CONCURRING OPINION BY
JUDGE FRIEDMAN.I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately to present a different legal analysis of the question before us here, i.e., whether a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) has jurisdiction to determine the question of paternity in deciding if a minor child is entitled to benefits under section 307 of the Workers’ Compensation Act1 (Act).
I. Jurisdiction
A. DPW and Paternity
The City of Philadelphia (Employer) argues in its brief that the courts of common pleas have exclusive jurisdiction to determine paternity. (Employer’s brief at 27.) However, this argument completely ignores the explicit statutory authority of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) to determine paternity.
DPW is the state agency responsible for developing and implementing a state plan for child support in accordance with Title TV-D of the Social Security Act. Section 4372 of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4372. In this role, DPW is required to make available “paternity determination services” and to establish the paternity of children to whom DPW has provided cash assistance, medical assistance or other services authorized by the Public Welfare Code. Sections 4371, 4373(b)(1) and 4373(b)(5) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 4371, 4373(b)(1), 4373(b)(5).
In order to expedite the establishment and enforcement of support on behalf of any assistance recipient or non-recipient receiving Title IV D services, DPW may issue an administrative order requiring “any individual to submit to genetic testing for the purpose of paternity establishment.” Section 4377(a)(1) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4377(a)(1). Moreover, DPW “may administratively assess a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per violation upon any person ... that fails to comply with [such] an order.” Section 4377(b) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4377(b). Finally, DPW “may make application to any court of common pleas or to the Commonwealth Court for purposes of enforcing any ... final administrative order.” Id.
The legislature granted DPW these explicit statutory powers pursuant to section 10 of Act 58 (Act 58), Act of December 16, 1997, P.L. 549. In section 11 of Act 58, the legislature then added subsection (i) to *930section 5103 of the Domestic Relations Code. Subsection (i) states, in pertinent part, that the name of the father of a child shall be included on the record of birth of a child of unmarried parents if a “court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction has issued an adjudication of paternity.” Section 5103(i) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5103(i) (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that the courts of common pleas do not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine paternity. Therefore, Employer’s argument must fail.
B. Workers’ Compensation and Paternity
The legislature has not enacted a statutory provision explicitly giving a WCJ the power to determine paternity. However, the legislature has given a WCJ the power to hear and determine “claims for compensation.” Section 2213 of the Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. § 573.
In giving a WCJ power to determine the ultimate issue of entitlement to benefits, the legislature certainly intended to give a WCJ the power to determine every relevant sub-issue. The fact that the workers’ compensation statute does not contain a specific provision giving a WCJ the power to decide a particular sub-issue, like paternity, does not mean that a WCJ lacks the power to decide the sub-issue. Such an interpretation of the statute would lead to an absurd result, making it impossible for a WCJ to execute the statutory duty to determine all claims for compensation. See section 1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (stating that, in ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute, we presume that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd or impossible of execution).
As to the question of paternity, section 307 of the Act provides that compensation is payable to “any child” under the age of eighteen. 77 P.S. § 562. This court has held that the phrase “any child” in section 307 embraces “illegitimate children.”2 Lehigh Foundations, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 416, 395 A.2d 576, 580 (1978). In so holding, this court specifically stated that, in some workers’ compensation proceedings, “illegitimate children” are required to prove paternity. Id. at 578 (citing Cairgle v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439 (1951)).
In Cairgle, a widow attempted to prove that her three minor children were entitled to workers’ compensation benefits after the death of her husband in 1948. However, the widow had been separated from her husband since 1932, and her three minor children were born in 1939, 1942 and 1943. The issue was whether James Cairgle, the deceased employee, was the father of the widow’s three minor children. The widow testified that, although she had been living with another man since 1936, she had had sexual intercourse with her husband from time to time. The referee did not believe the widow’s testimony and concluded that Cairgle was not the father of the widow’s three minor children. Thus, the referee concluded that the children were not entitled to benefits. Our supreme court ultimately affirmed the decision; although the *931court could have questioned the referee’s jurisdiction sua sponte, the court did not hold that the referee lacked jurisdiction to decide the paternity issue.3
Based on the above statutory provisions and case law, I would hold that, where the issue of paternity is essential to a determination of whether a child is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under the Act, a WCJ has jurisdiction to decide the question.
II. Burden of Proof
Employer argues that, even if a WCJ has jurisdiction to determine paternity, the WCJ in this case failed to apply the correct burden of proof. (Employer’s brief at 82.) Employer contends that the WCJ applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, but the proper burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.4 (Employer’s brief at 85.)
The majority states that the WCJ properly applied the “substantial evidence” standard. (Majority op. at 13.) However, substantial evidence is not a burden of proof; rather, substantial evidence is the quantity of probative, credible and competent evidence that is sufficient to meet a particular burden of proof. Because the majority fails to discuss the proper burden of proof for a paternity question in workers’ compensation proceedings, I cannot accept the majority’s analysis of this issue.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the function of a burden of proof as follows:
The function of a [burden] of proof ... in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (citation omitted). Different types of cases require different burdens of proof to satisfy the needs of due process. Id. In a typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties, where the litigants share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion, the plaintiffs burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. Id. In a criminal case, where the interests of the defendant are much greater, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In cases involving individual interests that are more substantial than mere loss of money, such as reputation or parental rights, an intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence is used. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).5
Here, Employer and Ashley Rossa (Claimant), a minor through her mother, Patricia Rossa (Rossa), are involved in a dispute over Claimant’s entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits. The resolution of the question rests on whether Daniel R. Boyle, a police officer who died in the course and scope of his employment, *932was Claimant’s father. Employer’s interest in this matter is not more substantial than the mere loss of money. Moreover, although Boyle is deceased, the risk of an erroneous determination of paternity is minimized by either party’s ability to seek exhumation of Boyle’s body for genetic testing6 or to request that Boyle’s father undergo genetic testing.7 Therefore, the proper burden of proof in this case is the preponderance of the evidence standard.8
Here, Claimant presented the credible testimony of various witnesses to show that Boyle was Claimant’s father.9 The fact that Claimant did not present better evidence goes only to the weight of the evidence presented, but, certainly, Claimant’s evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s finding of paternity. Employer had the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence, including evidence derived from genetic testing. Although Boyle’s father refused to undergo DNA testing, Employer could have sought the exhumation of Boyle’s body for such testing. However, because Employer failed to do so, Employer cannot now eom-*933plain about the WCJ’s credibility determination and paternity finding.10
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and reinstate the WCJ’s decision.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 562.
. I place the phrase "illegitimate children” in quotes because, under section 5102(a) of the Domestic Relations Code, all children "shall be legitimate irrespective of the marital status of their parents, and, in eveiy case where children are bom out of wedlock, they shall enjoy all the rights and privileges as if they had been bom during the wedlock of their parents.”23 Pa.C.S. § 5102(a).
. A court may, at any time, raise the issue of an agency’s jurisdiction sua sponte. Riedel v. Human Relations Commission, 559 Pa. 34, 739 A.2d 121 (1999).
. Employer requests a remand so that a WCJ can consider the evidence using the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Employer’s brief at 36.)
. See K.J. v. Department of Public Welfare, 767 A.2d 609 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) (J. Friedman, dissenting), appeal denied, - Pa. -, 788 A.2d 381, (No. 303 MAL 2001, 2001 WL 1203054, filed October 11, 2001).
. A court may order exhumation of a body where there is "reasonable cause" for it. Wawrykow v. Simonich, 438 Pa.Super. 340, 652 A.2d 843 (1994). A person seeking exhumation for DNA testing to establish paternity may satisfy this "reasonable cause” criterion by presenting credible testimony or other evidence relating to the paternity issue. Id. Once "reasonable cause” is established, the person then must show that, despite the passage of years, blood or tissue samples would be available for testing. Id.
I note that, in Carroll v. Willow Brook Co., 108 Pa.Super. 580, 165 A. 550 (1933), a widow sought workers’ compensation for herself and her minor daughter following the death of her husband. The question was whether her husband died in the course and scope of his employment. However, the widow objected to exhumation of her husband’s body for a complete autopsy. Because the deputy coroner could only speculate about the cause of death without a complete autopsy, the referee was unable to conclude that the widow’s husband died in the course and scope of his employment. Presumably, if the widow had not objected to exhumation of the body, the referee would have ordered it.
. See Wawrykow (stating that the appellant sought DNA blood grouping samples from the decedent or his parents). Although Boyle’s father refused to undergo genetic testing in this case, we cannot ignore the fact that the availability of DNA tests greatly reduces the risk of error in cases with paternity issues. In the opinion of some experts, DNA blood grouping tests can show a 99.99 percent probability of paternity. Id. (citing Smith v. Shaffer, 511 Pa. 421, 515 A.2d 527 (1986)).
. Employer’s assertion that the clear and convincing evidence standard always must apply to determinations of paternity is clearly mistaken. Where the paternity of a child born out of wedlock is disputed in a child support matter, the court makes the determination of paternity in a civil action without a jury, and the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 4343(a) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4343(a); see Minnich v. Rivera, 509 Pa. 588, 506 A.2d 879 (1986) (upholding the preponderance of the evidence standard).
In its brief, Employer cites Williams v. Milliken, 351 Pa.Super. 567, 506 A.2d 918 (1986), where a man attempted to prove that he was the natural father of two children. The court held that his burden of proof was clear and convincing evidence. However, in Williams, the man had to rebut a presumption of legitimacy, meaning that the mother was married to another man when the children were born. It was this special circumstance that necessitated a higher burden of proof than preponderance of the evidence.
. Rossa, Claimant's mother, testified that: (1) she dated Boyle from May 1989 to March 17, 1990; (2) while dating Boyle, she did not date other men; and, (3) while dating Boyle, the two engaged in sexual relations. Claimant was born on December 13, 1990. Other witnesses testified that Rossa contacted Boyle in April 1990 to inform Boyle of her pregnancy and that she continued to have contact with Boyle until Claimant’s birth. Rossa’s stepfather testified that he and Boyle discussed the matter of child support for Claimant.
. As a final note, Employer argues that it would not be fair to allow a WCJ to determine paternity because the WCJ's determination would be res judicata and because neither the putative father nor his personal representative would be a party to the proceeding. (Employer’s brief at 30.) Without addressing whether the WCJ’s determination would be res judicata, I point out that Employer does not have standing to raise a res judicata argument on behalf of a putative father or his personal representative.