(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately to suggest an alternative legislative analysis requiring the inclusion of pregnancy and related disabilities in the statutory prohibition of sex-based discrimination prior to 1978.
Comparing the Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act, MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458(1) et seq., and succeeding Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., with *306its Federal fair employment counterpart, 42 USC 2000e et seq., discloses a similar legislative development. At the time of the complaints for benefits underlying this appeal, the language of the respective state and Federal statutes was similar in detail. The Michigan Act provided:
"It is an unfair employment practice:
"(a) For any employer, because * * * of the sex of any individual, to refuse to hire or otherwise to discriminate against him with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” MCL 423.303a; MSA 17.458(3a).
The equivalent provision in the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 USC 2000e-2(a), was only slightly more detailed:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin: or
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
In two cases decided after these disabilities were incurred, the United States Supreme Court found the exclusion from coverage of pregnancy and pregnancy related disabilities not to constitute discrimination violative of the Federal prohibition. General Electric Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125; 97 S Ct *307401; 50 L Ed 2d 343 (1976), Nashville Gas Co v Satty, 434 US 136; 98 S Ct 347; 54 L Ed 2d 356 (1977). In so holding, the Supreme Court in Gilbert specifically rejected the pregnancy-inclusive interpretation of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline, 29 CFR § 1604.10(b), adopted by the Civil Rights Commission as an interpretive guideline and argued by the Department of Civil Rights herein as controlling.
Subsequent to the clang of those cases, both Congress and our Legislature enacted amendments specifically including pregnancy and related conditions in the definition of sex. MCL 37.2201(d); MSA 3.548(201)(d), 42 USC 2000e(k). In its discussion of the Federal amendment, a report of the House of Representatives, HR Report No. 95-948, [1978] US Code Cong & Admin News 4750, disparaged upon the Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co decisions:
"H.R. 6075 will amend Title VII to clarify Congress’ intent to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions in the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment.
"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charged with implementation of Title VII, interpreted the act to include discrimination based on pregnancy. * * * It is the Committee’s view that these guidelines rightly implemented the Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination in the 1964 act.
"Eighteen Federal district courts and all seven Federal courts of appeals which have considered the issue have rendered decisions prohibiting discrimination in employment based on pregnancy, in accord with the Federal guidelines.
"Contrary to these rulings and guidelines, the Supreme Court, in General Electric Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125 (1976), decided in favor of General Electric’s disability insurance plan, which excluded coverage for women with pregnancy-related disabilities. The Court concluded that this exclusion in the company’s benefits *308policy was not gender-related but condition-related. It went on to indicate that because the plan did not exclude any disability that could be incurred by both men and women, it was not discriminatory.
"Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, supported the EEOC guidelines as a reasonable interpretation and implementation of the broad social objectives of Title VII. He pointed out that since the plan included comprehensive coverage for males, and failed to provide comprehensive coverage for females, the majority erred in finding that the exclusion of pregnancy disability coverage was a nondiscriminatory policy. Furthermore, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, argued that 'it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male.’
"It is the committee’s view that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the Act.” (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.)
As the majority notes Title VII does not preempt state law and we are not required by the main Supreme Court decisions to exclude pregnancy, 42 USC 2000e-7. See also 42 USC 2000h-4. Additionally, to the extent that the Michigan statute resembles the Federal act, both presently and at the time of the claims, congressional criticism of the Supreme Court while endorsing EEOC guidelines appears probative of the intent underlying our own statute. Since passage of the Federal Civil Rights Act, our Legislature has been but one step behind Congress in implementing statutory revisions of the fair employment laws. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Congress’s intent to include pregnancy and pregnancy related disabilities in the prohibition of sex-based discrimination prior to its 1978 amendments found a counterpart in the Michigan legislative intent enacting the Michigan provision.