¶ 42. {dissenting). Medicaid is a program that was enacted in 1965 as a cooperative program between the states and the federal government to provide medical assistance to indigent individuals. "While state participation in the Medicaid program is purely voluntary, a state that participates must comply with the Medicaid laws and implementing regulations."1
¶ 43. The majority opinion concludes that Congress never "intended for private pay patients to be reimbursed for out-of-pocket amounts incurred prior to their application, and subsequent eligibility, for medical assistance."2 The majority reaches the wrong result because it takes the wrong path. It takes the wrong path because it attempts to answer the certified question.
¶ 44. Put simply, the court of appeals erred in stating the certified question. Its certified question assumes that the State retroactively compensated a medical assistance provider.3 Whether the compensation was retroactive is the very question presented in the present case.
¶ 45. The court of appeals and the majority opinion use the ordinary dictionary definition of "retroac*89tive." But the period of retroactivity is defined by law. The law is clear that the period of retroactivity begins before the month in which an applicant applies for benefits. None of the federal or state statutes or case law implicated in this case states or suggests that the month of application, here October 1999, is part of the period of retroactivity.
¶ 46. The facts are undisputed. Ms. Keup was a private pay patient in late September 1999 and prepaid her expenses for the month of October at the private pay patient rates. She applied for benefits on October 21,1999. On October 29,1999, Ms. Keup was approved eligible for benefits from October 1, 1999, and the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) paid the provider at the fixed medical assistance rate for Ms. Keup's care in October. The provider refunded the sum received from DHFS to Ms. Keup, but did not refund the full amount she had prepaid for the month of October.
¶ 47. The court of appeals and the majority opinion presume that any coverage provided by DHFS prior to October 21, 1999, the date of application, is "retroactive." The majority makes this presumption because it uses the common, layperson's definition of "retroactive" instead of using the definition of "retroactive" set forth in the applicable federal and state laws.4 Because I conclude that the majority opinion ignores the relevant federal and state laws defining the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits and because I conclude, contrary to the majority opinion, that Ms. Keup is not requesting a refund of moneys paid during her three-month period of eligibility for retroactive benefits (that is, July, August, and September), but rather is *90requesting a refund of moneys she paid during October 1999, the month in which she made application and in which she was eligible for benefits, I dissent. I further conclude that DHFS has jurisdiction to provide Ms. Keup a fair hearing and that the issue should be remanded to the Division of Hearings and Appeals and DHFS for a hearing.
i — I
¶ 48. A number of statutes and administrative rules, both state and federal, come into play in this case. I conclude, as did the amicus brief of the Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Elder Center of the Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups, Employment Resources, Inc., and ABC for Health, that this case can be resolved by a proper application of Wis. Stat. § 49.49(3m).
¶ 49. Section § 49.49(3m)(a) sets forth the general rule that "[n]o provider may knowingly impose upon a recipient charges in addition to payments received for services ...." The prohibition recognizes that recipients of Medicaid are poor and cannot pay significant out-of-pocket health care costs.
¶ 50. Nevertheless, the legislature has provided exceptions to the general rule set forth in Wis. Stat. § 49.49(3m)(a). The exception claimed to be applicable to the present case, § 49.49(3m)(a)(2), provides that "[i]f an applicant is determined to be eligible retroactively under s. 49.46(1)(b)5 and a provider bills the applicant directly for services and benefits rendered during the *91retroactive period," then the provider must obtain reimbursement under § 49.45 for the retroactive period and pay over those funds to the applicant; "[n]o provider may be required to reimburse the applicant or other person in excess of the amount reimbursed under s. 49.45."
¶ 51. In other words, under Wis. Stat. § 49.49(3m)(a)2 a health care provider is allowed to keep the difference, if any, between funds a recipient of medical assistance paid to a provider during the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits and the fixed reimbursement amount of medical assistance provided through the Medicaid program.
¶ 52. Wisconsin Admin. Code § HFS 106.04(3) similarly states that a provider shall reimburse a recipient of medical assistance the lesser of the amount received from medical assistance or the amount paid by the recipient for the "retroactive eligibility period."6 *92This Wisconsin administrative rule, like the Wisconsin statute, does not require a provider to reimburse the recipient of medical assistance the full amount the recipient paid the provider during the "retroactive eligibility period." Wisconsin Admin. Code § HFS 106.04(3) is an almost verbatim restatement of Wis. Stat. § 49.49(3m).
¶ 53. To determine how much the provider in the present case must reimburse Ms. Keup, the recipient of medical assistance for the month of October 1999, I must determine whether October 1999 falls within or outside of Ms. Keup's period of eligibility for retroactive benefits.
¶ 54. At the federal level, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) and 42 C.F.R. 435.914(a) determine the retroactive eligibility period. Section 1396a(a)(34) governs the retroactive eligibility of an individual to receive benefits for services and distinguishes between the month of application and the three months prior to the month of application. This provision defines the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits as beginning with "the third month before the month in which [the individual] made application for such assistance . . . ."7 The federal *93law thus calculates the three-month period of eligibility for retroactive benefits from the month of application rather than from the date on which the recipient applied for medical assistance or was declared eligible for medical assistance.
¶ 55. The language of § 1396a(a)(34) is clarified by the implementing federal code regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 435.914, which governs the effective date of eligibility for Medicaid in the states. Section 435.914(a) requires that state Medicaid agencies "make eligibility for Medicaid effective no later than the third month before the month of application" for individuals who received services during this three-month period.8
*94¶ 56. Case law confirms that the month of application is not within the definition of the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits.9 In Blanco v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34). The Ninth Circuit clarified that § 1396a(a)(34) did not include the month of application as part of the three-month period of eligibility for retroactive benefits. It explained the calculation of the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits as follows:
Medicaid coverage is retroactive for three months before the month in which the application is filed. If a person sought to apply for Medicaid on Friday, July 29, 1994, but found the office closed and so applied on Monday, August 1, she would have Medicaid coverage only for May, June and July and would have lost the coverage that she would have had for April if she had been able to apply on July 29.10
¶ 57. Similarly, the argument that the three-month period of eligibility for retroactive benefits is measured from the day of the application was explicitly rejected in Kempson v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources, 397 S.E.2d 314 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). In that case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that a December 22,1988, "application would *95provide retroactive coverage back three full months before the month of. . . application."11 The North Carolina Court of Appeals therefore declared that the patient was eligible for retroactive benefits beginning September 1, 1988. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the three-month period for retroactive benefits was measured from the day of the application. The court characterized the period of coverage from December 1, 1988, on as prospective and from September 1, 1988 to November 30, 1988, as retroactive.12 Other courts have reached a similar conclusion with respect to 42 U.S.C. § I396a(a)(34).13
¶ 58. Wisconsin has recognized and accepted the federal distinction between the month of application and the three prior months as the period of eligibility *96for retroactive benefits. The definition of the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 49.46(1)(b), which mirrors its federal counterparts.
¶ 59. Section 49.46(l)(b) provides that "[a]ny person shall be considered a recipient of aid for 3 months prior to the month of application if the proper agency determines eligibility existed during such prior month." (emphasis added). Section 49.46(l)(b), like its federal counterparts, establishes that the period of retroactive benefits refers to the three month period prior to the month of application for benefits. Like the controlling federal statute, the month of application itself is not part of the period of retroactive benefits under § 49.46(l)(b).
¶ 60. The court of appeals has previously addressed how § 49.46(l)(b) should operate. In St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 186 Wis. 2d 37, 45, 519 N.W.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals concluded that a medical assistance application filed on May 5, 1992, would allow a full three months of retroactive benefits prior to the month of May. The court of appeals concluded that the period of retroactive benefits ran from February 1,1992 until April 30,1992. In other words, the first five days of May did not count as part of the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits as those days were part of the "month of application."
¶ 61. In reaching its conclusion in the St. Paul case, the court of appeals apparently relied on DHSS's (now DHFS) own interpretation of § 49.46(l)(b). In its brief to the court of appeals, DHSS argued that a person shall be considered a recipient of aid for three months prior to the month of application if the proper agency determines eligibility existed during such prior month. *97The earliest possible date of medical assistance eligibility in St. Paul, as certified by the county agency, was February 1, 1992, three months prior to the May 5, 1992, application. If, in fact, as the State now seems to be arguing, the three-month period of eligibility for retroactive benefits runs from the date of application, the three-month period of retroactive eligibility in St. Paul would have run from February 4, 1992, not February 1, 1992.
¶ 62. Thus, all authority, both federal and state, on the subject seems to point toward the same conclusion.14 The statute allowing a provider to refund to a recipient only the amount the provider receives does not apply to the month in which an application is made; this statute applies only to the three — month period of eligibility for retroactive benefits prior to the month of application.
¶ 63. According to the majority opinion, the pre-application days of the application month are part of the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits.15 Therefore, according to the majority opinion, the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits can be longer than three months. Yet, the statutes limit the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits to three months. The *98majority opinion therefore seems to unlawfully extend the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits beyond what is authorized by statute. In this respect, the reasoning of the other courts that have touched on this issue are more faithful to the words and intent of the statutes defining the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits.
¶ 64. Ms. Keup was not found eligible for medical assistance for any months prior to the month of her application; she never requested reimbursement for expenditures during her period of eligibility for retroactive benefits under Wis. Stat. § 49.46(l)(b). She requested reimbursement only for the payments she made during the month of her application, October 1999. Under the federal and state statutes, October 1999, the month of application, is not to be considered within the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits. The general rule requiring a provider to accept the payments made by DHFS as payments in full applies to October 1999. I therefore conclude that the provider must reimburse Ms. Keup for the entire payment she made in October 1999.
¶ 65. Without discussion of Wis. Stat. § 49.46(l)(b), the majority opinion focuses on the federal distinction between applicants and recipients reflected in 42 C.F.R. § 400.203.16 It argues that at the *99time Ms. Keup entered the care facility in October 1999, she was neither an applicant nor a recipient under federal law17 and that she must have been a private pay patient to whom the care facility was authorized to charge any amount it deemed appropriate provided that the patient was given notice of the charge.18 Without analysis, the majority opinion presumes (as did the court of appeals) that the medical assistance Ms. Keup received for the month of October 1999 was retroactive because she applied for the assistance on October 21, 1999, and was approved for and received coverage beginning October 1, 1999.19 While the benefits Ms. Keup received for October 1-21 may be characterized as "retroactive" in the layperson's sense of the word because they covered a period of time prior to the date of *100the application, they were not retroactive under the federal and state statutes and rules defining the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits as the three-month period prior to the month of application.
¶ 66. Because her month of application was October 1999, Ms. Keup's eligibility for retroactive benefits ran from July 1, 1999, until September 30, 1999. Since Ms. Keup is only requesting total reimbursement for her nursing home prepayment for the month of October, she is not requesting reimbursement for payments made during her period of retroactive eligibility.20 Ms. Keup is therefore, in my opinion, entitled to a refund for the additional payment she made during October 1999. This interpretation corresponds with the technical use of the words governing the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits in the text of the federal and state statutes and rules.
*101¶ 67. The interpretation the majority opinion adopts not only disregards the text of the statutes and rules, but also fails to promote the overall goal of Wisconsin's participation in Medicaid: to provide health care to indigent individuals. For example, individuals seeking Medicaid eligibility as "disabled" rather than "aged" often face lengthy wait times of over three months between their application and the determination of their disability status.
¶ 68. Under the majority opinion, the entire waiting period plus the three months of retroactive benefits prior to the month of application are subject to the partial reimbursement rule. For individuals who are not institutionalized, the amicus asserts that the amount of reimbursement is highly significant, affecting people's ability to meet ongoing food, clothing, and shelter expenses and increasing the costs of prescription medication.
¶ 69. I believe that for people living below the poverty level the majority opinion causes additional hardships. The majority opinion shifts the burden of spiraling health costs onto the people who can least afford it. The legislature could not have intended this result.
¶ 70. The majority opinion's interpretation is, in my opinion, bad law and bad policy. I cannot join it.
¶ 71. Having resolved that Ms. Keup is entitled to a refund for her October payment, the remaining question is whether the Division of Hearings and Appeals had jurisdiction to provide Ms. Keup with a fair hearing in this case.
HH I — I
¶ 72. The majority opinion, echoing the arguments of the DHFS, concludes that the division "did not *102have jurisdiction to hear Ms. Keup's claim under Wis. Stat. § 49.45(5)(a) because none of the statutory bases for jurisdiction were met."21 In doing so, the majority opinion takes a narrow and unrealistic view of DHFS's statutory authority.
¶ 73. Wisconsin Stat. § 49.45(1) directs DHFS to administer the medical assistance program and imposes on the department broad duties including the duty to exercise responsibility relating to fiscal matters, eligibility for benefits and general supervision of the medical assistance program;22 the duty to determine the eligibility of persons for medical assistance;23 and the duty to set forth conditions of participation and reimbursement in a contract with providers of services.24 Section 49.45(5) allows a person who believes that the payments made on his or her behalf have not been properly determined or that his or her eligibility has not been properly determined may file an appeal with DHFS, and DHFS shall give the applicant or recipient an opportunity for a fair hearing.
¶ 74. The Administrative Code sets forth grounds for a fair hearing. Specifically, Wis. Admin. Code § HA 3.03(1) provides that "[ajny person applying for or receiving Medicaid .. . may appeal any of the following administrative actions of the department or agency . . . (d) The determination of the amount, sufficiency, initial eligibility date of program benefits ...."
¶ 75. Section HA 3.03(4) of the administrative code further provides that "[a]n applicant, recipient or former recipient may appeal any other adverse action or *103decision by an agency or department which affects their public assistance or social services benefits where a hearing is required by state or federal law or department policy."
¶ 76. In addition, Wis. Admin. Code § HFS 104.01 provides in pertinent part that" [applicants and recipients have the right to a fair hearing in accordance with procedures set out in ch. HSS 225 and this subsection when aggrieved by action or inaction of the agency or the department... ."25
¶ 77. DHFS is imbued with broad powers and duties. Read together, these provisions grant DHFS and the division jurisdiction to hear medical assistance cases arising from adverse inaction of the department that would affect benefit recipients. I do not understand how DHFS can assert that the division lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim when DHFS is the responsible governmental entity charged with overseeing the administration of medical assistance benefits and ensuring that recipients are properly reimbursed, and when its policy is being challenged. I conclude that the division has jurisdiction for the following reasons.
¶ 78. First, the division has jurisdiction because Ms. Keup claims she was aggrieved by the action and inaction of DHFS. DHFS claims that Ms. Keup was aggrieved by the legislature's enacting the statutes, not by it. This argument ignores, however, that Ms. Keup's claim stems from DHFS's interpretation of the statutes.
¶ 79. Second, contrary to the majority opinion's conclusion,26 Ms. Keup did claim that her medical assistance payments were not properly determined. Ms. Keup claimed that under the applicable federal and *104state statutes and rules she did not receive the correct amount of reimbursement. That Ms. Keup may be in error does not mean that the division does not have jurisdiction over her claim. Having jurisdiction to determine the merits of a claim is different from determining the merits. The division had jurisdiction to tell Ms. Keup that she was wrong. When the division refused to provide her with a fair hearing to examine her claim, its action authorized (or might authorize) health care providers to violate Wis. Stat. § 49.49(3m)(a), which prohibits knowingly imposing charges upon a recipient in addition to payments received for services under §§ 49.45 to 49.47.
¶ 80. Third, Ms. Keup can claim that her date of eligibility was improperly determined because medical assistance for the first part of October 1999 was treated as a retroactive payment, to which the exception under § 49.49(3m)(a)2. applied, rather than as a payment for the month of application to an eligible patient for which no exception applied. The provider claimed to be acting in accordance with DHFS policy and the law. DHFS had an affirmative duty to ensure the proper administration of medical assistance benefits under both state and federal law, and it was obligated to provide Ms. Keup with a fair hearing, based on its own administrative rules, to determine the merits of her claim.
¶ 81. Fourth, DHFS was required to provide Ms. Keup a fair hearing to prevent a violation of the directive under federal law that a "state plan must provide that the Medicaid agency must limit participation in the Medicaid program to providers who accept, as payment in full, the amounts paid by the agency plus any deductible, coinsurance or copayment required by *105the plan to be paid by the individual."27 Because Ms. Keup was (or claimed to be) a fully eligible Medicaid patient for the month of October 1999, the provider's refusal to accept the medical assistance as payment in full (as well as Ms. Keup's claim that DHFS agreed with the provider's position) places the provider (and DHFS) in violation of a federal regulation that DHFS is required to enforce.
¶ 82. Fifth, the majority opinion's conclusion that the division has no jurisdiction because it cannot provide a remedy, namely that it cannot be required to reimburse Ms. Keup because Wis. Admin. Code § HFS 104.01(11) prohibits DHFS from directly reimbursing medical assistance recipients, is not relevant' to the issue of jurisdiction. Ms. Keup is requesting that DHFS set forth a policy requiring a full refund of payments in cases like hers and that DHFS instruct the provider to refund her excess payment for the month of October 1999; she is not asking DHFS to pay her directly.
¶ 83. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 84. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.
Carroll v. DeBuono, 998 F. Supp. 190,193 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
Majority op., ¶ 29.
Majority op., ¶ 3.
Majority op., ¶ 4 n.6.
Section 49.46(l)(b) provides as follows: "Any person shall be considered a recipient of aid for 3 months prior to the month of application if the proper agency determines eligibility existed during such prior month."
Wisconsin Admin. Code § HFS 106.04(3) provides in relevant part:
A provider shall accept payments made by the department in accordance with sub. (1) as payment in full for services provided a recipient. A provider may not attempt to impose a charge for an individual procedure or for overhead which is included in the reimbursement for services provided nor may the provider attempt to impose an unauthorized charge or receive payment from a recipient, relative or other person for services provided, or impose direct charges upon a recipient in lieu of obtaining payment under the program, except under any of the following conditions:
Cb) An applicant is determined to be eligible retroactively under s. 49.46(l)(b), Stats., and a provider has billed the applicant directly for services during the retroactive period, in which case the provider shall, upon notification of the recipient's retroactive eligibility, submit claims under this section for covered services *92provided during the retroactive period. Upon receipt of payment from the program for the services, the provider shall reimburse in full the recipient or other person who has made prior payment to the provider. A provider shall not be required to reimburse the recipient or other person in excess of the amount reimbursed by the program....
In full, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) provides that:
[A state plan for medical assistance must] provide that in the case of any individual who has been determined to be eligible for medical assistance under the plan, such assistance will be made available to him for care and services included under the plan and furnished in or after the third month before the month in which he made application (or application was made on his behalf in the case *93of a deceased individual) for such assistance if such individual was (or upon application would have been) eligible for such assistance at the time such care and services were furnished.
42 C.ER. § 435.914 provides in full as follows:
(a)The agency must make eligibility for Medicaid effective no later than the third month before the month of application if the individual—
(1) Received Medicaid services, at any time during that period, of a type covered under the plan; and
(2) Would have been eligible for Medicaid at the time he received the services if he had applied (or someone had applied for him), regardless of whether the individual is alive when application for Medicaid is made.
(b) The agency may make eligibility for Medicaid effective on the first day of a month if an individual was eligible at any time during that month.
(c) The State plan must specify the date on which eligibility will be made effective.
In addition to the case law, a memorandum of the Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, dated January 8, 2004, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/survey-cert/sc0417.pdf (supplied by Ms. Keup and on file with the clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Madison, Wis.), supports the reasoning and conclusion of this dissent. See Wis. Stat. § 902.03(2) (judicial notice of federal regulations and orders).
Blanco v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
Kempson v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 397 S.E.2d 314, 319 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 316.
See, e.g., Blanchard v. Forrest, 71 F.3d 1163, 1166 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] state Medicaid plan must make available medical assistance for covered medical services furnished to the Medicaid recipient within the three months prior to the month in which the recipient applied for Medicaid ('the retroactive coverage period') if the recipient would have been eligible for Medicaid at the time the medical services were furnished."); Ahrendsen v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 613 N.W.2d 674, 677 (Iowa 2000) ("Lydia's September 1996 application for Medicaid benefits was approved effective June 1, 1996, which was three months prior to the month in which the application was submitted. That was the maximum period for retroactive payment permitted by federal statute and state regulation."); Majurin v. Dep't of Social Servs., 417 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) ("[Tjhere can be no legitimate dispute that under the federal scheme the state provider (here defendant) must provide retroactive coverage only back through the third month prior to the month of initial application.").
Additional Wisconsin statutes also confirm the language of § 49.46(l)(b). Wisconsin Stat. § 49.47(4)(d), pertaining to medical assistance for the medically indigent, echoes the language of § 49.46(l)(b) and provides that "[a]n individual is eligible for medical assistance under this section for 3 months prior to the month of application if the individual met the eligibility criteria under this section during those months." Likewise, § 49.47(6)(d) provides that "[n]o payment under this subsection may include care for services rendered earlier than 3 months preceding the month of application."
Majority op., ¶ 4 n.6.
In relevant part, 42 C.F.R. § 400.203 provides:
Definitions specific to Medicaid.
As used in connection with the Medicaid program, unless the context indicates otherwise—
"Applicant” means an individual whose written application for Medicaid has been submitted to the agency determining Medicaid eligibility, but has not received final action. This includes an individual (who need not be alive at the time of application) whose *99application is submitted through a representative or a person acting responsibly for the individual.
"Recipient" means an individual who has been determined eligible for Medicaid.
Majority op., ¶ 30.
Majority op., ¶ 31.
Majority op., ¶ 6. Although Wis. Admin. Code § HFS 104.01(11), which reiterates the exception that a provider does not have to fully reimburse a patient for payments made during the period of eligibility for retroactive benefits, need not conflict with § 49.49(3m) (or § HFS 106.04(3)), the majority opinion would seem to create such a conflict by interpreting the phrase "period of eligibility for retroactive benefits" differently under § HFS 104.01(11) and under § 49.49(3m). If there were, in fact, a conflict, § 49.49(3m) and § 49.46(l)(b) would control because statutory enactments supercede administrative rules. Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 73, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659; Basic Prods. Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 183, 186, 120 N.W.2d 161 (1963).
Ms. Keup was not, as the State and the majority opinion contend, a "private pay" patient in October 1999. The State's reliance on 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(c)(2), which states that a "facility may charge any amount for services furnished to non-Medicaid residents consistent with the notice requirement" is inapposite because for the month of October Ms. Keup was a Medicaid recipient.
Furthermore, the majority opinion's assumption that the patient in this case was requesting retroactive eligibility is not reflected in the record. Rather, a statement filed by the Ozaukee County Department of Social Services indicated that "Ms. Keup completed intake appointment for Medical Assistance-Institutions Categorically Needy on October 21, 1999. County worker processed case on October 29, 1999 for financial eligibility onset date of October 1, 1999." (Emphasis added.) The record does not suggest that the patient's medical assistance benefits were being applied retroactively, as the majority opinion intimates, but instead that she was eligible for medical assistance on October 1, 1999.
Majority op., ¶ 39.
Wis. Stat. § 49.45(2)(a)l.
Wis. Stat. § 49.45(2)(a)3.
Wis. Stat. § 49.45(2)(a)9.
Wis. Admin. Code § HFS 104.01(5)(a)l.
Majority op., ¶ 39.
42 C.F.R. § 447.15.