dissenting:
I strongly dissent from the result reached and the approach taken by the majority, which approach is unsound, illogical and, in several respects, wholly unsupported by precedent or common sense. I fear that today’s decision has, for all practical intents and purposes, completely eliminated any possibility of a successful challenge to economic or social legislation on Equal Protection grounds in the absence of “suspect” classifications or classifications affecting fundamental rights.1
I believe the majority and I are in basic agreement as to the standard of review to be utilized in scrutinizing classifications created by statutory enactments regulating economic and social welfare. An act of the General Assembly will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitution, Snider v. Thornburg, 496 *307Pa. 159, 166, 436 A.2d 593, 596 (1981), and the presumption is in favor of constitutionality with a heavy burden upon the one who challenges the legislation to overcome that presumption. Milk Control Commission v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 659, 198 A.2d 840 (1964).
In the area of economics and social welfare, absent some “suspect” classification or implication of a “fundamental right”, a state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause “merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect ... [or are] not made with mathematical nicety . . . . ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). As this Court stated in Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 400-401, 341 A.2d 441 (1971):
The Equal Protection Clause ... does not deny the state the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways, but does deny the right to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the particular statute. The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly circumstanced will be treated alike.
See Snider v. Thornburg, supra, 496 Pa. 165-166, 436 A.2d 596, quoting Moyer.
Accordingly, the reviewing court must juxtapose the legitimate objectives of the Act, as found in the Act and as offered by the parties, alongside the classifications created by the operation of the 35%-38% ratio contained in the Table, section 404(e)(1), 43 P.S. § 804(e)(1), and the “20% minimum rule”, section 401(a), 43 P.S. § 801(a), to determine if the classifications are reasonable, not arbitrary, and bear a “fair and substantial” relation to the objectives. See Snider v. Thornburg, supra, 496 Pa. 167, 436 A.2d 597.
It must be recalled that just recently, this Court in Snider v. Thornburg gave careful consideration to the appropriate standard of review for classifications created by economic or *308social legislation. This analysis was necessitated by two lines of cases of this Court which had been interpreted as espousing two different standards of review. 496 Pa. at 166, 436 A.2d at 595-96; compare Springfield School District v. Department of Education, 483 Pa. 539, 397 A.2d 1154 (1974) with Moyer v. Phillips, supra. A majority of this Court concluded that the two lines of cases were not, in fact, at odds, and firmly established that the test in this Commonwealth is whether the challenged classification is reasonable, not arbitrary, and rests upon a difference having a fair and substantial relation to some legitimate object of the legislation. 496 Pa. at 168, 436 A.2d at 597. We further explained that the “reasonable basis” or “rational basis” for a classification must be a function of the relationship between the classification and the purpose of the legislation. Id. at 436 A.2d 596, citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Staub, 461 Pa. 486, 337 A.2d 258 (1975).
It seems that the majority acknowledges this standard of review,2 yet by its abject deference to the legislature, the gloss put on the standard all but obliterates this Court’s ability, and abdicates our responsibility, to scrutinize legislative enactments for classifications which have no rational basis or bear no reasonable relation to legitimate legislative goals.3
*309Accepting, arguendo, the validity of the principle that “[i]n determining whether a classification is rational a court is free to hypothesize the reasons the legislature might have had for its classification,” majority opinion at 111, I cannot agree that a court is free to conjure some imagined “rational basis”. The majority makes the “hypothesized rational basis” appear from seemingly insubstantial matter: “The necessary rational basis for the legislative decision to require a lower percentage of earnings outside their highest quarter for higher paid claimants appears when we examine the rule in the context of its legislative history.” Majority opinion at 115 (emphasis added). This appearance of a “rational basis” takes the form of the following unintelligible statement: “the purpose of the amendment adding an explicit fixed percentage requirement to the statute for those earning maximum qualifying wages was improvement of the correlation between multiple of weekly earnings as a statistical test for attachment to the work force for claimants whose seasonal work is concentrated in their highest quarter.” Majority opinion at 116.
It is not only dangerous precedent to ferret out the “necessary rational basis” from such an unlikely source as the “context of [the] legislative history”, it is particularly onerous where, as here, the imagined “rational basis” actually contradicts the rational basis consistently offered by the Commonwealth as its justification for the classification. The Commonwealth tell us that the purpose of the monetary eligibility scheme here in question is to insure that benefits *310are paid only to those employees who have demonstrated a genuine, prior attachment to the labor force. Brief for Appellee Unemployment Compensation Board of Review at 19 and Brief for Appellee Attorney General at 7. The legislature has “measured that prior attachment by reference to two interrelated factors: high quarter earnings and total qualifying wages.” Brief for Appellee Attorney General at 7.
The majority acknowledges that the formula comparing high quarterly wages to total qualifying wages (“on the Table”, the formula establishes a 35%-38% ratio) is “designed to ensure that a certain percentage of a claimant’s wages will have been earned outside of her highest quarter, so as to demonstrate that a claimant has been genuinely attached to the labor force.” Majority opinion at 110, 114. However, in the next breath, the majority tells us that the “20% minimum rule” of section 401(a), 43 P.S. § 801(a), was intended both to “tighten up” eligibility (it is difficult to imagine how a 20% ratio “tightens up” eligibility when the ratio established by the Table is a 90% greater measure of attachment) while somehow simultaneously intended to be “in fact advantageous to the seasonal worker and ameliorate anomolous denials of benefits to claimants who are in fact fully attached to the work force but in seasonal employment which makes them powerless to correlate their work weeks with the base year calendar.” Majority opinion at 116. Thus, the majority pretends the legislature perceived this measurement from the Table (359N38%) as “anomolous” when it denies benefits to “seasonal workers”, and so enacted the “20% minimum rule” to “ameliorate” the disadvantage to those workers who are not sufficiently attached to the labor force under the Table formula.
Such reasoning is convoluted and contradictory. How can a “seasonal worker” be thought to be any more “fully attached to the work force” than, say, Elaine Martin who has averaged five months of work per year for three and one-half years? Is it because, as the majority postulates, “seasonal employment ... makes [seasonal workers] power*311less to correlate their work weeks with the base year calendar”? Is Elaine Martin any less “powerless to correlate [her] work weeks with the base year calendar”? It seems to me that “seasonal workers” by definition are not “powerless to correlate their work weeks” because a seasonal worker is one who has chosen to work in a limited season. Is the housewife who works for a department store during the Christmas season “anomolously” denied benefits because she cannot meet the Table requirements (35%-38%) which are designed to measure attachment to the labor forcel Is a college student who works construction in the summer “anomolously” denied benefits because he or she cannot fulfill the Table requirements designed to measure attachment to the labor force? Is it conceivable that the legislature felt it “anomolous” that those workers who did not fulfill the Table standards for measuring attachment to the labor force were ineligible for benefits, and so enacted legislation designed to make it easier for those less attached claimants to collect benefits? No, it is not conceivable that the legislature “intended” such an incongruous “rational basis”.
Such obviously specious reasoning does not befit this Court nor does it supply a rational basis or reasonable relationship to the legitimate legislative objective. The operative words (“rational” and “reasonable”) are rendered inoperative by the majority’s analysis. The “intent” attributed to the General Assembly by the majority—that the Table ratio of high quarter to total qualifying wages (set at 35%--38%) was meant to ensure a claimant’s genuine attachment, but this measure results in “anomolous” denials of benefits to workers who are not genuinely attached, thus necessitating a substantially reduced measure for those workers—is decidedly irrational and unreasonable to say the least.
Moreover, even assuming this “hypothesized” intent of the General Assembly were true and “rational”, there are two further reasons why such an intent cannot supply the requisite nexus—the fair and substantial relationship—to the legitimate legislative goal. First, the dichotomy created by *312the statutory scheme creating two separate and distinct ratios for measurement of attachment to the work force does not provide an “advantage” to all “seasonal workers” as the majority would have us believe. It provides an advantage only to the higher paid seasonal workers. In comparing “seasonal workers” who are similarly situated vis á vis their attachment to the labor force, i.e. those who have worked a like amount of equally distributed hours in the base year, we find that the lower paid seasonal workers are not at all “advantaged” by the “20% minimum rule”.
A seasonal worker, say a migrant farm worker, who has worked for 13 weeks in her high quarter at $200.00 per week ($2,600.00 high quarter earnings) and 4 weeks outside her high quarter at the same rate of pay ($800.00 outside earnings, or $3,400.00 total qualifying wages) is “on the Table” for determining eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. Her qualifying wage is $4,160.00, so she is denied benefits. The Table requires this worker to have made 37.5% of her earnings outside of her high quarter; she has earned only 23.5%. Being on the Table, this claimant cannot avail herself of the “20% minimum rule”.
A highly paid construction worker, on the other hand, has worked for 13 weeks in her high quarter at $500.00 per week ($6,500.00 high quarter earnings) and 4 weeks outside her high quarter at the same rate of pay ($2,000.00 outside earnings, or $8,500.00 total qualifying wages). Being “off the Table”, this seasonal worker need only have earned 20% of her earnings outside of her high quarter. Having 23.5% of her earnings in an “outside” quarter, as did the migrant worker, this claimant is eligible for benefits. These two claimants have demonstrated the exact same attachment to the labor force, the only difference being the rate of pay.
If, in fact, the legislative scheme were “intended” to benefit seasonal workers, it succeeds only in benefitting the higher paid seasonal workers. This, of course, is the essence of appellant’s argument. That similarly situated claimants, i.e., those who are equally attached to the labor force be they seasonal, part-time or permanent workers, are treated *313disparately solely on the basis of rate of compensation and that this disparate treatment has no rational basis or reasonable relationship to the legislative objective. The majority’s hypothetical claimants A and B, “control[led] for rate of compensation”, are completely irrelevant to our inquiry as these claimants are not similarly situated vis á vis their attachment to the labor force. Majority slip opinion, 502 Pa. at 302-304, 466 A.2d at 117, 118.
The second and fundamental flaw in the majority’s reasoning regarding the legislature’s “hypothesized” intent is that the General Assembly's intent is also irrelevant. The majority assures us that the Assembly’s intentions were admirable, and so goes to great lengths to attempt to dispel “any lingering suspicion that the 20% compensation requirement was deliberately designed to discriminate against workers earning low rates of compensation.” Slip opinion at 28.
It is not apparent who may have harbored this “lingering suspicion”. It was certainly not the appellant who has expressed such suspicion. It should go without saying that state legislatures rarely, if ever, have enacted legislation “deliberately designed to discriminate”. This obvious fact is surely one of the reasons that courts may feel comfortable in presuming the constitutionality of statutes. Nevertheless, though unintended, legislative enactments are occasionally discriminatory in effect. Where the effect of a statutory scheme is to create invidious classifications, it is immaterial that the legislature did not intend such a result. By allowing the General Assembly’s intent to assume such a dominant role in its rationale, the majority has elevated the presumption of constitutionality to an irrebutable one in equal protection cases, because a challenger will never be able to demonstrate that a statutory classification was “deliberately designed to discriminate”.
Even assuming the unassumable and unprecedented approach that the “hypothesized legislative intent” is dispositive, the “intent” attributed to the General Assembly herein cannot withstand scrutiny. Aside from the fact that, as we *314have seen, the “hypothesized intent” is neither rational nor reasonable (—it is, rather, arbitrary and illogical and has never been offered as justification by the Commonwealth at any point during this appeal—) and fails to accomplish its purpose (except as to higher paid “seasonal workers”), there is a final, equally fallacious defect in the analysis. The “bottom line” of the majority’s position is that two wrongs may make a right. Admitting that the use of two distinct and greatly discrepant ratios to measure attachment is inequitable, majority opinion, 502 Pa. at 291, 466 A.2d at 111, the majority finds this inequity acceptable because, in 1959, the inequity was even worse! Id., 502 Pa. at 299-300, 466 A.2d at 115-116.
The majority informs us that prior to 1964, once a claimant earned the maximum qualifying wage ($1,825.00 in 1959), in her high quarter, there was no requirement that the claimant have earned any wages outside the high quarter. Majority opinion, 502 Pa. at 299, 466 A.2d at 115. Thus, while a claimant “on the Table” had to have earned 35%-38% of the qualifying wages outside of the high quarter, those who earned the maximum qualifying wage in one quarter had to have earned 0% of their wages in an outside quarter. As will be discussed more fully, infra, the pre-1964 scheme was clearly unconstitutional and an arbitrary measure of attachment to the labor force, since it measured attachment at a 35%-38% rate for lower paid claimants and not at all for higher paid. The majority finds the present statutory scheme valid, and the classifications reasonably related to the goal of measuring genuine attachment, because its predecessor classifications were more unconstitutional. Such reasoning is disturbing in its implications.
No one could dispute that a statutory classification that predicated eligibility for benefits on, say, the color of the claimant’s eyes, stating that “claimants with brown or green eyes are not eligible for benefits,” would be arbitrary and unconstitutional. If the legislature later amended the statute to permit brown-eyed claimants to collect benefits, does that classification havé a “rational” basis because the old *315statute was more arbitrary? Is the exclusion of a green-eyed claimant valid because the brown-eyed claimants are now eligible? This is, most certainly, an absurd example. It is not, I submit, any more absurd than the principle it illustrates, which principle has today been adopted by the majority—presently arbitrary classifications can be upheld as “rationally” based because an older classification was worse.
In my opinion, appellant is correct in arguing that the statutory classifications of unemployment compensation eligibility challenged herein are arbitrary and have no rational basis or reasonable relationship to the legitimate legislative decision to require claimants to be attached to the labor force. The crux of appellant’s argument is that Part C of the Table operates to require claimants making $3,738.00 or less in their high quarters to have earned 35%-38% of their total base year wages in another quarter or quarters, while the Table and the “20% minimum rule” of section 401(a) allow those claimants earning more than $3,738.00 in their high quarters to qualify for benefits if as little as 20% of their base year wages are earned outside of the high quarter. These two methods of computing eligibility create, appellant asserts, classifications impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.
Section 3 of the Act, 43 P.S. § 752 declares the public policy leading to its enactment:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemployment and its resulting burden of indigency falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker, and ultimately upon the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in the form of poor relief assistance. Security against unemployment and the spread of indigency can best be provided by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used as compensation for loss of wages by employes during periods when they become unemployed through no fault of their own. The principle of the accumulation of financial reserves, the sharing of risks, and the payment of compen*316sation with respect to unemployment meets the need of protection .against the hazards of unemployment and indigency. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this Commonwealth require the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth in the enactment of this act for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.
One cannot glean from this declaration any justification for the classifications at issue. Rather than bearing a fair and substantial relation to the legitimate goals expressed in the declaration, the classifications work against those goals, for lower paid workers (those whose high quarterly wages are less than the Table maximum) would generally be closer to indigency than those who have been earning money beyond the maximum.
The principle argument advanced by the Commonwealth is that the financial qualification provisions of sections 401(a) and 404(e)(1), 43 P.S. § 801(a) and 804(e)(1), referred to by. the Attorney General as “previous-work” requirements, are designed so that only those claimants who have demonstrated a “genuine attachment” to the labor force will be eligible to receive benefits, thereby helping to preserve the fiscal integrity of the unemployment compensation fund. I agree with the Commonwealth Court, and contrary to the majority’s suggestion, appellant does not dispute, that both of these (i.e., benefits to be paid only to those who have displayed “genuine attachment”, and “fiscal integrity”) are legitimate legislative objectives. However, appellant’s position is that creation of two different standards (and the resulting classifications) for determining attachment to the labor market and preserving the fiscal integrity of the fund is not rationally related to these purposes in a fair and substantial manner. I agree.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the Pennsylvania legislative scheme to assure that claimants are genuinely attached to the labor force, a brief review of the origins of *317previous work requirements is in order. In 1936, Pennsylvania enacted its Unemployment Compensation Law in response to federal incentives in the Social Security Act.4 The unemployment compensation system is basically an insurance program and, in such programs, it is appropriate that there be a period of time in which workers earn their rights and in which some contributions are paid in their behalf.5 Most states have developed some type of qualification requirements and/or formula in order to test a claimant’s attachment to the labor force.
As noted by the Attorney General, the “problem of devising previous-work requirements for unemployment compensation claimants has been very troublesome”. Brief for Attorney General at 9. The source of this trouble lies in administrative and reporting difficulties, particularly the inability to obtain accurate information from the employers concerning an employe’s actual time worked. (This informational deficiency was acute at the time the unemployment compensation laws were coming into being. As seen by the 1980 amendments to the Pennsylvania Act, section 404(c), 43 P.S. § 804(c), adopting “credit week” requirements, this problem has apparently been eliminated. See majority slip opinion at 5, note 5 and 31, note 21 and accompanying text.) As should be obvious, and as the Social Security Administration initially recommended, the most direct and accurate measure of attachment to the labor force is a formula that is a function of time, i.e., one which considers length and consistency of work during a given period. Brief for Attorney General at 9, n. 6. The length of time spent working is the preferred measure rather than formulae that are expressed as functions of earnings. See Munts article cited in *318note 5, supra at 3. The latter measures, “statistical surrogate^] for direct evidence of time worked”, majority opinion at 114, were adopted because quarterly wage records were more readily available to state agencies than were records of time worked.
Pennsylvania has adopted one of the common variations of the formulae based on earnings—the “multiple of weekly benefits” method.6 Under this method, qualifying wages are defined as some multiple of the weekly benefit rate; in Pennsylvania, the multiple is “40”, but with a “minus $80.00” variation, as is explained in the majority opinion. According to Professor Munts, this method of determining attachment “has a powerful bias in favor of claimants with high weekly wages. Highly paid workers whose weekly benefits are limited by the maximum ... can earn enough to qualify for the maximum weekly benefit in a shorter period of time than low-paid workers need.” Munts, supra note 5, at 4. In Pennsylvania, this bias is exacerbated by the “20% minimum rule” which, the Board asserts, is also a “measure of the attachment of the individual to the labor market”. Brief for appellee Board at 17. To illustrate this bias, consider the following examples:
Claimant 1 (hypothetical) earns $10.00 per hour and works 480 hours in her high quarter, or, earns $4,800.00 in that quarter. Since she is “off the Table”, she must make at least 20% of her total base year wages outside of her high quarter. Thus, her qualifying wages are $6,000.00 (20% X 6,000.00 = $1,200.00; $6,000.00 - $1,200.00 = $4,800.00). In order to earn an additional $1,200.00, claimant 1 must work 120 hours outside of her high quarter.7
*319Claimant 2 (hypothetical) earns $7.00 per hour and, similarly, works 480 hours in her high quarter. (This was appellant’s hourly rate of pay with her employer). Her high quarterly earnings are, therefore, $3,360.00 and, according to the Table, her qualifying wages would be $5,360.00. In order to qualify, claimant 2 would have had to have earned $2,000.00 outside of her high quarter (or 37.3% of her total base year wages), which would require 286 hours outside of her high quarter.
Under the classifications created by the different standards for determining attachment to the labor force (a ratio of 35%-38% as established by the Table vs. the “20% minimum rule”), claimants who work equal numbers of hours in their high quarters (i.e., are equally “attached”) receive disparate treatment solely on the basis of the rate of pay. Due to the formulae and the different pay rates, claimant 2 is required to work 166 additional hours outside of her high quarter than is claimant 1, in order to qualify for benefits. Clearly, the use of different standards for higher paid vs. lower paid claimants is irrational and arbitrary, and bears no fair or substantial relation to the legitimate legislative decision to require claimants to demonstrate “genuine attachment” to the labor force. As dramatically illustrated by the above example, the use of two distinct methods/ratios utterly fails to achieve the goal of assuring attachment since a claimant with significantly fewer total base year hours and “outside high quarter” hours than a claimant with lower wages can be determined to be eligible for benefits, while the lower-paid claimant, with demonstrably greater attachment to the labor force, is determined to be ineligible.
In appellant’s case, the same inequity results. Appellant worked 427 hours at $7.00 per hour for a high quarterly wage of $2,989.00. Her Table “qualifying wage” was, therefore, $4,800.00. Accordingly, to be eligible, she would have had to have worked 259 hours outside of her high quarter (259 hours X $7.00 per hour = $1,813.00: $1,813.00 + $2,989.00 = $4,802.00: the applicable outside earnings/qualifying wage ratio is 37.7%). Since appellant had worked only *320206 hours outside (approximately) of her high quarter, for additional earnings of $1,444.00, she was ineligible for benefits.
Claimant 3 (hypothetical), on the other hand, works 427 hours (the same as appellant) at $10.00 an hour for high quarterly wages of $4,270.00. The Table requires claimant 3 to make $6,000.00 qualifying wages (or 20%, whichever is greater—$6,000.00 is greater). Thus, claimant 3 must earn an additional $1,730.00 to qualify, or, must work 178 hours outside of her high quarter (the applicable ratio of outside earnings/qualifying wage is 28.8%). Again, claimant 3 works fewer total hours and fewer hours outside of her high quarter than appellant, but is deemed eligible for benefits despite demonstrably lesser attachment to the labor force.
The Commonwealth Court attempted to demonstrate a rational relation between the classifications and the goal of limiting benefits to individuals with genuine attachment to the labor force by focusing on actual dollar amounts. That court stated:
Upon reviewing the Table, it is clear that claimant has focused her analysis too narrowly by simply examining the comparative percentage amounts which must be earned outside of the higher quarter. Although the percentage amount required to be earned outside of the high quarter does decrease as high quarterly wages exceed the Table maximum, the employee must still earn a comparatively high actual dollar amount. The system devised by the legislature recognizes that, where an employee with a sporadic work pattern earns a high quarterly wage, exceeding the Table maximum, it will become increasingly difficult for him to continue to earn a substantial percentage (e.g., 35 percent) of his overall compensation outside of his high quarter. Therefore, we are satisfied that a genuine attachment to the labor force can be shown by examining the actual dollars which must be earned outside of the high quarter, without requiring that those dollar amounts increase on a flat percentage scale. 63 Pa. Cmwlth. 207, 439 A.2d at 210.
*321Again, an illustration disproves this hypothesis. Claimant 4 (hypothetical), earning $3,738.00 highest quarterly wages, must earn $6,000.00 qualifying wages to be determined eligible for benefits—or 37.7% of total base year wages must have been earned outside of the high quarter. Claimant 5 (hypothetical), earns $4,800.00 highest quarterly wages and must also earn $6,000.00 qualifying wages—or 20% earnings outside of the high quarter. The total base year dollar amounts are equal and the comparative dollar amounts (i.e., the high quarter dollar amounts compared with the total base year dollar amounts) as a measure of distribution of wages actually demonstrates greater attachment to the labor force by claimant 4, since a far greater proportion of 5’s wages are concentrated in the high quarter than are 4’s. Even looking at the actual dollar amounts, therefore, instead of the relative percentages, it is apparent that the use of two separate systems to determine previous-work experience is not rationally related to the claimant’s attachment to the labor force, and that the classifications are arbitrary.
Both the Board and the Attorney General place great reliance on the case of Ertman v. Fusari, 442 F.Supp. 1147 (D.Conn.1977) as it involved an equal protection challenge to the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Law. The previous work requirements of that Act were of the “multiple of weekly benefits” variety, specifically, the multiple of 40 (the “forty” rule). Claimant there had argued that had he earned less in his highest quarter or had his weekly benefits been reduced from $89.00 to $66.00 per week, he would have been eligible for benefits under the “forty” rule. The federal district court held, at 442 F.Supp. 1151:
it is not the function of the Court to strike down or alter the State’s unemployment compensation eligibility standards because an incidental individual inequality results from its operation; the remedy rests with the legislature. . .. “General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases.” *322Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53, 98 S.Ct. 95, 99, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977). (further citations omitted).
That court held that the “forty” rule bore a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose of limiting the beneficiaries of the compensation fund to those claimants who were genuinely attached to the labor market. Id. at 1151.
However, the Board and the Attorney General both fail to point out that, unlike Pennsylvania’s system, Connecticut did not utilize a counterpart to the “20% minimum rule”. The “forty” rule formula is applied in Connecticut to all claimants, regardless of earnings, to determine if their distribution of wages demonstrates the requisite attachment. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-235. There is no arbitrary cut-off point on a Table that triggers more lenient eligibility requirements. Again, appellant herein does not challenge the use of formulae based on earnings to measure attachment; she challenges rather, the use of different formulae for different, but similarly situated, claimants.8
The majority offers two hypothetical claimants (A and B) to illustrate that inequity would remain if the legislative scheme were uniform and imposed a 35%-38% outside high quarter/total qualifying wages ratio “across the board”. Majority opinion at 118. As previously explained, by controlling these claimants for “rate of compensation”, the hypotheticals are irrelevant to our determination as the claimants are not then similarly situated vis á vis attachment to the labor force. These hypotheticals do serve to illustrate, however, the inherent inequality in the use of “surrogate” methods comparing wages earned in various periods instead of actual time worked. Munts, supra note 5, at 3-4. This inevitable disparity in such a system may well *323be the sort of imprecision that is tolerated by the Equal Protection Clause even though the calculation of eligibility is “not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). As noted, the “multiple of 40” rule adopted by the Connecticut legislature withstood an equal challenge for that reason. Ertman v. Fusari, supra.9
Once again, we are not here faced with an equal protection challenge to the validity of proportionality or multiple of weekly benefits formulae generally, and the possible existence of some inequity or imprecision in the multiple of forty formula is irrelevant to the determination of whether classifications created by the adoption of two different schemes—both purported to measure attachment to the same labor force, but at different rates—are valid. Once again, two wrongs do not make a right.
Also asserted as a legitimate legislative objective of the classifications by the Commonwealth, and adopted by the Commonwealth Court, is the preservation of the fiscal integrity of the unemployment compensation fund. There is no doubt that this is a legitimate legislative objective. However, “financial expediency alone does not justify an invidious discrimination.” Foster v. UCBR, 47 Pa.Commw. 441, 408 A.2d 216, 219 (1979) and see Wallace v. UCBR, 38 Pa.Commw. 342, 393 A.2d 43, 47 (1978). In Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 493, 97 S.Ct. *3241898, 1910, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977), the United States Supreme Court stated:
It is clear that protection of the fiscal integrity of the [unemployment compensation] fund is a legitimate concern of the State. We need not consider whether it would be “rational” for the State to protect the fund through a random means, such as elimination from coverage of all persons with an odd number of letters in their surnames.
In the instant case, while the means selected by the legislature to ensure the fiscal integrity of the fund (by requiring genuine attachment to the-labor force) is not as obviously random as even/odd number of letters in surnames, or the color of claimants’ eyes, the lower paid/higher paid dichotomy created by the Act is nevertheless arbitrary and does not bear a fair and substantial relation to the legislative objectives. If the “20% minimum rule” is sufficient to preserve the fiscal integrity of the fund when dealing with higher paid claimants, there is no perceptible justification for “preserving the fund” at a 35%-38% rate for lower paid claimants. And if fund preservation is a goal behind the classifications, then there is no reasonable relation to that goal in relaxing the eligibility standards for those claimants who will receive the maximum amount of benefits.10
Finally, the Attorney General makes his own two wrongs make a right argument. He suggests that an inequity has been visited upon higher paid claimants, stating “the continuation of the 37% requirement for those who earned above $3,738.00 in 1979 would have been unfair in light of the fact that the legislature has placed a maximum upon the weekly benefit rate and the total amount of compensation for those who earned above $3,738.00 in 1979.” Brief for Attorney General at 24. (Emphasis in original). Apparently, the Attorney General perceives the “20% minimum rule” as a *325sort-of “quid pro quo” for this “unfairness” and suggests that, to “make it up” to the higher paid claimants, the legislature decided “to simplify the relationship between high quarter wages and qualifying wages for those who earn more than the amounts on the Section 404(e)(1) Table. .. . [The “20% minimum”] test is easy to administer, does not require extension of the Section 404(e)(1) Table ad infinitum and greatly simplifies the relationship between high quarter wages and qualifying wages for those who earn more than the ...” maximum Table amounts.
There is no “inequality” in such a system. Unemployment benefits are not intended to operate as alimony payments operate to maintain the recipient in the manner to which he or she is accustomed. The purpose is, rather, to stave off indigency during temporary periods of unemployment. Section 3, 43 P.S. § 752. The legislature has determined that such goal can be achieved by establishing a maximum rate of 66%% of the statewide average weekly wages. Section 404(e)(2), 43 P.S. § 804(e)(2). Even if this capping of benefits were, somehow, inequitable to higher paid wage earners, the legislature cannot cure one inequity by creating another. Moreover, the contributions to the unemployment compensation fund are capped as well, section 4(x)(l), 43 P.S. § 753(x)(l), so that contributions by an employer are not made on portions of a claimant’s salary for which there will be no proportionatly increased benefits paid. (The current “cap” on contributions is $6600.00. No payments to the fund results from any earnings in excess of this amount).
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how the application of a 20% rate is any “simpler” than the application of a 38% rate or, if the Table were extended as it could easily be by simple extrapolation of the formula, by looking at the Table and reading across to Part C. This “matching-inequalities” argument does not provide a rational basis for the classifications involved.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the classifications created by the operation of the section 404(e)(1) Table (“35%-38%”) and the section 401(a) “20% minimum rule” are invidious as they are unreasonable and arbitrary as they do *326not exhibit a fair and substantial relation to the legitimate objectives of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Inasmuch as the legislature has selected the “20% minimum” as a sufficient indicator of attachment to the labor force,11 the far more stringent eligibility requirements contained in the Table (35%-38%) violate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws to those claimants governed by the latter. Accordingly, I would declare Part C (“qualifying wages”) of the section 404(e)(1) Table, 43 P.S. § 804(e)(1), to be clearly, palpably and plainly unconstitutional, reverse the opinion and order of the Commonwealth Court, and remand the matter to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review for computation of benefits consistent with this opinion.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. The majority correctly proceeds upon the premise that the Unemployment Compensation Law does not involve a “fundamental interest” or create “suspect” classifications. Therefore, the traditional equal protection test—whether the classification has a rational relation to a legitimate state interest—is applicable. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977).
. See majority opinion at 111 (“If the statutory classification bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state end, it is within the legislative power. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973).”), opinion at 112 (quoting from City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), “our decisions ... require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”) and opinion at 113 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981), “legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”)
. While the Snider v. Thornburg standard of review is, essentially, that applied by the United States Supreme Court to classifications created by state economic or social legislation which does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, it is, indeed, not surprising to find, that Court reluctant to invalidate the enactments of state legislatures on equal protection grounds. See majority opinion 502 Pa. at 291 n. 11, 466 A.2d at 111, n. 11. Notions of federalism enter into play where the federal courts review such “local” legislation because “[sjtates are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local *309economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.” City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517,49 L. Ed.2d 511 (1976). While the doctrine of separation of powers requires substantial deference to the legislature in the economic sphere, Snider v. Thornburg, supra, 496 Pa. at 167, 436 A.2d at 596, the federal judiciary is further restrained from interference with state legislative enactments under our dual federal/state system of government. I submit, however, that even with the heightened deference to state legislatures exhibited by the United States Supreme Court, that Court would find no rational basis or reasonable relationship to legitimate legislative objectives in the statutory scheme presented herein.
. See Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 Neb.L.Rev. 668, 668-674 (1958).
. Most of this overview of “substantial attachment” requirements has been provided by the Attorney General who has relied extensively on a 1980 report issued by Professor C. Munts, Director of Research and Evaluation for the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation, entitled Previous Work Requirements and the Duration of Benefits: Unemployment Compensation: Studies and Research.
. Fourteen states utilize this type of formula; 15 states and the District of Columbia utilize a “multiple of high quarter earnings” test; 8 states use a “flat amount of earnings” test; and 13 states use a “weeks-of-work” formulation.
. This hypothetical example, and the other examples to follow, are based upon application of the Table as it existed at the time appellant filed her claim. The principles illustrated by these examples hold true under the current Table, but some of the figures would be changed.
. The Attorney General also advances several other purported legislative objectives for the use of different criteria to determine financial eligibility: 1) that the criteria are designed to exclude “new entrants” to the work force from receiving benefits; 2) that it is “appropriate” to require claimants to earn coverage; and 3) that the classifications “test claimants’ work-oriented motives”. These “objectives” are simply sub-categories of the goal of requiring “genuine attachment”, see Munts, supra note 5 (relied on by the Attorney General), and there is no need to address the arguments separately.
. An argument could reasonably be made that even this inevitable inequality with such “surrogate” measures of attachment is intolerable since less drastic means now exist, and have been implemented by the legislature, which demonstrate attachment by reference to actual time worked. The less drastic means were adopted in 1980, section 404(c), 43 P.S. § 804(c) (establishing a minimum of 18 credit weeks worked in a claimant’s base year regardless of amount of qualifying wages). See majority opinion, 502 Pa. 287, 305, 466 A.2d at 109, 119, notes 5 and 21 and accompanying text. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (no need for state to use particular statutory scheme resulting in discriminatory classifications where less drastic means existed and were employed to accomplish objectives).
. At oral argument, in response to questioning from the bench, the Attorney General specifically denied that invalidation of the dual monetary eligibility requirements of the Act would significantly impair the fiscal integrity of the unemployment compensation fund. Any adverse impact on the fund caused by such an invalidation would be significantly muted by the 1980 “credit weeks” amendments. See note 9, supra.
. The “20% minimum rule” in 401(a)(1) is a measure of attachment of the individual to the labor market.” Brief for appellee Board at 17.