concurring specially.
I concur in the majority decision.
Appellant produced no evidence or offer of evidence showing negligence of respondent Lintel occurring after the fatal collision, or showing that Lintel’s conduct contributed to the death of Shirley Gertken. The facts here do not present the question whether Lintel had a duty to assist Gertken pursuant to the mandate of Minnesota Statutes § 169.09, subd. 3(a) (Supp.1983). Moreover, the assertion of a statutory duty of care requires consideration of the duty as declared in the Good Samaritan Law, which arises only when a person “knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm.” Minn.Stat. § 604.05, subd. 1 (Supp.1983). The evidence shows no knowledge of respondent Lintel as to Shirley Gertken’s plight after the collision, or even his reason to know that she was in peril.
In addition, we are not at liberty to lightly disregard the trial court’s decision at the time the trial began to limit the plaintiff’s proof to the cause he first alleged, negligence leading to a collision. While the trial court must exhibit liberality toward the amendment of pleadings, its discretion to control the issues of the case is uniquely broad and cannot be readily set aside. McDonald v. Stonebraker, 255 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Minn.1977) (“In the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, we will not reverse the trial court’s actions in allowing or disallowing amendments.”). In fact, if the trial court did not err in refusing the proposed amendment, the topic of post-collision duties need not be addressed here at all.