concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This appeal requires us yet again to interpret the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49(LAD). Specifically, we must determine whether the LAD carries its own standard of proof for an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress caused by sexual harassment in the workplace. In my view, such a LAD claimant must demonstrate entitlement to damages for infliction of emotional distress caused by sexual harassment under the proof requirements set forth in our decision in Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 706 A.2d 685 (1998). In the absence of textual support in the LAD for a lesser standard of proof than that which we established in Taylor for the common law tort of infliction of emotional distress committed in a harassment setting, I would not lessen the proof requirements for compensatory damages.
I.
The cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which we first recognized as part of our common law in Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Society, 111 N.J. 355, 544 A.2d *88857 (1988), was reformulated for the specific context of harassment claims under LAD in Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 508-21, 706 A.2d 685. Taylor squarely brought before the Court the standard to be applied to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress where that cause of action is based on discriminatory conduct and joined with causes of action for discrimination under the LAD. Writing for the Court, Justice Handler expanded the test for intentional infliction of emotional distress articulated in Buckley, supra, which required a plaintiff to “establish intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe.” 111 N.J. at 366, 544 A.2d 857.1
Our expansion of Buckley in Taylor was manifest;2 however, we did not alter the basic requirement that only “severe” distress will sustain an award of compensatory damages under our common law, and mentioned specifically that the plaintiff in Taylor both “sought medical treatment for [her] emotional anguish” and “claimed to suffer harm that was both severe and enduring.” Id. at 515, 706 A.2d 685. Although we did not hold that a claim for compensatory damages for emotional distress arising in the context of a LAD discrimination claim specifically required expert or *89medical corroboration as a matter of law, we held that that the plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence to “permit[ ] a rational factfinder to conclude that she suffered severe emotional distress.” Ibid. Cf. Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 312-13, 661 A.2d 1202 (1995) (citing Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir.1994) (noting that LAD claim for emotional distress damages, like analogous federal civil rights claims, does not require, as matter of law, expert testimony to corroborate claimant’s alleged emotional distress)).
In my view, the majority’s decision renders Taylor, which postdated the 1990 LAD amendments that the majority and the Appellate Division find to be so persuasive, a nullity. In Taylor, Justice Handler painstakingly analyzed the circumstances in which a plaintiff brings both a claim of discrimination under the LAD and a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and both claims arise from the same discriminatory conduct. It is curious that our Court would have gone to such lengths to canvass decisions from around the country concerning claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on discrimination if one of the very causes of action then before it, a discrimination claim under the LAD, subsumed the entire analysis. The Court’s careful analysis in Taylor is now inoperative in that the majority holds that the LAD authorizes a standard for obtaining compensatory damages for emotional distress that is far below that articulated in Taylor. As demonstrated below, this case is indistinguishable from, and should be controlled by, our holding in Taylor.
II.
Plaintiff’s seven-count Complaint included three counts against Bob Ciasulli Mack Auto Mall, Inc. (Mack): Count I for hostile work environment created by sexual harassment and discrimination, in violation of the LAD; Count II for constructive discharge based on sexual harassment and discrimination, in violation of the LAD; and Count VII for intentional infliction of emotional dis*90tress. Each count “demand[ed] judgment against [Mack] as follows: (1) Compensatory Damages[;] (2) Punitive Damages[;] (3) Equitable relief to the fullest extent permitted by the LAD; (4) Costs of Suit; (5) Attorney’s Fees to the fullest extent permitted by the LAD and the law; (6) Lawful Interest; [and] (7) Such other relief as the Court deems equitable and appropriate.”
Before trial, Mack filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Count VII for common law intentional infliction of emotional distress, and to compel discovery concerning the nature of plaintiffs asserted emotional trauma. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss Count VII.3 Thus, we note that the common law emotional distress claim was dismissed from plaintiffs action, and she proceeded to trial only on Counts I and II.
The ensuing jury trial spanned nearly two weeks. During trial, there was ample testimony concerning the outrageously hostile and discriminatory environment at Mack’s place of business, which both the majority, ante at 74-76, 853 A.2d 923-24, and the Appellate Division have well detailed. Tarr, supra, 360 N.J.Super. at 268-70, 822 A.2d 647. The vivid portrayal of an “abusive environment” that plaintiff endured in the workplace was fairly described by the Appellate Division as “despicable, insulting, reprehensible, crude, gross, demeaning, and contemptible[.]” Id. at 270, 822 A.2d 647. Despite that portrayal, plaintiffs
testimony respecting her response ... was not extensive. Although she apparent ly had mental health care after leaving Mack ..., she chose not to offer expert testimony. She testified only to her acute embarrassment and humiliation, [caused by one co-worker’s] remarks in the presence of persons not employed by the dealership, [that] made her turn ‘beet red’ and ‘want to crawl under my desk.’ [find].
Plaintiff also testified that she would cry “ ‘all the way home from being frustrated, from being intimidated, from feeling that you *91couldn’t breathe around there [but you were gonna get yelled at for something or you were in fear of losing your job].’ ” Ibid.4
At the close of plaintiffs ease-in-chief, Mack moved to strike all evidence of plaintiffs emotional distress from the jury’s consideration on the LAD claims. The trial court granted Mack’s motion, ruling from the bench, in pertinent part, as follows:
But I think you're talking about recovering in a ease like this for emotional distress, I think that you need more than a temporary upsetment. And certainly if you’re trying to recover for long-term medically diagnosed emotional injury or psyche injury, that that’s obviously something that requires an expert opinion, and that’s not here.
But the cases also talk about, for example, the emotional distress that is naturally attendant to somebody who suffers an injury. That’s something the jury can consider. In this particular case the allegation is that the plaintiff—or the plaintiff testified that on occasion she would cry as a result of the treatment that she received at work, and I don’t know that that really even rises to the level of being the type of injury that in the absence of expert testimony which would then indicate some other type of treatment, that the jury is free to assess an award.
The jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff was the victim of sexual harassment, including “that the working environment was intimidating, hostile and abusive.” However, the jury did not award any compensatory damages to plaintiff, based on its determination that she suffered no past or future lost earnings as a result of defendant’s sexual harassment. Therefore, no punitive damages were awarded. Tarr, supra, 360 N.J.Super. at 267, 822 A.2d 647; see generally N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13c (stating that punitive damages are available only if compensatory damages, rather than nominal damages, have been awarded). The trial court did award plaintiff attorney’s fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1, “concluding that because plaintiff had proved a sexually harassing hostile workplace, she was a prevailing party despite her failure to prove damages.” Tarr, supra, 360 N.J.Super. at 267, 822 A.2d 647.
In a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1(a), plaintiff again raised the issue of compensatory damages for emotional distress, asserting that 1990 amendments to the LAD created a *92lower threshold for obtaining compensatory damage for emotional distress. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion, ruling from the bench, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]he [1990] amendments ... I interpret pretty clearly as not expanding the types of damages that somebody can have, but basically recognizing that an employee would have damages that might reasonably flow from an act of discrimination that could be compensable and that could be the subject of compensatory damages. What are the purposes of compensatory damages? Compensatory damages are intended to make a litigant whole for a loss, no more, no less. Compensatory damages are not intended to punish a litigant for the wrongdoing but rather to make a party whole. Really, the plaintiff did not testify as to any other types of loss.
* * * *
I guess the question is whether or not—I think the amendments because they use the term, “physical and emotional distress,” and in some cases, “severe emotional trauma,” that they are talking about a level that goes beyond just a temporary upsetment. That was the term that I used. Granted, we may not be talking about something that requires a showing of medical treatment or medication in order to meet the emotional distress things. By analogy, I would say that in a personal injury action emotional distress standing alone with nothing else is generally not compensable. Emotional distress attendant to other factors like an emotional distress that one endures as a natural consequence of an injury would be an element of compensatory damages because in order to reconstruct the plaintiff, in effect, before the harm is done, you’re recompensing [him or her] for a loss. In that case, the loss of their emotional distress. But, really, the plaintiff in this ease didn’t really go into any detail as to whether or not her emotional distress, if any, was caused by a frustration as the result of the job or whether it was as to other factors, or whether it rose to the level of being any type of recognized level of emotional distress that we recognized in the law. I don’t think that when the Legislature amended the law in 1990 that it [in]tended to reduce the bar and say that litigants in [LAD] cases were going to be treated differently than other litigants in asserting common law claims founded upon emotional distress. That was why I found that there really was no testimony in the case to support a claim for emotional distress.
* * * *
The Legislature never intended to create a new form of damages not recognized in common law, but [it] did intend to codify the availability of damages that were normally available to the plaintiff as a function of common law in a personal injury type of action, tort or contract. The reason is that you have to remember why they did what they did in 1990, and that was to respond to the Shaner[ v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989)] decision which raised, in effect, *93almost like as an afterthought the question of whether or not damages that are recognized at common law should be the prime focus of [the LAD].
So I’m not saying that emotional distress damages have to be pi-oven by expert testimony, although that would be preferable, or that the plaintiff has to show that she sought treatment or anything for it. But she has to testify as to something that is related to the incident in question and it has to be something more than just sort of a passing problem. And that’s what happened in this case was that she made a passing reference to crying in the ear and there was basically no testimony to indicate that that was related to the incident in question or to other problems or that it was substantial, that it was significant or that it caused her any continuing emotional distress.
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court on the issue of compensatory damages for emotional distress by relying on Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J.Super. 297, 316-17, 265 A.2d 404 (Ch.Div.1970), in which a chancery court awarded nominal damages to a plaintiff based on racial discrimination, and Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 412, 301 A.2d 754 (1973), in which this Court affirmed an “incidental award [to the plaintiff] for pain and suffering” recommended by a Hearing Examiner with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (Division) and adopted by the Division Director. From those earlier decisions, the Appellate Division extrapolated that a plaintiff does not have to prove severe and substantial emotional harm to reach the jury on compensatory damages for emotional distress in the context of the LAD. Id. at 276-77, 822 A.2d 647. It found that the 1990 amendments to the LAD “confirmed” the “authority” of Gray and Zahorian. Id. at 273, 822 A.2d 647. We granted defendants’ petition for certification. 178 N.J. 29, 834 A.2d 403 (2003).
III.
Persons seeking redress under the LAD either may file a complaint (1) with the Division or (2) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, by jury trial if requested. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13. Pursuant to the LAD, “[a]ll remedies available in common law tort actions shall be available to prevailing parties. These remedies are in addition to any provided by this act or any other statute.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Those two sentences mandate that for LAD *94claims, in addition to the equitable remedies available to courts and the Division under N.J.S.A. 10:5-17, prevailing parties also may seek traditional tort remedies. Plaintiffs thesis is that that language in N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 expresses a legislative intent to lower, in LAD actions, the proof standard that otherwise would apply in a common law tort action to obtain compensatory damages for emotional distress caused by discriminatory conduct. However, that theory is not supported by text, legislative history, or prior decisional law.
A.
We turn first to the legislative history of the LAD to examine whether the Legislature intended the disputed language in N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 to apply a standard of proof lower than that which the common law requires for an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress caused by discriminatory conduct. When the LAD was enacted in 1945, an action under the statute could be brought only before the Division. In 1979, amendments to the LAD authorized, “[t]he right to bring judicial action ás an alternative to administrative relief.” L. 1979, c. 404. In Shaner, supra, we analyzed the impact that the 1979 amendments to the LAD had on causes of action and remedies available under the statute. 116 N.J. at 437-46, 561 A.2d 1130. Although we observed that the Division had awarded compensatory damages for economic losses, id. at 439, 561 A.2d 1130 (citing Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 126, 253 A.2d 793 (1969)), and incidental damages for “pain and suffering or personal humiliation,” ibid. (citing Zahorian, supra, 62 N.J. at 416, 301 A.2d 754), we emphasized that such monetary awards “should not be ‘a primary item’ of relief ... but must be ancillary to and correlated with the grant of broader remedies, which in combination are ‘reasonably calculated to eliminate the effects of the discrimination.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Zahorian, supra, 62 N.J. at 413, 416, 301 A.2d 754).
We characterized our courts’ powers under the LAD as largely coextensive with those vested in the Division. Id. at 440, 561 A.2d *951130. The broad scope of those powers, including both “an authority that parallels the Division’s enumerated powers, which are directed to the rectification of work-place discrimination,” ibid., and the ability to award incidental or nominal monetary awards, ibid, (citing Zahorian, supra, 62 N.J. at 413-14, 301 A.2d 754; Gray, supra, 110 N.J.Super. at 317, 265 A.2d 404), led us to conclude that a court’s power to enforce the LAD was equitable in nature. Id. at 441, 561 A.2d 1130. We found that granting the right to a jury trial could subvert the LAD’s goals of providing broad remedies and an efficient forum to vindicate grievances, given the “attendant delays and inherent limitations of the scope of jury verdicts.” Ibid. Shaner thus held that there was no right to a jury trial under the LAD. Id. at 446, 561 A.2d 1130.
Almost immediately thereafter, the Legislature amended the LAD to overrule Shaner. Bipartisan sponsors advanced an amendatory bill that added a right to jury trial for LAD actions, as well as the currently disputed language to N.J.S.A. 10:5-13. L. 1990, c. 12, § 2. In addition, the bill inserted a paragraph in the declarations section of the LAD, N.J.S.A 10:5-3, that listed certain harms traditionally compensable in our common law of tort. See L. 1990, c. 12, § 1.
The Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee Statement on the Assembly Bill Substitute for Assembly Bill Nos. 2872,2118 and 2228, provided as follows:
In Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff who brought an action under the “Law Against Discrimination”, P.L.1945, c. 169 (C. 10:5-1 et seq.) (LAD) was not entitled to jury trial. This bill would amend the LAD to grant a plaintiff the right to a jury trial. This bill would also add language to the findings section of the LAD listing the hardships (i.e. economic loss, emotional trauma) which victims of discrimination might suffer and language indicating that the LAD is to be liberally construed so that all common law remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages, are available to persons protected by the LAD.
[Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee, Statement for Assembly Bill Nos. 2872, 2118 and 2228.]
That statement encapsulates the twin purposes of the 1990 amendments: (1) to overrule our holding in Shaner that LAD claimants *96were not entitled to a jury trial for LAD causes of action; and (2) to reject our dicta in Shaner that monetary awards were a secondary, rather than co-equal, form of remedy under the LAD.
B.
N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 ties the LAD remedies to those available in the common law, in that the section authorizes that “[a]ll remedies available in common-law tort actions shall be available to prevailing plaintiffs,” which are “in addition to any provided by this act or any other statute.” The common law of tort allows the recovery of nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 903, 907, 908 (1979), including both pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensatory damages. Id. §§ 905-06. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 expresses the legislative desire to allow claimants to recover those common law tort remedies—nominal damages, pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensatory damages, and punitive damages—under the LAD. There is no mention in N.J.S.A. 10:5-13, or elsewhere in the LAD, that the “common law tort actions” giving rise to such remedies should be altered.
The declarations section of the LAD, N.J.S.A 10:5-3, does not support a contrary conclusion. The last paragraph of that section lists several types of harms, which may accompany discrimination, including “physical and emotional loss” and “severe emotional trauma.” Ibid. It then states: “Such harms have, under the common law, given rise to legal remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The Appellate Division concluded that the phrase “emotional stress” in N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 evidenced a legislative intent to lower the standard for obtaining compensatory damages based on emotional distress, one purportedly endorsed by Zahorian and Gray. Tarr, supra, 360 N.J.Super. at 273-75, 822 A.2d 647. The panel surmised that the Legislature could not have intended through the 1990 amendments to heighten the standard, enunciated in Zahorian and Gray, for obtaining such damages. Ibid.
*97However, the term “emotional stress” in the declarations section was not listed in isolation. The term is part of a longer phrase, “physical and emotional stress,” that is itself set off by semi-colons from other varieties of “harms” listed in N.J.S.A. 10:5-3. Not only does isolating “emotional stress” mischaracterize the legislative use of the term but it also makes no sense in the context of the paragraph as a whole. When it is isolated, the phrase “emotional stress” subsumes the later term “severe emotional trauma.” See N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 178 N.J. 327, 336, 840 A.2d 231 (2004) (finding preferable interpretation “that ... gives meaning to all of the words employed in the statute”). Furthermore, “emotional stress” alone is not a “harm” that has “given rise to legal remedies” under our common law. “Emotional stress” affords common-law legal remedies only when coupled with “physical” stress, Buckley, supra, 111 N.J. at 367, 544 A.2d 857, or when “emotional stress” rises to the level of “severe emotional trauma.” Ibid.; accord Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 514-15, 706 A.2d 685.
One must construe the phrase “emotional distress” out of context to conclude that the 1990 LAD amendments meant to apply a standard lower than the common law threshold for obtaining compensatory damages based on emotional distress caused by discrimination, which is none other than the Taylor standard. The majority’s contrary conclusion appears to me to be at odds with a reasonable construction of the actual language of the Legislature and lacks support in the legislative history of the LAD.5
C.
Furthermore, I must part company with my colleagues concerning the import of Gray and Zahorian in this matter.
*98In Zahorian, our affirmance of a Division Director’s award of incidental monetary damages has no relevance to a claim for emotional-distress compensatory damages of the type available under the common law of tort, brought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5—13, because Zahorian was not a common-law tort action, but a statutory action under the LAD. The monetary damages awarded in Zahorian were “incidental” to the broad equitable powers vested in the Director under the LAD. Such incidental monetary damages were available in this matter, but plaintiff never requested such relief. In respect of Gray, supra, even accepting that the cause of action there was considered to be the “tort” of violating “paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article I of New Jersey’s Constitution,” 110 N.J.Super. at 307, 265 A.2d 404, the court’s remedy was nominal damages that reflect the violation of a constitutional right, but that did not compensate for an actual loss. Id. at 317-18, 265 A.2d 404; see generally id. at 315-16, 265 A.2d 404 (quoting Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 96-97, 186 A. 585 (Sup.Ct.1936) (noting that “[i]t is the established rule of this state that ... [f]or the invasion of a legal right, the law ordinarily infers that damage has ensued. And, in the absence of actual loss, the law vindicates the right by awarding nominal damages”)).
Nominal damages, however, are not what plaintiff seeks here, and that is not what the majority seemingly now will allow. Plaintiffs claim is for compensatory damages and all additional relief that is predicated on such an award. An award of nominal damages, as opposed to compensatory damages, automatically forecloses the possibility of awarding punitive damages. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13c. Holding that “compensatory” damages for emotional distress are now available under the LAD solely based on the violation of a constitutional or legal right, without any showing of severe emotional distress as by the common law required for an emotional distress claim, and as Taylor, supra, underscored, is antithetical to that important limitation in the Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17. As Justice Hall admonished, a legislative intent to revamp such “an important public policy matter ... is so extremely doubtful that I am convinced the power *99should be denied unless and until the Legislature bestows it in plain and unmistakable language.” Zahorian, supra, 62 N.J. at 417, 301 A.2d 754 (Hall, J., dissenting).
IV.
In my view, the Legislature did not intend to lower the threshold for recovering common-law remedies when such remedies are sought under the LAD, nor can that be reasonably inferred from the LAD. Therefore, in this matter I would require plaintiff to satisfy the modified four-prong test for obtaining compensatory damages for emotional distress that arises from discriminatory conduct, as set forth in Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 509-21, 706 A.2d 685.6 Based on my review of the record, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs claim for compensatory damages grounded on her alleged emotional distress because plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing under Taylor.
Specifically, in respect of the subjective severity of plaintiffs alleged emotional distress, the trial court correctly observed that the LAD does not require: (1) “a showing of medical treatment or medication in order to meet the emotional distress things,” (2) “that emotional distress damages have to be proven by expert testimony, although that would be preferable,” or (3) “that the plaintiff has to show that she sought treatment or anything for it,” which is consistent with our observation in Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at 313, 661 A.2d 1202, that a claim for emotional distress damages under the LAD does not require as a matter of law “expert testimony or independent corroboration.” However, the trial court found plaintiffs “temporary upsetment” did not demonstrate “severe” emotional stress, as required under our common *100law. The trial court noted correctly that “emotional distress standing alone with nothing else is generally not compensable,” and that the alleged emotional distress
has to be something more than just sort or a passing problem. And that’s what happened in this case was that [plaintiff] made a passing reference to crying in the car and there was basically no testimony to indicate that that was related to the incident in question or to other problems or that it was substantial, that it was significant or that it caused her any continuing emotional distress.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff’s proofs differ substantially with those offered by the plaintiff in Taylor. There, the plaintiffs supervisor, who was a white male, referred to the plaintiff, who was an African-American female, as a “jungle bunny” in the presence of others, eliciting laughter from one listener. Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 495, 706 A.2d 685. The plaintiff immediately began to cry and went to the bathroom. When discussing the remark with co-workers soon thereafter, all of whom were white and male, she was mocked. Id. at 495-96, 706 A.2d 685. After bringing the incident to light, the plaintiffs co-workers “acted coolly toward her and were afraid to talk to her.” Id. at 497, 706 A.2d 685. The plaintiff consulted a psychiatrist periodically for almost a year; she was a “nervous wreck”; “[s]he was afraid to leave work alone and lived in constant fear of reprisal”; and “bought a bullet-proof vest.” Ibid. The plaintiff suffered from insomnia, mood changes, and other symptoms indicative of “post-traumatic stress disorder,” as diagnosed by her psychiatrist. Ibid.7
*101In the matter before us, although a co-worker testified about how she believed the discrimination had affected plaintiff, plaintiff herself introduced no other evidence of her emotional distress, except her own testimony. Plaintiff made the tactical decision not to offer evidence that she visited psychiatrists, psychologists, and/or social workers in and around the time of the discriminatory conduct giving rise to this lawsuit, possibly because some or all of those visits related to marital difficulties she was experiencing around the same time. Plaintiff also apparently testified at her deposition about headaches, high blood pressure, and an appetite change, all potentially related to the discriminatory conduct, but perhaps relating to the difficulties associated with her marriage, or perhaps other undisclosed factors. Plaintiffs trial strategy instead appears to have been to limit the evidence of her emotional distress to her feeling “bothered,” and to crying while driving home on one occasion. Unlike at her deposition, plaintiff did not testify at trial about her headaches, high blood pressure, or loss of appetite. Plaintiff did not testify that she sought medical, psychological, or social worker treatment. In my view, the evidence presented by plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of subjective emotional distress under Taylor.
Y.
In conclusion, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs claim for compensatory damages based on emotional distress. That said, I join in the Court’s reversal of the Appellate Division judgment that had imposed individual liability on defen*102dant Bob Ciasulli. I also concur in the Court’s conclusion that, to recover attorney’s fees as a prevailing party under the LAD, our courts should employ the same standard as that used for such claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. See ante at 84-86, 853 A.2d at 929-30 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)).
Justice VERNIERO joins in this opinion.
For affirmance in part/reversal in part/remandment—Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE—4.
For concurrence in partldissent in part—Justices VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA—2.
Buckley, supra, set forth a four-prong test for establishing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) intentional conduct; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) proximate cause; and (4) severe emotional distress. 111 N.J. at 366, 544 A.2d 857. Among other things, Taylor essentially subdivided the fourth prong of Buckley to require both (a) subjective and (b) objective severity. Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 516-18, 706 A.2d 685.
First, we "conclude[dj that power dynamics of the workplace [could] contribute to the outrageousness of defendant’s conduct." Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 511, 706 A.2d 685. Second, we held that the severity of a person’s alleged emotional distress has both a subjective component, measured by the actual evidence of severe emotional distress, id. at 514-15, 706 A.2d 685, and an objective component, such that "people cannot recover for idiosyncratic emotional distress that would not be experienced by average persons.” Id. at 515, 706 A.2d 685. In respect of the objective component, we held that "[w]henever an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arises out of conduct that also constitutes invidious discrimination [under the LAD], the average person standard must be adapted to reflect those characteristics of the plaintiff that are the focus of the alleged discrimination.” Id. at 516-17, 706 A.2d 685.
The trial court compelled plaintiff to produce for in camera review documents relating to plaintiff's medical and social worker visits to which she adverted when deposed, and which might bear on her allegation of emotional distress.
The bracketed material comes from plaintiff’s trial testimony.
Declarations in a statutory preamble are not considered operative terms; however, they may act as an intrinsic aid to interpretation if a statute's operative terms are ambiguous. Blackman v. Iles, 4 N.J. 82, 91, 71 A.2d 633 (1950). Notably, here, the Court is urged by plaintiff to accord to N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 operative status. That it should not do.
As previously stated, under that test, to recover compensatory damages for emotional distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) intentional conduct, id. at 513-14, 706 A.2d 685; (2) outrageous conduct, id. at 509-13, 706 A.2d 685; (3) proximate cause, id. at 515, 706 A.2d 685; (4)(a) subjectively severe emotional distress, id. at 514-15, 706 A.2d 685; and (4)(b) objectively severe emotional distress. Id. at 516-20, 706 A.2d 685.
Although the plaintiff in Taylor, supra, adduced evidence that she consulted a psychiatrist, and that the psychiatrist diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress /disorder, the Court did not hold that such expert evidence was a prerequisite to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on discrimination as a matter of law. 152 N.J. at 514-15, 706 A.2d 685. Rather, such evidence, as a matter of fact, might bolster the conclusion that a plaintiff suffered "severe” emotional distress. The Court’s explicit observation of the same in Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at 313, 661 A.2d 1202, is wholly compatible with Taylor. I note in addition that the majority of federal Courts of Appeal addressing claims of compensatory damages for emotional distress in the context of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981 and 1983, as well as 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Title VII), have held that a plaintiff is not barred as a matter of law from recovering compensatory damages *101for emotional distress without expert testimony or corroborative evidence, and that the absence of corroboration goes to the weight of the evidence demonstrating emotional distress. See, e.g., Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of New York. v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 55 (2d Cir.2002); Gunby v. Pa. Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1121-22 (3d Cir.1988), cited with approval in Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 428 n. 6 (3d Cir.1999); Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir.2001); Thomas v. Texas Dep’t Criminal Justice, 297 F.3d 361, 368-69 (5th Cir.2002); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc. 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1996); Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527, 531 (8th Cir.1999).