dissenting.
The opinion submitted by Spencer, J., holds, in substance, that sections 48-810.01 and 79-1290, R. S. Supp., 1969, do not conflict with other provisions of Chapter 48, article 8, R. S. Supp., 1969. It is stated that the Court of Industrial Relations has the power to settle any controversy over wages or working conditions and, in so doing, is not compelling the school district to enter into any contract but is simply settling a dispute. This is an obvious fallacy. Section 48-819, R. R. S. 1943, makes the orders of the court binding upon all parties and failure to comply is punishable by contempt proceedings. When the court sets wages or working conditions in any case, it is thereby compelling the school district to comply by entering into contracts with the members of the labor organization involved on the terms fixed. When contracts are thus extended to all members of the organization, it requires a very fine splitting of hairs to hold that no contract has been entered into with such labor organization. In truth and in fact, such organization has obtained its contract by court order and sections 48-810.01 and 79-1290, R. S. Supp., 1969, are rendered meaningless. These statutes cannot be reconciled with other sections of Chapter 48, article 8, R. S. Supp., 1969. They are diametrically opposed and unless given their clear meaning must be considered to have been repealed by implication.
It must be borne in mind that the act defining the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations, and the interpretation placed thereon, affects and applies to all political subdivisions, including not only school districts, but also counties, townships, cities and villages, and the State. All of these organizations have, by statute, been granted authority to employ necessary employees, enter into contracts with them, and fix wages and conditions of employment. Some instances pertaining to schools are found in sections 79-328, 79-441, 79-486. 79-519. 79-908. 79-1004. 79-1035. 79-1104. 79-1249. *55179-1258, 79-1282, 79-1290, 79-1429, and 79-2619 (3), R. R. S. 1943. Others, pertaining to counties are found in sections 23-104 (6), 23-109, 23-135, 23-223, 23-224 (8), 23-260, 23-343.04, 23-904, 23-916, 23-1111, 23-1114, 23-1204, and 23-1209, R. R. S. 1943, and R. S. Supp., 1969. Has Chapter 48, article 8, R. S. Supp., 1969, amended all these statutes, and similar sections pertaining to other political subdivisions, by implication? If so, the amendment or repeal is of wholesale proportions and section 48-810, R. S. Supp., 1969, is in violation of Article III, section 14, Constitution, State of Nebraska, which provides in part: “And no law shall be amended unless the new act contain the section or sections as amended and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed.”
“Even though an act of the legislature professes to be an independent act, and does not formally purport to amend any prior act or acts, yet if, in fact, the legislative intent is to, and it clearly appears that the act does, make changes in an existing act or acts by adding new provisions or changing existing ones therein and mingling the new and the changed with the old on the same subject, so as to make of the old, the changed, and the new a connected piece of legislation covering the same subject, the later act must be considered an amendment of the former act or acts and within the constitutional prohibition.” State ex rel. Beal v. Bauman, 126 Neb. 566, 254 N. W. 256. See, also, Tukey v. Douglas County, 129 Neb. 353, 261 N. W. 833; Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. County of Box Butte, 166 Neb. 603, 90 N. W. 2d 72.
“The constitutional provision is applicable to an act which is not complete in itself, but relates to other existing statutes by changing them in part so that the changes and the existing provisions result in a connected piece of legislation covering the same subject matter.” State v. Greenburg, 187 Neb. 149, 187 N. W. 2d 751.
Prior to the passage of Laws 1969, chapter 407, section 3, page 1407, section 48-810, R. R. S. 1943, did not apply to governmental functions of political subdivisions but *552was limited to governmental service in a proprietary capacity. In making the section applicable to all forms of governmental service, the 1969 act necessarily limited and circumscribed the authority previously accorded to governmental units to determine and fix the wages and working conditions of employees. This is the principal subject of the act. It authorized the Court of Industrial Relations to step in and dictate settlements when disagreements arose. It is apparent that the 1969 act was not an independent act but related to other existing statutes granting sole authority to governmental units to finally determine and fix wages and terms of employment. It was the evident design that the changes in the 1969 act and the existing provisions result in a connected piece of legislation covering the same subject matter. It clearly appears that the 1969 act does make changes in existing statutes by limiting authority previously accorded governmental units, making their decisions subject to review and nullification, and permitting the Court of Industrial Relations to make these decisions for them. It represents an attempt to make of the old, the changed, and the new a connected piece of legislation covering the same subject and must be considered an amendment of the former acts and within the constitutional prohibition.