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Company would not have been immune even if it had been an instrumentality of the county. Thus, our point was that volunteer companies never necessarily had governmental immunity before Utica Mutual, and those in Prince George’s County in particular could not have, because of the waiver. See id. We did not say that it was not the purpose of the Fire and Rescue Company Act to confer immunity on volunteer companies.
The fact, noted in Utica Mutual, see 308 Md. at 569, 520 A.2d at 1326, that the bill that became § 5-604 at first referred to “a volunteer fire company or rescue company” but was later amended to refer simply to “a fire company or rescue company” does not alter the analysis. I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “[a]lthough the term “volunteer” was not included in the final form adopted by the General Assembly, this alone does not presume that the legislature intended to extend the immunity to state, county, or municipal fire departments.” Chase, 126 Md.App. at 433, 730 A.2d at 247-48. The Attorney General’s opinion analyzing a proposed City of Annapolis ambulance fee ordinance examined this issue:
The City Attorney has expressed doubt ... that CJ § 5-309.1 [now codified as § 5-604] applies to municipal fire departments, and we share that doubt. As we discussed in our prior opinion, “[t]he history of [§ 5-604] indicates that it constituted the legislative response to a decision by the *141Court of Special Appeals holding that volunteer fire companies are not considered governmental entities entitled to immunity, and that volunteer firemen are not public officials for the purpose of governmental immunity.” Opinion No. 87-055, at 6 n. 6. When the bill was introduced, it expressly limited the grant of immunity to “volunteer” fire companies. See Senate Bill 731 of the 1983 Session. According to the hearing summary of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, “the purpose of this bill is to protect volunteer fire departments from liability arising from suits which do not involve acts of gross negligence.” The committee then adopted an amendment that deleted the original provisions and extended the immunity to fire and rescue companies, without the modifier “volunteer.” Nevertheless, even after the amendment, the committee identified the “background” problem as the fact that “few people would volunteer to serve the fire departments, if they realized that they could be subject to liability for their acts.”
80 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 95-020 (June 9, 1995).
In sum, the Court of Special Appeals held § 5-604 does not apply to municipal fire and rescue departments. I agree, and would hold that § 5-604 therefore affords Petitioners no immunity.
Judge ELDRIDGE and Judge WILNER have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.
. We noted in Kaczorowski v. Mayor and. City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987) that
in State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d 51 (1987) .... [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning — what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative scheme.” We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297. That context included, among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill.
Id. at 515, 525 A.2d at 633 (citations omitted).