dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s conduct failed to constitute a violation of subsection 2, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142 § 2, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131. Under subsection 2, “parties must obey decrees and orders, witnesses must appear when subpoenaed, jurors must present themselves when called. There must be a formal order directed to a specific person or group of persons, but the refusal to comply need not occur in the court’s presence.” In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 556, 359 A.2d 749, 741 (1976) (emphasis added) “A conviction of contempt for violation of a court order can be sustained only if the order or decree was definite, clear, specific and left no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited” Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 368-9, 386 A.2d 971, 977 (1978).
In the instant case, the court specifically ordered appellant to sit down, stay out of the case, and remain silent.
“THE COURT: I don’t want to hear from you Mr. Nu-gent. You are not in this case. Don’t misunderstand me. I will make it clear. I have ordered and directed that you are not in this case. I have not granted leave for Mr. Sagel to withdraw.
“Now, I am going to spell it out, so we understand each other. It is well known that I do not use the item of contempt. I have ordered you to sit down and stay out of this case. There is only one thing left for you to do. You may return to your office and bring anybody you want to, but, I have ordered you not to open your mouth again.
“Now, there is only one option you have open to you after that. Under the decision in Commonwealth versus Schofield, you owe only a duty of respectful submission to this Court. Under the situation in Commonwealth versus Schofield, if you do not obey my order, it is my intention to hold you in contempt if you violate that order. From that order you owe a duty of respectful submission and only a right of appeal. In the event that I hold you for contempt, if I sentence you to a term less than six months, *10that will be done summarily for disobedience to the direct order of the Court. If I impose a fine, that also will take immediate effect.
“In the event that I seek to sentence you for more than six months, then you would have a right to jury trial.
“I have now warned you of your rights. You understand them, and I direct you now, without further word, to sit down.
“MR. NUGENT: Your Honor, I wish to speak. I take exception—
“THE COURT: I hold you in contempt. The sheriff may take Mr. Nugent into custody for violation of a direct order of this Court.
“Now we will proceed.”
(emphasis added)
The preceding order and warning was definite, clear, specific and could not have left any doubt or uncertainty in appellant’s mind as to its meaning. Therefore, I find appellant’s conduct falls within subsection 2.
The majority also contends that appellant was merely attempting to lodge an objection after being told by the trial judge to sit down and not participate in the sentencing proceedings. It is clear from the exchange between the trial judge and appellant, that appellant’s objection was of record before he was held in contempt. In United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972) the court held that one’s belief that certain action was necessary to preserve claims for appellate review does not excuse violation of a direct order of the trial judge.
Furthermore, had no objection been made, there would be no danger of foreclosing appellate review of the judges order to refrain from participation in the sentencing proceeding.
A court of appeals could not penalize a litigant solely because his attorney fulfilled his well established obligation to comply with the orders of a trial judge, [citations omitted] To conclude otherwise would require us to ascribe an irrationality to the appellate process which our *11objective respect for the judicial system will not permit. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Intern. U. of Op. Engrs., 552 F.2d 498, 506 (3rd Cir. 1977)
It is well settled that the invalidity of a court order generally is not a defense in a criminal contempt proceeding. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967).
Notwithstanding an attorney’s obligation to zealously advocate his or her positions, “the dignity, the independence, and the control of the court must not be degraded by lawyers who equate contempt with courage. The processes of orderly trial, which are the supreme object of the lawyers calling, must be protected.” Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Intern U. of Op. Engrs., supra at 503.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.