concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient in this case to sustain the guilty verdicts on the charges of criminal conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. However, I part with the majority on the sentencing issue.
The statutory analysis espoused in Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 533 Pa. 294, 621 A.2d 990 (1993); Commonwealth v. Beatty, 411 Pa.Super. 450, 601 A.2d 1253 (1992) (en banc), alloc. granted 531 Pa. 644, 612 A.2d 983 (1992); and Commonwealth v. Eyster, 401 Pa.Super. 477, 585 A.2d 1027 (1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 646, 602 A.2d 857 (1992), that a “previous conviction” must precede a subsequent offense before the “previous conviction” can be used to enhance the sentence for the later offense, applies with equal vigor in the case at bar. Here, appellant committed his second offense before he was convicted for his first offense. Under these circumstances, I would vacate judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ., join.