(dissenting):
This case presents an important question concerning the interests of a natural parent, the state, the foster parents, and the Commonwealth in a determination of custody. When a natural parent has relinquished the custody of a child to a social service agency, under an entrustment agreement, but there has never been a judicial declaration that the child is deprived,1 what standard must the juvenile court employ in deciding whether the child should be returned to the natural parent? I would hold that the juvenile court must first determine whether or not the child will be deprived within the meaning of the Juvenile Act2 if returned to the natural parent. If *238the court determines that the child would be deprived if returned to the natural parent, it must then determine what disposition is best suited to the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child as required by the Act.3 If the court determines that the child will not be deprived, then the court must determine whether there are, nevertheless, compelling reasons for continuing custody of the child with the foster parents.
James and John LaRue were born on January 2, 1971. Joanne LaRue, the twins’ mother, retained custody of James and John until July 12, 1971. Although the record is almost completely devoid of direct testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding appellant’s decision to place the twins in the custody of Allegheny County Child Welfare Services (“CWS”),4 the CWS deprivation petition stated that “. . . said children were referred to [CWS] on July 15, 197 [1], by officials of Mercy Hospital who reported that said children were not receiving adequate care and supervision in their home. Said children were immediately taken to Zoar Home and after an Entrustment Agreement was signed by the mother, they were transferred to a [CWS] foster home.” On November 10, 1971, CWS placed the twins in the home of Dove and Allie Harp, where they have remained until the present.
*239On January 17, 1975, appellant revoked the entrustment agreement and notified CWS that she desired the return of her children. Because CWS felt that appellant was not able to provide adequate care for the twins, it filed a petition requesting the court to order the children “placed under the supervision of [CWS] with permission to place.”
The lower court held a hearing on March 15, 1975, at which the following facts were adduced. Appellant is twenty-eight years old and has never been married. She presently resides with her three other children in a three-bedroom home in a residential community. The house is rented on a month to month basis, and is appellant’s third residence in the past four years. The other children all attend school; one is in a special school for slow learners. Her caseworker, Dennis Noble, testified that when he visited the home “[t]he downstairs was pretty cold. . . . There was a broken window or door with a blanket hanging over it. The kitchen wasn’t very clean and there were — I saw a couple of roaches on the walls and floor of the living room.” In the bedroom intended for the twins, the plaster was falling from the ceiling.
Mr. Noble’s testimony was primarily an explication of the position expressed by CWS in its petition: “. When arrangements were made for the mother to visit with said children at [CWS], there were times when the mother would not appear and when she would come to visit them, her visits with said children would be brief. It was seldom that the mother would visit for the full time allotted her. During these visits, the interaction between the mother and said children was poor. The mother has expressed a desire to have said children return to her home. [CWS] does not feel that the mother is capable of providing adequate care and supervision for said children as yet.” Mr. Noble testified that while appellant was giving her other children adequate care, the *240addition of the twins to the household would prove too great a burden. He referred to the fact that one of appellant’s other children had been severely burned the previous December and still required treatment at the clinic twice a week.5 He also claimed that appellant “has never really cared for younger children. Her mother was taking care of the other children when they were young. . ” 6 Finally, Mr. Noble relied on a conversation he had with appellant on January 30, 1975. At that time, she told Mr. Noble that she had no real plans for the twins and that “Maybe I am not ready to have them back.”
Appellant vigorously disputed Mr. Noble’s assertion that she had never cared for her children when they were young. In this regard, it should be noted that Mr. Noble had been assigned to appellant’s case only five weeks prior to the hearing, and had seen her on only two occasions. Appellant further testified that she loved her sons, and was afraid that if they were not returned soon, they would never consider her their mother. Finally, appellant testified that she visited the children once a month (the maximum allowed by CWS) during the four-year period, and did not miss more than three appointments.
Lynette Norton, the caseworker for the foster parents, testified that she sees the twins approximately once every two weeks and testified that they are in good health, well-groomed and well-behaved. She stated that the *241twins enjoy an excellent relationship with the foster parents and the Harp’s two other foster children. Ms. Norton testified that the twins really do not know that appellant is their mother, although they were not upset or afraid when they met with her. She agreed with Mr. Noble’s conclusion that the removal of the twins from the foster home to reside permanently with their mother would be harmful:
“Q. Did the children seem anxious to get back to Mrs. Harp after the visits?
“A. I think so.
“Q. Did you ever mention to the children about going and staying with their mother permanently?
“A. I think that would be upsetting to them. I wouldn’t threaten a four-year-old with moving him out of his situation unless there was an eminent [sic] reality.
“Q. Did you ever inquire as to their feelings about moving them? About how they would like to go live with their mother or do you want to live with your mother?
“A. I have asked them how they enjoyed the visit and I haven’t been able to elicit much of an intelligible response. These are only four-year-old children, and I haven’t talked to them about how they would feel about returning home to her because I think that would frighten them if they would understand that at all.” Ms. Norton also disputed appellant’s claim that she visited the twins every month: “The record shows that visits were infrequent and since one a month is usually the maximum, I take that to imply once every several months.”
The final witness was the foster mother, Mrs. Harp. She described the close relationship that she and her husband have with the twins. Mrs. Harp is not employed and stays with the children on a full-time basis. She stated that she would gladly adopt the children were she allowed to do so.
*242Appellant’s counsel also sought to 'bring to the court’s attention the completely inadequate efforts of CWS in attempting to reunite appellant with her children:
“[COUNSEL FOR MS. LARUE]: One of the things I wanted to bring out, Your Honor, is the fact that in past Ms. LaRue has had a number of caseworkers, and there has been no consistent effort on the part of Child Welfare to introduce my client to any kind of counseling. And I am suggesting that [CWS] bears the responsibility toward the parent and that the parent shouldn’t have the responsibility of her own seeking the necessary counseling. And what I am asking is: In the future, is Ms. LaRue to anticipate from [CWS] the experience that she has had in the past which is occasional visits once a month; caseworkers leaving a month and two-months absence.
“THE COURT: I think I can take judicial notice of it. Yes, that’s what she is going to experience because Child Welfare doesn’t have the wherewithal; and once the child is out of the home, they are pretty much out of the picture in terms of trying to bring about some change in the situation unless there is a continued hearing where the Court has control of it and specific directions have been given. So, I don’t think that [Mr. Noble] is going to be able to tell you anything more than whatever services they have given in the past, which is minimal or not at all.”
The lower court noted, “ [t] his is the kind of situation where those kids and the mother should have been in an intensive program within weeks or a month after the child was removed.”
The Court determined that it could not find the twins deprived under present circumstances: “It is clear that a petition to find the children deprived must be dismissed as such, since a finding of deprivation is a ‘present finding’ and cannot relate to the past or projected to the future. The children are in a good home, doing well, and *243under no construction of the term deprived can this court find them deprived.”
Because the lower court determined that it could not make a finding of deprivation, it chose to treat the case as a traditional custody battle between two parties equally entitled to custody. It placed the burden on appellant to prove that the best interests of the children would be served by changing the present custody arrangements: “Okay, on that basis the mother is seeking return even though there was no Petition or no court determination made that she was unfit at that time. I think we have to proceed on the basis that the children now have almost a basic right to remain where they are unless the mother can show that she has the ability and capacity that in their best interest those children should be returned to her.” The court concluded that it must determine whether there were strong reasons for interrupting the present custody arrangements and whether the appellant was capable of providing adequate care: “There are two things in this case. One, I think just by virtue of the fact that Mrs. Harp has had these children so long and nowhere is there any indication that she is unfit. So, to my thought under that circumstance alone, no matter how well qualified Ms. LaRue would be, how much her circumstances have changed, I would say at this time we would have to make an Order placing the children with Child Welfare in her home. The other part is: I haven’t been convinced by anything I have heard here yet that Ms. LaRue is anywhere near being able to take these children back and giving them what would be equivalent or as good as what they are getting with Mrs. Harp, even in a minimal way. I just don’t believe that the circumstances there are stable enough that these children should be considered to be returned home for the indefinite future. .” (Emphasis supplied).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered that CWS retain custody and continue placement of the *244twins in the foster home. It continued the case for six months with the intention of reviewing its order at that time.
I
In order to articulate meaningful standards and procedures for juvenile courts to apply in child custody cases involving entrustment agreements, it is necessary to examine the interests at stake, the posture assumed by the Commonwealth in resolving those interests, and the procedures and standards established by the legislature for removing children from the custody of their parents.
The Juvenile Act7 was adopted to effectuate the following legislative purposes:
“(1) To preserve the unity of the family whenever possible and to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this act;
“(2) Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior, and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation;
“(3) To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety;
“(4) To provide means through which the provisions of this act are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.”
The Act provides comprehensive investigative and procedural safeguards to ensure that a child is not removed from the home unless it is determined that the child is ei*245ther delinquent or deprived and that there are no other means available to the court to promote the purposes of the Act. It contemplates that a proceeding to remove a child from the home will be commenced either by a delinquency or deprivation petition. 11 P.S. § 50-314. After adequate notice and a hearing, the Act requires that the court “.. . . shall make and file its findings as to whether the child is a deprived child, or if the petition alleges that the child is delinquent, whether the acts ascribed to the child were committed by him. If the court finds that the child is not a deprived child or that the allegations of delinquency have not been established it shall dismiss the petition and order the child discharged from any detention or other restriction theretofore ordered in the proceeding.” 11 P.S. § 50-320 (a) (Emphasis supplied).
If the court determines that the child is deprived, it is required by the Act to frame an order which is “best suited to the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child . . The court may:
“(1) Permit the child to remain with his parents, guardian, or other custodian, subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes, including supervision as directed by the court for the protection of the child.
“(2) Subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes transfer temporary legal custody to any of the following: (i) any individual in or outside Pennsylvania who, after study by the probation officer or other person or agency designated by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive and care for the child; (ii) an agency or other private organization licensed or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child or (iii) a public agency authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.
“(3) Without making any of the foregoing orders transfer custody of the child to the juvenile court of another state . . . .” 11 P.S. § 50-321.
*246Thus, the Legislature has declared that the family unit is not to be invaded by agents of the Commonwealth unless it can be proven by clear and convincing evidence that a child is deprived.8 Moreover, unless it is clearly necessary to separate child and parent, the family unit is to be preserved.9 The Juvenile Act contemplates that the first intervention by the Commonwealth, will be by petition brought in a juvenile court.
II
The difficulty in the instant case arises from the fact that the legislative procedures were not followed; rather, the children were removed from the home under the authority of an entrustment agreement. The Juvenile Act makes no provision for entrustment agreements; it does not prescribe procedures and standards governing their revocation. In short, the Juvenile Act did not contemplate the factual situation in this case.
Our Supreme Court has recently held that entrustment agreements are valid. Lee v. Child Care Service Delaware County Institution District, 461 Pa. 641, 337 A.2d 586 (1975). The Court held that the Department of *247Public Welfare regulations which authorized the county to utilize placement agreements were a valid exercise of the Department’s statutory authority. Further, the Court rejected appellants’ claims that the transfer of custody in this manner violated Pennsylvania decisional law or the due process clause of the federal constitution. In so doing, however, the Court emphasized the non-final nature of the agreement: “While it is certainly true that parents have a constitutionally protected interest in their children, see, e. g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1226, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975) (dictum); . . . appellants have failed to establish that the use of these ‘placement agreements’ in any way deprives them of due process. This is not a case where parental rights are terminated without an opportunity for the parent\_s~\ to prove their suitability to retain custody of their children. . . . Instead, here the parents consent to the transfer of custody to the Service and on that basis the Service undertakes the care of their children. Parents are told in clear language that conditions for the return of their children are ‘subject to the approval of [the Service].’ Moreover, it is apparent that they give up no right to a judicial determination of their rights to custody of their children. The agreement clearly provides that in the event of any disagreement on the conditions for return of the child, the dispute will be ‘reviewed’ by the Juvenile Court.’’ 461 Pa. at 650, 337 A.2d at 590 (Emphasis added).
Ideally, the entrustment agreement should be employed when a family finds itself in need of temporary assistance. See Lee v. Child Care Service Delaware County Institution District, supra, (Dissenting Opinion by NIX, J.). For example, a parent may become ill, lose his or her apartment, or be forced to leave the home for a period of time. If the parent has no relatives with whom the child may be left, it is perfectly reasonable to seek the aid of a social service agency. It is apparent, however, *248that entrustment agreements are often secured by the child welfare agency in lieu of filing a deprivation petition. See, general, Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35 Pitt.L.Rev. 1 (1973).
The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Manual for Services to Children and Youth, Regs. 4302 and 4332 “stress that the ‘parents right to maintain their relationship shall be safeguarded’ and the supportive help is to be provided to the parents during the child’s placement.’-’ Levine, Caveat Parens, supra at 21, n. 113. All too often, however an agency such as CWS, in its zeal to protect the child, loses sight of its corresponding duty to protect the interests of the parents, and to work with both child and parent in an effort to construct a foundation for the eventual return of the child. The net result of CWS’s use of entrustment agreements as a substitute for a deprivation petition combined with the agency’s failure to perform its duty to preserve the family is that the judicial function is supplanted and the stated legislative policy is thwarted. “An unpalatable reason for removal is that it is easier administratively to remove a child from an environment than to undertake the task of altering it. The result is that children are casually removed from their parents by agencies presumptively acting with the power of making a legal determination of deprivation. The portent of a double standard has been noted by a Pennsylvania Juvenile Court judge: ‘The minimum standard of care expected of a family and the criteria for intervention are established by the agency empowered to provide the service. As a rule, the standard is less than necessary to sustain an adjudication of neglect.’ It thus appears that many children removed by agencies would remain in their own homes if parents had the opportunity of being heard in a court of law.” Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection System, supra at 24-25.
*249While CWS’s use of entrustment agreements may covertly defeat the rights of the parent to custody, the child who is placed in foster care may develop strong psychological bonds with its foster parents. Under the provision of the Juvenile Act, CWS resorts to court when it is necessary for the welfare of the child to intervene in the lives of the family and to establish a judicially sanctioned method of alleviating the conditions which impinge on the child’s welfare. Because the child and the family have not yet been separated, the rights of the parent to custody and the interests of the child are sufficiently congruent that our legislature has declared that parent and child should not be separated unless justified by clear necessity. By contrast, when the Commonwealth has already separated the parent from its child under the authority of an entrustment agreement, the child’s interests and the rights of the parent often grow increasingly divergent: “Nothing could be more cruel than the forceable separation of a child from either its real or foster parents by whom it has been lovingly cared for and to whom it is bound by strong ties of affection; to a child it is equally cruel whether the separation is brought about by ‘kidnapping’ or by legal process.” Commonwealth ex rel. Children’s Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 97, 66 A.2d 300, 306 (1949). The juvenile court faces the difficult task of reconciling these potentially competing interests.
Clearly, the court cannot simply give the natural parent specific performance of the implicit provisions of the agreement allowing unilateral recission. The interests of children will not be governed by ordinary contract principles: “A child is not a chattel and therefore cannot be made the subject of a contract by a parent, with the same force and effect as a gift of conveyance, or grant of property, irrevocably or otherwise; the relationship of parent and child is a status and not a property right; the doctrine of the integrity of written instruments has *250no materiality and since the welfare of the child is the determining factor, the court in the exercise of its equitable powers may ignore a bargain previously made by a parent in parting with a child . . . .” Commonwealth ex rel. Berg v. The Catholic Bureau, 167 Pa.Super. 514, 517, 76 A.2d 427, 429 (1950). See also, Commonwealth ex rel. Children’s Aid Society v. Card, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Bankert v. Children’s Services, 224 Pa.Super. 556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973). On the other hand, there is a danger that the court will focus on the child to such an extent that the very real interest of the natural parent is completely forgotten. The approach we should adopt must, therefore, ensure the protection of the parent’s rights and the child’s interests.
Because the Juvenile Act did not contemplate the use of entrustment agreements and because no case clearly controls the present situation, we should fashion procedures and standards which accommodate the potentially competing interests of parent and child while preserving the declared policy of the Commonwealth of preserving family unity, whenever possible.
Ill
The proceeding to terminate an entrustment agreement may be commenced either by a petition by CWS to have the child declared deprived or by a habeas corpus petition brought by the natural parent.10 There must be a hearing by the juvenile court which comports with due process standards contained within the Juvenile Act.11
*251The court must first determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing that the child will be deprived if returned to the natural parent. We have recently held that this determination can be based on prognostic evidence. In re DeSavage, 241 Pa.Super. 174, 360 A.2d 237 (1976). Because the child-parent relationship has been disrupted by the entrustment agreement, the juvenile court will necessarily focus upon the ability and willingness of the natural parent to meet the child’s physical, mental and moral needs. If the petitioner does establish by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be deprived, then the court must determine whether clear necessity dictates that the child be continued in foster care or whether a less drastic solution is available. At this stage of the court’s inquiry, the focus will be on what combination of custody, visitation and counseling is best suited to the needs of the child. 11 P.S. § 50-321.
If the court determines that the evidence that the child will be deprived is not clear and convincing, the court must determine, in cases involving entrustment agreements, whether there are compelling reasons for continuing the child in foster care.12 At this stage, the court *252must attempt to reconcile the important rights of the parent to custody with the interests and welfare of the child. We emphasize that at this stage of the proceedings the court must not simply compare the homes of the foster and natural parents. Instead, the court should consider the following factors in reconciling the rights of the natural parent with the interests of the child.
The court must inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement to determine if the parents’ right to custody has been abused. Was the agreement signed under duress? Was the signing of the agreement clearly necessary in order to protect the child from living in continuing conditions amounting to deprivation? Or could more extensive efforts by CWS have preserved the integrity of the family ?
The court must then examine the efforts of the parents to preserve a relationship with their child. It must determine whether those efforts were promoted or frustrated by the social service agency. It must determine whether foster care or CWS custody continued beyond the time that the disability or other reasons for signing the entrustment agreement had lapsed.
The court must also examine the effect of continued foster placement on a child. As we have already noted, a strong bond may grow between the child and his foster parents. If the child is uprooted again, severe psychological damage may result. The court must, therefore, attempt to determine how strong the bond between the *253child and the foster parents has grown. The duration and continuity of foster care and the age of the child will obviously bear on this aspect of the court’s inquiry. If the child has been in foster care for a relatively short period of time, or has been shifted about from one foster home to another, or began foster care after it had attained an age which would enable it to accept and understand disruptive changes in its life, then it is less likely that the child will be adversely affected. On the other hand, if the child is relatively young or had continued in one foster home for a prolonged period of time, maintaining continuity will be much more important to the child’s welfare.
Finally, the court must also consider the comparative ability of the two sets of parents to meet the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child. If the home of the natural parents is stable and the child’s needs are likely to be met adequately, the court will be more ready to return the child to the natural parents. However, if the home of the natural parents is marginally adequate, and if the foster home is substantially better able to provide the necessities of a child’s life, then the court will be more likely to continue foster care. In this respect, the court will necessarily take into account the needs of the child for stability and continuity. If one disposition is more likely to meet these needs, while the other would appear to be of a temporary nature, then the court should be more willing to place the child in a situation which will lead to stability.
Obviously, each case involving an entrustment agreement will ultimately be decided on the basis of its own particular facts and the foregoing list of factors is not meant to be exhaustive. For this reason, when a natural parent seeks to regain custody of a child, it is absolutely essential that the juvenile court conduct a complete evidentiary hearing. The rights of the natural parent and *254future of a child cannot be determined on anything less than a thorough consideration of all relevant factors: “This court has repeatedly made plain that in a child custody case two requirements must be satisfied: the record must be complete; and the hearing judge must by his opinion give us the benefit of a thorough analysis of that record.” Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa.Super. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976).
I empathize with the plight of the parties and with the difficult choices facing our juvenile courts. The lower court in the instant case was obviously moved by sincere concern for the welfare of the children, the frustrations of appellant, and the potentially thankless position of the foster parents. Nevertheless, I would vacate the order of the lower court and remand for further proceedings because I do not believe the lower court gave adequate weight to appellant’s right to custody. The lower court did not inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the signing of the entrustment agreement. It deprived appellant of an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses who could shed light on this subject. It should not have placed the burden on appellant to show that her home was better than the foster parents. The lower court did not have the benefit of this Court’s reasoning in In re: Dale Henry DeSavage, supra, which authorized an examination of the adequacy of the appellant’s home under a deprivation standard based on prognostic evidence. I am confident that the lower court will remedy these problems on remand.
I would vacate the order of the lower court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, § 24; 11 P.S. § 50-321.
. The lower court did not allow testimony regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the appellant’s decision to sign the entrustment agreement. However, it did rely extensively on facts contained in CWS’s file, which was not admitted into evidence. This procedure alone would be reversible error because it deprived appellant of her rights of confrontation and cross-examination. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Wood v. Tucker, 231 Pa.Super. 461, 463, 332 A.2d 191 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Mathis v. Cooper, 188 Pa.Super. 113, 146 A.2d 158 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Balick v. Balick, 172 Pa.Super. 196, 92 A.2d 703 (1952); Commonwealth ex rel. Rubertucci v. Rubertucci, 159 Pa.Super. 511, 49 A.2d 269 (1946); Commonwealth ex rel. Oncay v. Oncay, 153 Pa.Super. 569, 570, 34 A.2d 839 (1943).
. The record reveals continuing attempts to imply negligence on appellant’s part in connection with the accident. It occurred while appellant was in the home, but on a different floor. Mr. Noble was permitted to testify over objection, that a hospital social worker had said there was some question concerning whether appellant had acted promptly. He also testified that the hospital wanted to file an abuse report, but that appellant’s social worker, Mrs. Gibson, was convinced the incident was purely accidental, and persuaded the hospital not to file the report.
. There was also testimony that appellant’s fifteen-year-old niece ran away on two occasions while she resided with appellant.
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, § 1 et seq.; 11 P.S. § 50-101 et seq.
. The high standard embodied in the definition of deprivation is necessary to “impress[ ] the trier of fact and the parties with the importance of protecting the family from intrusion by the state”. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa.Super. 371, 391, 324 A.2d 562, 573 (1974).
. It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that the power of the state to separate a child from its parents is justifiable only in cases of clear necessity: “A court should not take the custody of children from their parents solely on the ground that the state or its agencies can find a better home for them. If ‘the better home’ were the only test, public welfare officials could take children from half of the parents in the state whose homes are considered to be the less desirable and place them in the homes of the other half of the population considered to have the more desirable homes. Upon extending the principle further, we would find that the family believed to have the best homes would have the choice of any of our children.” Commonwealth ex rel. Benson v. Wayne County Child Welfare Services, 198 Pa.Super. 329, 332, 181 A.2d 850, 852 (1962).
. The form of the petition or the party who filed it should not determine the standard. The instant case could have been commenced by a habeas corpus petition filed by appellant rather than a deprivation petition filed by CWS. See Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa.Super. 371, 385, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
. Juvenile Act, supra; 11 P.S. §§ 50-312-50-320.
. I recognize that this inquiry is not explicitly authorized by the Juvenile Act; and, to this extent, a proceeding after the revocation of an entrustment agreement deviates from the statutory scheme for deprivation proceedings. The facts of the instant case are analogous to those in Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, supra. In Stapleton, Brent Leitzel, born on August 13, 1968, spent the first three months of his life in the custody of his natural parents. On November 22, 1968, the Dauphin County Child Care Service filed a petition alleging that Brent and his brother were deprived. Brent was placed with foster parents (not the Stapletons) until April 25, 1969, when he was returned to the Leitzels. The Service removed Brent a second time in August, 1969, and placed him in the custody of the Stapletons. The juvenile court adjudicated Brent a dependent child, and the Service was formally granted custody on January 30, 1970. Brent remained in custody of the Stapletons until October 10, 1973, when they returned him to the Service under the threat of a contempt citation. The litigation commenced when the Service notified the Stapletons that it intended to return Brent to his natural parents. Our Court held that because the case did not involve removal of the child from the home of the natural parent, a deprivation stan*252dard was inapplicable. We held that because there had already been a prior deprivation proceeding and the family had already been wrenched apart, the reason for the standard no longer existed and the court below should have awarded custody based upon an analysis of the child’s best interests.
Stapleton did not address the situation in which the natural parent-child relationship was disrupted by means other than the judicial process. However, because the deprivation proceedings and standards contained within the Juvenile Act preclude any analysis of the interests of the child if there is no clear and convincing evidence of deprivation, I would extend the Stapleton rationale to the facts of the instant case.