DISSENTING OPINION BY
ORIE MELVIN, J.:¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. I disagree that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the third element of the abuse of process claim was met here. Rather, I believe that Appellants have failed to show they sustained a compensable degree of emotional harm as a result of the filing of the guardianship action.1
¶ 2 “To establish a claim for abuse of process it must be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.” Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 785 (Pa.Super.2002). Abuse of process cases frequently turn on the second element of this three-part conjunctive test, and, hence, the courts of this Commonwealth have had little opportunity to discuss the third element of harm caused to the plaintiff.
¶ 3 In Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228 (Pa.Super.1998), although it reversed the verdict on the plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim on the grounds that such was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code, this Court arguably suggested that emotional harm is compensable in an abuse of process action by affirming the award of *23damages for emotional distress without differentiating between the three different theories presented (i.e., intentional inflection of emotion distress, abuse of process and intentional interference with contractual relations). See id. at 1239 (noting that expert medical testimony is not required to establish a claim for abuse of process). This Court did not describe the “emotional distress” alleged by the plaintiffs in Shiner. It does appear, however, that courts in other states generally recognize emotional harm as a compensable injury in abuse of process actions. See generally 20 Causes of Action 223, Susan A. Lentz, Cause of Action for Abuse of Process §§ 9, 14 (2006); see also Seltzer v. Morton, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d 561, 592 (2007) (upholding damages award in abuse of process and malicious prosecution action where plaintiff testified he lived in a “state of panic” accompanied by physical complications of anxiety, including irregular bowel function, perpetual upset stomach and sleeplessness as a result of defendant’s conduct); Sanders v. Pete & Sons Garage, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 844 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (affirming grant of new trial to defendants on counterclaim of abuse of process where defendant testified that plaintiffs suit required her to appear in court and made her nervous, causing upset stomach and sleeplessness).
¶ 4 In the present case, Appellants asserted in them complaint that they suffered “extreme emotional distress, fear, upset and anxiety that their parental rights would be terminated.” I conclude, however, that in this case Appellants have failed to show a compensable degree of emotional harm and, therefore, cannot establish the third element of their prima facie case. Critically, at his deposition, Appellant Oscar Cruz testified as follows:
Q: Mr. Cruz, can you tell us what effect, if any, the petition to appoint a guardian had on the decision you and Jacqueline made to settle the case?
A: Well, when that petition, it’s like Princeton would try, you know, do anything to give us pretty much nothing. So, from my understanding they put that petition together to have someone else decide how much should we get or not. So, it got me really upset.
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Q: Mr. Silverman asked you if you had any counseling from being upset about the [filing] of the petition?
A: Yes.
Q: Were you upset about the petition being filed?
A: Yes. But I didn’t get any counseling for it. I was upset about it.
Q: Were you and Jacqueline both upset about it, to your knowledge? -
A: Yes.
Q: What about it upset you?
A: That Princeton would- try to go that far to, you know, so they could settle the case, I guess, for less or more, it doesn’t matter. But to have someone else decide instead of us.
(Deposition of Oscar Cruz (Exhibit J to Response of Plaintiffs to Motion of Defendants Alan S. Gold, Esquire and Gold, Butkovitz & Robins, P.C. for Summary Judgment), 4/26/04, at 133-135). Appellant Jacqueline Nieves Cruz testified as follows:
Q: Did you — when you did learn the petition had been filed, did you discuss this with Oscar?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: And what was the substance of that discussion with Oscar? What did you discuss?
*24A: I was upset.
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Q: And what did you tell him?
A: From my understanding, that I was — we were unfit parents.
Q: Okay. And when you say unfit parents, what do you mean by that?
A: I felt like — how can I say this? We wasn’t worthy enough to make decisions for Adam, for his well-being. That’s the way I felt.
# # * #
They were trying to put someone else as Adam’s guardian, because like I said, we were not worthy to make any decisions for Adam.
(Deposition of Jacqueline Nieves Cruz (Exhibit K to Response of Plaintiffs to Motion of Defendants Alan S. Gold, Esquire and Gold, Butkovitz & Robins, P.C. for Summary Judgment), 5/15/04, at OI-OS).2
¶ 5 The record reflects that the guardianship petition was filed on February 27, 2002. The trial court denied the petition on March 7, 2002 and shortly thereafter, Appellants agreed to a settlement in the underlying case. As to Jacqueline Nieves Cruz’s claim that she believed her parental rights would be terminated, I would point out that the petition was limited in scope and never asserted any possibility that her parental rights would be terminated. At most, Appellants have established that they were “upset” by the filing of the petition to appoint a guardian for their child. While I do not mean to suggest that they had no basis to be upset by that event, I conclude that mere upset as described above is insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the harm requirement of the claim for abuse of process. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. I recognize that this issue was not reached by the trial court below, but this Court may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Brickman Group, Ltd. v. CGU Ins. Co., 865 A.2d 918, 928 (Pa.Super.2004).
. While there is additional deposition testimony in the record from Jacqueline Nieves Cruz regarding anxiety and depression, she clarified that she was not attributing this to the actions of the defendants. See Deposition of Jacqueline Nieves Cruz (Exhibit G to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Princeton Insurance Company), 5/15/04, at 168-172; see also id. at 202-204.