dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Under the unique facts presented here, remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not the offense took place on the campus premises is unwarranted. I would find due to the liberal construction to be afforded in applying 71 P.S. § 646, that the General *163Assembly did not intend such an absurd result as is considered by the majority — that a campus security officer on routine patrol, who, due to the geographic makeup of the campus must utilize public streets for ingress and egress, is possibly without jurisdiction to apprehend a felon while a felony is in progress depending on the location of where the felony takes place.
In construing legislation, this court must ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). Since section 646 is not penal in nature, it must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose and promote justice. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c); Commonwealth v. Holderman, 284 Pa.Super. 161, 425 A.2d 752 (1981). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd or impractical. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1). A review of the text of section 646 reveals that it does not address the jurisdictional question in the instant case of whether campus security may apprehend a felon off campus while on routine patrol and utilizing public roadways of egress and ingress to effectuate the patrol.
Where the statutory definition is not explicit, we may ascertain the intention of the legislature by considering, among others, such factors as the occasion and necessity for the statute, the circumstances under which it was enacted, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be attained, the consequences of a particular interpretation and the contemporaneous legislative history of such statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c); Com., Higher Ed. Assistance v. Abington Memorial, 478 Pa. 514, 387 A.2d 440 (1978). A review of the scant legislative history surrounding the enactment of section 646 reveals that the statute was promulgated to provide effective protection to the persons and property located within the campus and to relieve local authorities of the burden of supplying the service, Holderman, supra; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 381 Pa.Super. *164592, 554 A.2d 542 (1989), and to alleviate the legislature’s concern over the delay that results from colleges and universities relying on local or state police for campus security. Mitchell, supra.
A thorough search reveals only four cases which interpret the jurisdictional restraint on campus security. In Savage, supra, the sole case cited by the majority, campus security intentionally usurped the power of the local police by concentrating their efforts on activities occurring at a local pub beyond the campus boundaries. Campus security went so far as to position the patrol car facing the pub and remained stationary until a violation occurred. While laying in wait, campus security witnessed Savage run a red light and gave chase. Once captured, Savage was also charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Following his conviction of the two summary offenses, Savage appealed. A panel of this court, agreeing with the trial court, found that both the red light violation and the subsequent chase occurred off the campus premises, violating section 646, and subsequently the evidence obtained as a result of his arrest had to be suppressed.1
In Holderman, supra, a panel of this court was presented with the issue of whether campus security could make a summary arrest outside the campus boundaries where the initial offense occurred on the campus and where campus security made the arrest after hot pursuit of the offender. Finding that section 646 must be liberally construed, the panel concluded that the subsequent arrest off campus was lawful and that the legislature could not have intended to prohibit *165campus security from pursuing and arresting summary offenders fleeing campus.
Similarly, in Mitchell, supra, this court, again recognizing the liberal construction of the statute to effectuate its remedial purpose, held that the legislature could not have intended to limit the jurisdiction of campus security solely to educational and residential grounds, but also to commercial properties owned by the college or university which were used for investment purposes. The court in Mitchell realized that campus properties of “a college or university, especially when located within a municipality, may not be contiguous, but may be located in or constitute various sections of the municipality”. Mitchell, 381 Pa.Super. at 602, 554 A.2d at 547. The court stated that to hold otherwise,
we would be ignoring the layout and everyday operation of a college or university. We find the legislature would not have created a situation where it would have ignored the realities of the college or university campus ... We, therefore, conclude that “premises” and “grounds and buildings” within the statutory framework of 71 P.S. § 646(h) include, not only academic and residential areas, but also commercial property of a college or university used for investment purposes.
Id. While acknowledging that a campus may not be contiguous, but rather may be located within or constitute various sections of municipality, the panel did not specifically address the jurisdictional power of campus security to make an arrest on routine patrol which occurs between point “A,” located on the campus, and during the drive on a public street while en route to point “B” which is also campus property, but located in another section of the municipality.
Thus, all these cases are readily distinguishable from the instant facts and establish that the situation presented here is one of first impression. Instantly, we have an officer on routine patrol, who due to the geographic nature of the *166university campus must use routes of ingress and egress which, while may be adjacent to campus property, are not designated as campus owned roadways, who sees a felony in progress and then hotly pursues the suspects after being flagged down by the victim. These actions are in compliance with the legislative intent embodied in the statute governing the powers of the campus security to effect an arrest and do not usurp the powers of the municipal police authorities as is prohibited by 71 P.S. § 646.
I would find that an arrest that occurs on a public roadway which, due to the geographic make up of the campus must be used by campus security while performing routine patrol is lawful and consistent with the legislative intent. Further, such an activity naturally flows from the statutory meaning to be given to protection of campus grounds and premises. I find it absurd that the legislature could have intended that campus security while on routine patrol are powerless to act under such circumstances. Requiring campus security to contact campus dispatch who in turn must contact local authorities would waste crucial time and possibly result in physical injury to the victim. Here, campus security did not intentionally usurp local authority or somehow purposefully involve themselves in such conduct that would be out of the norm of the routine patrol. The officer happened upon a felony robbery in progress which included the defendant wielding a 10-12 inch kitchen knife at the victim. The victim was a student at the university, was walking home to his apartment and had just walked past the University of Pittsburgh Law School when he was attacked.
Unlike the cases cited above, the instant facts establish the urgency of the situation and at the very least that the attack occurred adjacent to the university campus. To hold that the location of the incident could jeopardize the arrest, where campus security are on routine patrol, undermines the legislative objective in promulgating the statute to protect persons and property and to alleviate the burden on local police *167authority. Mitchell, supra. As such, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
. Research discloses only one other case where an arrest off campus by campus security resulted in suppression of evidence. In Commonwealth v. Dixon, 226 Pa.Super. 569, 323 A.2d 55 (1974), the defendant was arrested for the summary offense of disorderly conduct on a public road adjoining the campus. No facts were offered as to whether security personnel were on routine patrol or had acted intentionally to usurp local authority. Also distinguishable from the instant case, was the fact that the parties in Dixon stipulated prior to trial that the arresting officer had no jurisdiction under the facts to make the arrest. Id. at 571, 323 A.2d at 56.