The Maine Employment Security Commission denied Francis Radvanovsky’s application for unemployment benefits on the grounds that he had not earned sufficient remuneration to requalify for benefits pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(5). On appeal, the Superior Court held the Commission erred in refusing to consider as remuneration general assistance payments from the City of South Portland received by Radva-novsky after the City had imposed a work requirement as a condition of continued eligibility for assistance. Upon appeal to the Law Court, the Commission contends that such municipal general assistance payments cannot be considered for purposes of requa-lification, just as they are not used to reduce weekly unemployment benefits of eligible recipients. Since we agree with the Commission, we reverse the decision of the Superior Court.
The Commission’s findings of fact are not disputed. Following his last employment in March 1976, Radvanovsky received the initial maximum unemployment benefits for which he qualified. Upon Radvanovsky’s request for determination of insured status dated December 1, 1976, the Commission required him to earn $512 after November 30, 1975, in order to requalify for benefits. His earnings through March 1976 totaled $435.64. In December of 1976, he began receiving general assistance from the City of South Portland. After April 6,1977, the City required Radvanovsky to work 10 hours per week in the South Portland Public Library in order to maintain his entitlement to general assistance. When he reapplied for unemployment benefits in May, 1977, Radvanovsky had earned general assistance payments of at least $180.00. This amount together with his prior earnings would exceed $512. Thus, we are presented with a question of law which we must review under 26 M.R.S.A. § 1194(9).1 Moore v. Maine Dept. of Manpower Affairs, Me., 388 A.2d 516, 518 (1978).
26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(5) (Supp.1980) states in pertinent part:
provided no individual may receive benefits in a benefit year, unless, subsequent to the beginning of the next preceding benefit year during which he received benefits, he performed services, whether or not in employment as defined in section 1043, subsection 11, and earned remuneration for such service in an amount equal to not less than 8 times his weekly benefit amount in the benefit year being established.
In determining whether Radvanovsky “earned remuneration” for service performed, we find no aid in either the legislative definitions provided in 26 M.R.S.A. § 1043, or in the above exclusion of the § 1043 definition of employment. The legislature has neither expressly required nor *963prohibited the use of municipal general assistance payments for purposes of requalifi-cation. Indeed, when work requirements were expressly approved under municipal general assistance programs,2 the Commission was given no direction whatsoever concerning the impact of such requirements upon the Employment Security Law. We must search for more general principles.
The Employment Security Law provides for “the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment from which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment.” 26 M.R.S.A. § 1042. Municipal General Assistance Programs provide for “the immediate aid of persons who are unable to provide the basic necessities essential to maintain themselves or their families.” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4450. We find nothing in the spirit or purpose of either program that suggests a legislative intent that the one, general assistance, should provide a basis to reestablish eligibility for the other, unemployment benefits. We do not infer such an irrational intent on the part of the legislature.
In the instant case, Radvanovsky earned for his services not remuneration but rather continued eligibility for receiving general assistance from the City under 22 M.R.S.A., chapter 1251. As a condition to receiving general assistance, persons otherwise eligible for such assistance who were capable of working must perform services for the City. The extent of Radvanovsky’s general assistance eligibility was first determined; calculation of his working hours was based on that determination at the rate of $3.00 per hour. When he required additional assistance, his eligibility for such assistance had to be first established before he was permitted to work additional hours. Had Radva-novsky become disabled, general assistance would have continued at the same rate. His services could not displace those of regular municipal employees. He cannot be said to have reentered the labor force in any meaningful sense.
In 1977 the legislature revised the municipal general assistance legislation, specifically authorizing municipalities to adopt work requirements “as a condition to receiving general assistance,” and transitionally approving preexisting work requirements. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4504; P.L.1977, c. 417, §§ 12, 16. Radvanovsky points to the legislature’s failure to also exclude such general assistance payments from the definition of “wages” in 26 M.R.S.A. § 1043(19)(B) as evidence that the legislature intended such payments to be “wages,” at least for purposes of requalifying for unemployment benefits. This argument is unpersuasive. Such an exclusion was unnecessary because the recipients of general assistance are not receiving remuneration for services. The work requirement has neither changed the nature of the payments, nor made them subject to any other incidents of wages.3
Since we hold that Radvanovsky received no remuneration for services performed for the City, the payments made by the City of South Portland may not be considered under Section 1192(5) for the purpose of reestablishing eligibility for unemployment benefits. The decision of the Superior Court must be reversed, and that of the Commission affirmed.
The entry is:
Judgment of the Superior Court reversed.
Remanded to the Superior Court for the entry of judgment affirming the decision of the Maine Employment Security Commission.
McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK and GLASSMAN, JJ., concurring.
DUFRESNE, A. R. J., dissenting in separate opinion.
. Subsequent to the commencement of this action, section 1194(9) was repealed (effective July 1, 1978) and judicial review was made subject to Title 5, section 11001 et seq.
. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4504 as amended by P.L. 1977, c. 417, §§ 12, 16 (effective October 1977).
. The petitioner’s equal protection argument therefore must fail. For the reasons discussed in text, it is rational to distinguish persons earning remuneration for services performed from persons earning continued eligibility to receive general assistance for services performed.