concurring.
I enthusiastically endorse and join the majority opinion.
I write separately to express my continuing disagreement with this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 533 Pa. 167, 620 A.2d 1115 (1993), and to affirmatively welcome the “reining in” of what might have otherwise become an unfettered stampede to apply the “independent source doctrine” in contravention of the clear purposes of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the exclusionary rule.1
The case sub judice addresses the question of whether the “independent source doctrine” secures the admissibility of evidence discovered during an illegal, forcible entry and search of a dwelling, when prior to the warrantless entry the searching officers sent fellow attesting officers to a magistrate in order to seek a search warrant which concededly is based upon probable cause.2 In my view, consideration of the “inde*573pendent source doctrine” under the instant facts raises a serious concern.
Simply stated, I firmly believe that expansion of the applicability of the “independent source doctrine” beyond very narrow and limited circumstances may encourage governmental officials and police officers to adopt a dangerous mindset. If the “independent source doctrine” were applied under the instant facts every police officer in this Commonwealth could rightfully conclude that if he or she first sent for a warrant based upon probable cause, and that warrant were ultimately issued, no evidence seized as a result of an illegal early entry and search without the warrant, would ever be suppressed. This potential mindset undermines the fundamental principle that the admissibility of evidence discovered during a warrant-less entry without exigent circumstances is the exception to the rule rather than the rule itself.
I believe application of the “independent source doctrine” is proper only in the very limited circumstances where the “independent source” is truly independent from both the tainted evidence and the police or investigative team which engaged in the misconduct by which the tainted evidence was discovered. In my view, the “independent source doctrine” can be safely applied under these limited circumstances because I do not believe that the police would risk an illegal entry based upon the remote possibility that a truly independent source will somehow materialize to remove the taint of their illegal entry. Only such limitations on the doctrine can effectively protect from the possibility that police might engage in misconduct without fear of consequence. While acknowledging the applicability of the “independent source doctrine” under these limited circumstances, I feel compelled to state clearly and unequivocally that the “independent source doctrine,” as an exception to the exclusionary rule, should not be allowed to swallow the rule itself. I fear, however, that this Court’s decision in Brundidge has already gone a long way toward sanctioning such a result.
Thus, in the case sub judice, I would go further than the majority and hold that except under extraordinarily specific *574circumstances which are not present here, i.e., a truly independent source, this Court should never tolerate the entry or search of any constitutionally protected private place, absent exigent circumstances, without the proper and prior issuance of a valid search warrant. Such an illegal entry or search should always result in the application of the exclusionary rule, and the consequent suppression of any evidence discovered as a result of the police misconduct, whether intentional or inadvertent. I am compelled to conclude that the application of the “independent source doctrine” in a situation where the “independent source” is not truly independent of both the tainted evidence itself and the officers involved in the initial illegal search will completely eviscerate the exclusionary rule, failing either to deter police misconduct or to protect individual privacy rights as required by Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
. I dissented in Brundidge because of my concern that the "independent source doctrine” was being applied where there were serious questions as to whether the "independent source” was truly independent. This Court’s application of the “independent source doctrine” under the facts in Brundidge created what I believe to be a dangerous precedent, which will only mislead law enforcement officials and encourage police to adopt a “search first, pursue warrant later” mentality.
. The question is interesting. As the officers in the case sub judice sent for the warrant prior to their initial illegal entry of the house, there was no risk of a "search first, pursue warrant later” mentality, as there was in Brundidge. However, other concerns remain, as I discuss infra.