concurring.
I join in the opinion and result reached by the Court today. I write only to express my misgivings on the resolution, both nationally and within this state, of the admissibility of victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of capital trials.
A judge’s agreement or disagreement with the opinions of the United States Supreme Court, or with the amendments to the State Constitution approved by the people, and the legislation that follows, are almost always irrelevant: the judge is obligated, regardless of his or her personal views, to obey the law. My agreement with Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), however, and disagreement with Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), both run deep, as does my disagreement with the constitutional amendment approved by the voters in New Jersey in 1991 (N.J. Const, art. I, ¶ 22) and the law, the victim impact statute, that was adopted thereafter. L. 1995, c. 123; N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3e(6). While the actions of the United States Supreme Court left each state free to accept or reject victim impact evidence, I find the conclusion inescapable that New Jersey voters, by approving the amendment to our Constitution, intended to allow the Legislature to adopt the victim impact statute. I realize that Payne was decided after the Legislature approved the constitutional amendment, but before the voters acted on it. The timing cuts both ways, but as far as I am concerned the spirit and intent of that constitutional amendment was clear: the voters intended to authorize any and all aid or support for victims of crime and their families that was not prohibited by the United States Constitution. Certainly victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of capital trials fits within that class. I believe it would be clearly inconsistent with sound constitutional interpretation to hold otherwise.
*60Today’s opinion does no more than accord to our constitutional amendment and the victim impact law their most obviously intended consequence, namely, to allow the State to introduce, in opposition to evidence of the defendant’s good character and the mitigating circumstances of the offense, the damage done by taking the life of the victim, damage both to the victim and to his or her family. Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at 824-25, 880 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 2611 n. 2, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735, 739 n. 2. For all of the reasons expressed in the majority opinion in Booth and the dissenting opinion in Payne, I disagree. Although my disagreement is irrelevant, I feel compelled to express it. Victim impact evidence has no place in a rationally conducted sentencing proceeding. It is a throwback, at least potentially, to the days when the death penalty could be imposed arbitrarily, without reason, much like being struck by lightning.