(dissenting). I cannot agree that the claims raised in plaintiff’s complaint are subject to summary dismissal by the court on the basis of governmental immunity and, therefore, dissent.
In Count III of his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that the "facility was designed, constructed, maintained and operated in a dangerous and defective condition in that it did not provide for constant and unobstructed observation of all areas by the supervisory personnel” and that the facility "was dangerous in that it physically separated the plaintiff and potentially dangerous inmates from observation and supervision by the correctional facility staff”.
In two recent opinions, a five-member majority1 *794of our present Supreme Court has rejected the former narrow construction placed on the so-called public buildings exception to governmental immunity contained in MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) by this Court. Pichette v Manistique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268; 269 NW2d 143 (1978), Tilford v Wayne County General Hospital, 403 Mich 293; 269 NW2d 153 (1978). Instead, the Court stated the statute placed "upon governmental agencies the duty to maintain safe public places”. Pichette, at 285. A correctional facility is a public building and an inmate is a member of the public for purposes of this statute. See, Green v Dep’t of Corrections, 386 Mich 459, 464; 192 NW2d 491 (1971).
Plaintiff has pled facts which bring his complaint within the statutory exception as interpreted by the Supreme Court. He is claiming a defect in the building, not mere negligence in the supervision of the inmates in the building. Whether he can prove that a correctional facility which does not provide for constant observation is a defective building, or whether, if shown to be defective, the building was the cause of his injuries is something to be shown at trial. See, Lockaby v Wayne County, 63 Mich App 185, 191; 234 NW2d 444 (1975) (N. J. Kaufman, J., dissenting in part), lv gtd, 400 Mich 814 (1977). The Court of Claims, by summarily dismissing the complaint, and the majority, by affirming that dismissal, are confusing the legal and fact-finding roles of the Court of Claims. Plaintiff is entitled to trial on the merits of the defective building allegations.
Similarly, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of plaintiff’s claim of nuisance in Count IV of the complaint. There may be a variance between what plaintiff has alleged and what he can prove, but *795plaintiff has alleged facts concerning a "dangerous condition” "intentionally created” even if those precise words are not used. Under the opinions2 in Rosario v City of Lansing, 403 Mich 124; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), further proceedings should be held in the Court of Claims. Whether there was a nuisance in fact and whether that nuisance was intentionally created are questions of fact for the trier of fact and not questions of law for a court.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings in the Court of Claims.
The point in question is discussed in § IIB of Justice Fitzgerald’s opinion in Pichette v Manistique Public Schools. The Chief Justice and Justice Levin signed the opinion authored by Justice Fitzgerald. Justices Moody and Williams joined in this part of Justice Fitzgerald’s opinion in their own separate opinions.
Since there was no majority opinion in either of the cited cases, the applicable rule to be drawn from them is unclear. See, Affiliated FM Ins Co v Department of State Highways, 86 Mich App 203; — NW2d — (1978). At the very least, governmental immunity is no bar to an intentionally created nuisance in fact, the position set forth by Justices Moody and Williams.