dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority reverses the order of the Superior Court and remands this case for a new trial on the grounds that the prosecutor improperly questioned appellant, Brent Eu-banks, concerning his religious beliefs. This issue was never raised by appellant, either in the courts below or before this Court. The issue has therefore been waived and *212may not serve as the basis for reversing the judgment of sentence. Pa.R.A.P. 302; Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974).
Additionally, I disagree with the majority’s advisory holding that evidence of the victim’s prior murder conviction should have been admitted into evidence. The majority states that “such evidence is admissible because it makes the defendant’s version more probable than it would be without evidence of the conviction.” While evidence of the victim’s conviction may make appellant's claim that the victim had told him that she had killed someone more probable, whether the victim told appellant that she had killed someone is irrelevant to the matter at issue: whether appellant committed rape, aggravated assault, simple assault and unlawful restraint.
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Greene, 469 Pa. 399, 366 A.2d 234 (1976), in support of its position on this issue. In Greene, the appellant was convicted of murder and robbery for killing one of the owners of a pharmacy and taking an attache case containing the store’s daily receipts. At his trial, the appellant testified that he had gone to the pharmacy, not to commit a robbery, but to pick up some drugs which he had purchased illegally from the pharmacy earlier that day. The appellant then sought, but was not permitted, to introduce evidence which would have corroborated this story, namely, the testimony of a witness who would have testified that he had extensive knowledge concerning the pharmacy’s practice of selling prescription drugs without prescriptions. This Court held that
[although it was the jury’s prerogative to assess the credibility of the witness and the weight to be attributed to his testimony, the proffered testimony definitely was relevant to the proposition upon which the defense was building its case. The exclusion of this testimony, therefore, was improper____ An accused has a fundamental right to present defensive evidence so long as such evidence is relevant and not excluded by an established evidentiary rule. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. *213284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038 [1049], 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972).
469 Pa. at 404, 366 A.2d at 237.
Greene is distinguishable from the instant case, and despite its broad language, it does not require the admission of the challenged evidence in the instant case. In Greene, the challenged evidence was germane to the issue of the appellant’s intent with regard to the crimes of murder and robbery, and it thus bore upon a matter at issue in the case. It was, therefore, relevant and admissible.1
Even if the victim’s conviction in the instant case had some relevance to an issue in the case, that relevance is so slight as to be far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Relevant evidence is nonetheless excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion,” Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3rd Cir.1980). “Prejudice,” of course, does not mean “detrimental to a party’s case” but rather “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.”
Whistler Sportswear, Inc. v. Rullo, 289 Pa.Super. 230, 433 A.2d 40, 47 (1981).
In the instant case, introduction of the victim’s conviction for murder would definitely have had an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.” In all likelihood, the jury would have viewed the fact that the victim had *214been convicted of murder as bearing on the victim’s character and, consequently, on her credibility. Thus, the jury would have been basing its decision on the victim’s conviction for murder and not on the evidence presented by the Commonwealth. This clearly would have been improper. See Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 591 (1973) (“In order to prevent smearing rather than merely discrediting of the witness, [prior convictions used for] impeachment should be limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.”) and Commonwealth v. Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 417 A.2d 611 (1980) (Murder is not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement.). Therefore, evidence of the victim’s conviction was inadmissible and was properly excluded by the trial court.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. See also Commonwealth v. Bailey, 450 Pa. 201, 299 A.2d 298 (1973) (Court held it was error to exclude evidence that the victim's husband was a moneylender when appellant was charged with murder, appellant claimed he had gone to the victim’s home to discuss an extension of time for repaying a loan, and the challenged evidence had some beating on appellant’s intent at the time of the killing of which he was convicted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 447 Pa. 300, 290 A.2d 121 (1972) (Court held it was error to exclude evidence that the victim’s brother was a fence when appellant was charged with murder, appellant claimed that he had gone to the brother’s watch repair shop to demand payment for some stolen jewelry he had previously left at the shop, appellant claimed the killing was committed in self-defense, and the challenged evidence had some bearing on appellant’s intent at the time of the killing of which he was convicted).