Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Carlson

MILLER, Justice (on reassignment).

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. We reverse.

Agnes M. Carlson (Agnes) sold her ranch to her son L. Melfred Carlson and his wife, Kay. She sold the property under contract for deed, for a price of $295,000. After the down payment was made, the balance due was $269,000 together with interest at the rate of six percent per annum. The first payment was due on March 15, 1982.

On March 4,1982, Melfred and Kay Carlson (Melfred and Kay) mortgaged this property to the Federal Land Bank of Omaha (FLB) as security for a promissory note executed by them in the principal sum of $267,000. Agnes executed a subordination agreement dated February 18, 1982, which subordinated her interest as seller in the contract for deed to the mortgagee FLB. The subordination agreement contained the following provision:

This Subordination is limited to the amount actually loaned by the Lender to the Borrower for the foregoing purpose, but shall not exceed Two Hundred Sixty-seven Thousand Dollars ($267,000.00).

Melfred and Kay defaulted on the mortgage and FLB commenced this foreclosure action.

FLB moved for and was granted summary judgment by the trial court. The summary judgment granted recovery to FLB against Melfred and Kay in the amount of $399,660.28; determined FLB’s mortgage to be a valid first lien against the property subject to the right of Agnes to a life estate in and to the “family home”; held that Agnes’ interest in the property as seller under the contract for deed is subject to and inferior to the lien of the bank to the extent of $267,000, the subordinated amount; granted a deficiency judgment against Melfred and Kay for the difference between the judgment amount and $267,-000; held that the FLB was entitled to bid the sum of $267,000 at the foreclosure sale; and, among other things, directed that the property be sold in one tract at public auction.

The summary judgment does not contain a determination of the value of the property, although findings of fact state that the fair market value is substantially less than the total incumbrances against it (see Findings VI and IX). In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated:

The reasonable value of the premises considering the equity of Defendant Agnes M. Carlson under the unsubrogat-ed (sic) portion of her mortgage is not the appraised value, but rather the amount of subrogation (sic) i.e. $267,000. Therefore, it will be the decision of the Court that Plaintiff may bid the sum of $267,000 at foreclosure sale.

Agnes appeals from the granting of the summary judgment. Melfred and Kay have not appealed.

ISSUES

The issues as framed by appellant are:

*4171. Did the court’s summary judgment violate the terms and conditions of SDCL 21-47-15 which provides [for a fair and reasonable bid by mortgagee]?
2. Did the trial court violate the terms and conditions of SDCL 21-47-16 which provides [that the holder shall provide proof of the fair and reasonable value of the mortgaged premises if he is unwilling to bid the full amount of the judgment debt]?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that the property should be sold in one parcel or tract?

DECISION

Issues 1 and 2 are so intertwined that they may be treated together. We have previously referred to SDCL 21-47-15, -16, and -17 as the “deficiency judgment statutes.” Miners & Merchants Bank v. Braden Forestry, 374 N.W.2d 123 (S.D.1985); Perpetual Nat’l. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 85 S.D. 330, 182 N.W.2d 216 (1970). The legislative policy for the enactment of these statutes is indicated in the title of the bill: An Act to Prevent Unjust Enrichment and Gain by the Holders of Real Estate Mortgages Through the Foreclosure Thereof by Action. 1939 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 146.

SDCL 21-47-15 allows the mortgagee to purchase the property subject to the mortgage at the foreclosure sale provided “he bids fairly and in good faith ... and bids the fair and reasonable value thereof.”

SDCL 21-47-16 provides:

If the holder of such mortgage is not willing at such sale to bid the full amount of the judgment debt, it shall be the duty of such mortgage holder to establish at the time of the trial by competent proof to the satisfaction of the court, the fair and reasonable value of the mortgaged premises, and the court shall determine the same in its decree; and if the court shall find such fair and reasonable value to be less than the sum due on said mortgage, with costs and expenses of sale, it may by such decree authorize such mortgage holder to bid not less than the fair and reasonable value as thus determined, and if a deficiency remains after the foreclosure sale, such mortgagee, or his assigns, shall be entitled to a general execution for' such deficiency only upon application to the court in which the judgment was rendered.

The import of these statutes goes deeper than the right to recover a deficiency judgment. A deficiency judgment is, naturally, the inevitable result of bidding less than the full amount of the judgment debt. The right of the mortgagee to bid at all is embodied in § 21-47-15 which requires submission of a bid at the fair and reasonable value, made in good faith. This requirement works to the protection of inferior lienholders as well as the mortgagors. Thus, Agnes had standing to raise this issue, even though Melfred and Kay did not appeal.

It is significant to note that § 21-47-16 imposes upon the mortgagee the duty to establish, at the time of trial, the fair and reasonable value of the mortgaged premises. In American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, Etc. v. Kass, 320 N.W.2d 800 (S.D.1982), we equated the term “fair and reasonable value” with “market value” saying: “ ‘market value’ is the highest price for which property considered at its best and most profitable use can be sold in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer, neither acting under compulsion and both exercising reasonable judgment.” 320 N.W.2d at 802 (citations omitted). We further held that “any relevant and material evidence, if competent under general rules of evidence, is admissible to prove market value” in a foreclosure and deficiency judgment action. Id.

Here, the only determination made by the trial court of fair and reasonable value was in its memorandum decision, which of course is not and cannot be appealed. The only testimony of value of the property was an appraisal of $484,000, which seems to have been totally ignored by the trial court. The $267,000 subordinated amount determined by the trial court (although omitted from its findings of fact) does not *418meet any of the criteria that have been developed by this court to determine fair and reasonable value. In fact, it appears that there was a total disregard of that statutory requirement. Apparently, the trial court became involved in an exercise of marshalling assets and overlooked the basic question of full and true value, regardless of the liens.

As stated earlier, the only evidence in the record regarding value is that of an appraisal at $484,000. The trial court did not have to accept that figure. Under the record there is an obvious genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment, namely, the reasonable value of the property. The trial court, rather than adopting any figure, made a calculation of its own, which exercise is a finding of fact and does not belong in a summary judgment action.

Agnes argues that by allowing the summary judgment to stand we allow FLB, in essence, to disenfranchise her of a portion of the balance due on her contract. She argues in her brief that this amount is $76,000, being the difference between her balance due and the subordinated amount. Because this case is remanded to the trial court we need not address that issue.

Agnes also claims that the court abused its discretion in ordering the ranch to be sold as a single tract. The trial court concluded the ranch was one distinct, compact, and contiguous farm, ranch or tract which should be sold in one unit. The ranch consists of approximately 4,000 acres located in Harding County, South Dakota, and consists of a balance between crop land, pasture land, and improved pasture land, together with improvements thereon. The property has been utilized as a distinct, compact and contiguous farm or ranch.

SDCL 21-47-13 gives the court the power and discretion to determine the manner of sale of mortgaged property. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly directed that the mortgaged premises here be sold as a single tract or parcel of land. Furman v. Anderson, 61 S.D. 378, 249 N.W. 626 (1933).

The summary judgment is reversed.

MORGAN, J., and GERKEN, Circuit Judge, concur. WUEST, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur in part and dissent in part. GERKEN, Circuit Judge, sitting for HENDERSON, J., disqualified.