concurring:
Reluctantly, I concur. I cannot fault the logic of the majority opinion as it proceeds to its conclusion from the premise of Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d 1302 (1979). I do question, however, the wisdom of that premise.
I agree with the majority that the approach to Md. Rule 735 mandated by Countess v. State cannot be reconciled with the approach to Md. Rule 731 c mandated by Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 361 A.2d 113 (1976). For my part, I far prefer the more sensible approach of Davis v. State, so well articulated there by Judge Digges.
What we have done here (or rather what the rule has done under the Countess approach to rule interpretation) is to exalt form over substance. In this case, it is clear to any rational beholder that the appellant voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. That should end the inquiry. To send this case back for a retrial mocks the business of judicial review. It is one further illustration of why the public perceives the judicial system as frequently operating in an ivory tower. At a time when resources are finite and caseloads are staggering, sound policy calls for concentrating the limited judicial, prosecutorial and defense resources that are *7available upon issues of real substance rather than upon the abracadabra of reciting a litany. We are fiddling while Rome burns.