concurring.
The majority affirms the decree of the orphans’ court refusing trustee Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Company’s request for payment of $2,400 of commissions on the principal of settlor Allen Ritzman’s perpetual charitable trust. While I agree with the majority’s result, I cannot agree with its reasoning.
Dauphin Deposit introduced evidence that its present fee of five per cent of trust income, as fixed by settlor’s deed of trust, is less than the current rate charged for administration of trusts. This evidence, according to the majority, is insufficient proof that Dauphin Deposit “is not receiving fair and full compensation” and therefore will not support a claim on principal.
*480In Breyer Estate, 475 Pa. 108, 379 A.2d 1305 (1977), this Court unanimously upheld the orphans’ court’s exercise of discretion in awarding interim commissions where the trustee presented the very evidence Dauphin Deposit offered here and the opposing beneficiary offered no countervailing evidence. As in Breyer, I am not prepared to say that, as a matter of law, Dauphin Deposit’s evidence of comparable fees is insufficient. Rather, this evidence could reasonably support Dauphin Deposit’s claim. It is for the orphans’ court, with years of experience in supervising the fund, and not for us, to determine if in these circumstances this evidence requires such an award.
A far more straightforward, sensible ground supports the decree of the orphans’ court. The orphans’ court, in disallowing Dauphin Deposit’s request for commissions from principal, relied upon the “Taxis rule,” that trustees of perpetual charitable trusts can draw from principal only if they demonstrate the existence of unusual or extraordinary circumstances. E. g., Pender Estate, 68 Pa.Dist. & Co.2d 265 (O.C.Div.Mont.1974). This rule restates the common law standard applicable to all trusts until 1953, when the Legislature enacted 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7185 (1975), which directs orphans’ courts to allow trustees “not . . . fully compensated . . . such original or additional compensation out of the trust income or the trust principal, or both, as may be necessary to compensate him for the services theretofore rendered,” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7185(b), unless the settlor directs otherwise. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7185(c).1
*481When it enacted Section 7185, the Legislature did not intend to disturb the common law limitation on interim commissions from perpetual charitable trusts. By using the language “[w]henever it shall appear either during the continuance of a trust or at its end” (emphasis added), the Legislature clearly contemplated that its modification of the common law rule extended only to trusts of a fixed duration. A contrary interpretation of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7185, permitting application to a perpetual charitable trust, would inevitably destroy the principal and hence the trust. The “Taxis rule” is a sound one upon which the orphans’ court properly relied and which this Court should follow.
The majority also affirms that portion of the orphans’ court decree directing Dauphin Deposit to pay attorneys’ fees from trust income rather than principal. Again, though I agree with the majority’s result, I cannot agree with its rationale. The majority finds that Dauphin Deposit has not demonstrated that the orphans’ court, in deeming trust income rather than principal the source of payment, abused its discretion under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8111(b).2 Dauphin Deposit is not, however, a proper party to take a position that counsel fees should be paid from principal rather than income. Rather, its sole responsibility as fiduciary in this respect is to comply with the decree of the orphans’ court. Here, as to the source of payment of attorneys’ fees, as in Girt Estate, 452 Pa. 156, 165 n. 7, 305 A.2d 372, 378 n. 7 *482(1973), “[t]he professional corporate fiduciary, having no estate interest whatsoever in the outcome of this litigation, should not have participated in this appeal.”
For these reasons, I would affirm the decree of the orphans’ court.
POMEROY and NIX, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.. 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7185(b) & 7185(c) provide:
“Compensation
(b) Allowed out of principal or income. — Neither the fact that a fiduciary’s service has not ended nor the fact that the trust has not ended shall be a bar to the fiduciary’s receiving compensation for his services out of the principal of the trust. Whenever it shall appear either during the continuance of a trust or at its end, that a fiduciary has rendered services for which he has not been fully compensated, the court having jurisdiction over his accounts, shall allow him such original or additional compensation out of the trust income or the trust principal or both, as may be necessary to compensate him for the services theretofore rendered by him. The
*481provisions of this section shall apply to ordinary and extraordinary services alike.
(c) Compensation prescribed by will or other instrument.— Where the compensation of a fiduciary is expressly prescribed either by provisions of a will or deed of trust or other instrument under which he is acting or by provisions of an agreement between him and the creator of a trust, nothing in this section shall change in any way the rights of any party in interest or of the fiduciary.”
We have held that trusts established before 1953 are subject to these sections. Ehret Estate, 427 Pa. 584, 235 A.2d 414 (1967).
. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8111(b) provides:
“Expenses; trust estates
(b) Trustees’ compensation, compensation of assistants and court costs and attorneys’ and other fees may be apportioned between income and principal as the court may direct.”