DISSENTING OPINION BY
TODD, J.:¶ 1 Because I conclude that there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding Appellants’ abuse of process claim, I would reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and thus I dissent.
¶ 2 As the Majority has correctly stated, an abuse of process claim requires proof that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff. Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 785 (Pa.Super.2002). With respect to the first prong, I concur in the Majority’s conclusion that Appellants were the legal object of the guardianship petition, and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
¶ 3 With respect to the second prong, contrary to the Majority, I believe there remains a factual issue. The trial court concluded that “[t]he legal process employed in seeking the appointment of a guardian was appropriate to ensure that Adam’s interests would be properly represented in settlement,” and that “[t]he evidence which [Ajppellants have produced in this action suggests nothing more sinister or malicious than a dispute over the settlement amount.” (Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/05, at 6.) I do not believe, however, that the evidence warrants so definitive a conclusion. While the trial court’s interpretation of the evidence may be one reasonable interpretation, I find that a jury could, reasonably, come to a different conclusion — namely, that Appellees were seeking a guardian ad litem not for the primary benefit of Adam, a guardianship’s undeniable aim, but for the primary benefit of orchestrating a settlement. Such use of the guardianship process would not be, in my view, a “legitimate object” of the process. See Werner, 799 A.2d at 785. Rather, I conclude that a jury could reasonably conclude that Appellees’ actions were a “perversion of legal process to benefit someone in achieving a purpose which is not an authorized goal of the procedure in question” — that is, settlement of the malpractice case. Id. Accordingly, I conclude there remains a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this second prong.
¶ 4 With regard to the third prong— whether Appellants were harmed — I likewise conclude that there is an outstanding factual issue.7 While much of Appellants’ abuse of process claim related to their later withdrawn damages claim that filing the petition coerced them into prematurely settling the malpractice litigation, they also asserted emotional harm as a distinct element of their damages (see Complaint, 5/22/03, at 5), and I find they have supplied sufficient evidence to raise a jury question in that regard.8
*863¶ 5 Appellants cite to their deposition testimony as evidence that they were emotionally harmed. At his deposition, Oscar Cruz testified as follows:
Q: Mr. Cruz, can you tell us what effect, if any, the petition to appoint a guardian had on the decision you and Jacqueline made to settle the case?
A: Well, when that petition, it’s like Princeton would try, you know, do anything to give us pretty much nothing. So, from my understanding they put that petition together to have someone else decide how much should we get or not. So, it got me really upset.
Q: Mr. Silverman asked you if you had any counseling from being upset about the [filing] of the petition?
A: Yes.
Q: Were you upset about the petition being filed?
A: Yes. But I didn’t get any counseling for it. I was upset about it.
Q: Were you and Jacqueline both upset about it, to your knowledge?
A: Yes.
Q: What about it upset you?
A: That Princeton would try to go that far to, you know, so they could settle the case, I guess, for less or more, it doesn’t matter. But to have someone else decide instead of us.
(Deposition of Oscar Cruz (Exhibit J to Response of Plaintiffs to Motion of Defendants Alan S. Gold, Esquire and Gold, Butkovitz & Robins, P.C. for Summary Judgment), 4/26/04, at 133-35 (R.R. 770-772a).) Further, Jacqueline Nieves Cruz testified as follows:
Q: Did you — when you did learn the petition had been filed, did you discuss this with Oscar?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: And what was the substance of that discussion with Oscar? What did you discuss?
A: I was upset.
And what did you tell him? O'
From my understanding, that I was — we were unfit parents. <J
Okay. And when you say unfit parents, what do you mean by that? O’
I felt like — how can I say this? We wasn’t worthy enough to make decisions for Adam, for his well-being. That’s the way I felt. <1
They were trying to put someone else as Adam’s guardian, because like I said, we were not worthy to make any decisions for Adam.
(Deposition of Jacqueline Nieves Cruz (Exhibit K to Response of Plaintiffs to Motion of Defendants Alan S. Gold, Esquire and Gold, Butkovitz & Robins, P.C. for Summary Judgment), 5/15/04, at 91-93 (R.R. 775a-777a).)
¶ 6 Viewed in a light most favorable to Appellants, I find that this evidence demonstrates that the filing of the petition resulted in some emotional harm to Appellants. A jury could find that Appellants, faced with a petition alleging that a guardian ad litem was necessary to represent Adam’s best interests in the settlement, and thus removing this decision-making *864from them, were, unsurprisingly, distressed.
¶ 7 While Appellees counter that this evidence shows that Appellants’ harm, if any, was minimal, they have failed to cite any caselaw suggesting that “upset” is an insufficient degree of compensable emotional harm, and I would not so conclude as a matter of law. Appellees also cite other evidence suggesting that Appellants were not distressed by the petition, that Appellants laughed about it. (See Princeton’s Brief at 22.) Such evidentiary conflicts, however, simply reinforce, in my mind, Appellants’ contention that the degree of their harm is a jury question.
¶ 8 For these reasons, I find that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and so I dissent.9
. Although neither the Majority nor the trial court addressed the harm prong, if, as a matter of law, Appellants cannot sustain this prong of their abuse of process claim, Appel-lees would nevertheless be entitled to summary judgment, and we could affirm the trial court on that basis. See Shearer v. Naftzinger, 560 Pa. 634, 638, 747 A.2d 859, 861 (2000) (a lower court may be affirmed on any basis). Thus, I am obliged to address it.
. Appellees do not dispute that emotional harm is compensable in an abuse of process action, and indeed this Court has so held. See Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding, inter alia, that expert testimony was not required to prove *863damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim). Rather, Appellees dispute that Appellants have shown a compensable degree of emotional injury.
. As an alternative basis for granting summary judgment in their favor, Appellees Gold and GBR assert that they cannot be held separately liable for abuse of process as they were only acting as counsel for Princeton, filed the petition at Princeton’s request, and cannot be held vicariously liable for their client’s abuse of process. (Brief for Gold and GBR, at 20-21.) I find they have waived this issue, however, as Gold and GBR failed to raise it below in their motion for summary judgment. See Wagner v. Erie Ins. Co., 801 A.2d 1226, 1233-34 (Pa.Super.2002) (finding waiver where appellee did not raise issue in cross-motion for summary judgment, and thus trial court did not have opportunity to address it), aff'd per curiam, 577 Pa. 563, 847 A.2d 1274 (2004).