(dissenting in part, concurring in part). The trial court granted defendant an accelerated judgment based on the provisions of GCR 1963, 116.1(2), that "the court lack[ed] jurisdiction of the subject matter”. The procedure for determining a motion based on this rule is provided in GCR 1963, 116.3 which states in relevant part:
"As to defenses and objections based upon * * * (2), * * * in sub-rule 116.1, the court may order immediate trial of any disputed questions of fact, and judgment may be rendered forthwith if the proof shows that the moving party is entitled to judgment upon the facts as determined; or the court may postpone the hearing on the matter until the trial on the merits.”
*192According to the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 116.3, the section "gives the court discretion to determine any disputed issues of fact by means of a trial at the hearing stage. If a right to jury is involved and demanded, the court must postpone the hearing until the trial.” 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 324.1 Plaintiff made a timely motion for jury trial.
I find that plaintiff’s pleadings presented a disputed question of fact for jury determination, viz. whether plaintiff’s injuries arose from the dangerous condition of defendant’s (Wayne County’s) building. The statute under which plaintiff asserted an exemption from defendant’s claim of governmental immunity, MCLA 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) provides:
"Governmental agencies have the obligation to repair and maintain public buildings under their control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building if the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The pleadings showed that the jail officials were aware of plaintiff’s mental instability. They show that the jailers placed plaintiff in an area reserved for individuals with such propensities and that the jail officials took affirmative steps to recognize and segregate such potentially unstable inmates. Plain*193tiff also alleged that, having recognized the dangers and segregated the unstable prisoners, the jail officials took no steps to provide the minimum physical protections required by such prisoners. From these allegations, I find a clear question of fact whether a "dangerous condition” existed.
I cannot agree with the majority’s statement that "as to the failure to provide a padded cell, cell padding has not been shown to be more of a part of the building than the 'mini-trampoline’ which was held in Cody v Southfield-Lathrup School District, 25 Mich App 33, 38-39; 181 NW2d 81 (1970), not to come within this exception”. First, the plaintiff in Cody did not, as did plaintiff here, allege any facts to show that defendants had allowed a "dangerous condition”, within the meaning of the statute, to exist. As the Cody court noted:
"Their action was based solely on the alleged negligence of the defendants. They assert the injuries were caused by the child’s use of the 'mini-trampoline’, an object in the building, but in no way attached to it.
"A 'mini-trampoline’, which plaintiffs have never alleged to be improperly manufactured, negligently erected, or dangerously maintained, is not within the exception.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id., pp 38-39.
Plaintiff here, by alleging the facts I noted above, has presented enough to constitute a factual dispute within the statutory exception. Second, bare walls or iron bars are clearly as much a part of the Wayne County Jail as was the machine which the Supreme Court, in Green v Department of Corrections, 386 Mich 459; 192 NW2d 491 (1971), found to be part of the building. Finally, Cody stressed the portion of the statute which relates to *194"defective” conditions. The pleadings here allege "dangerous” conditions. The statute clearly distinguishes the two types of conditions by stating them in the disjunctive, "dangerous or defective condition”. (Emphasis supplied.)
I concur in the majority’s disposition of the other issues involved here. I would remand this case to the trial court for a trial to determine the applicability of the building exception to defendant’s (Wayne County’s) statutory immunity. I agree with the learned trial judge’s dismissal of claims against all defendants except for Wayne County.
While the committee notes do not bind this Court they are, nonetheless, relevant and persuasive authority in interpreting the General Court Rules. Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 481; 189 NW2d 202 (1971).