(concurring specially).
I concur with the result reached by the majority even though it was based upon the wrong grounds. The issue of use and maintenance was not reached by the trial court. That issue was one of the bases of the summary judgment motion of Wien-eke’s insurance carrier but the trial court chose to only address one other bases, that is, that Wieneke’s losses did not arise out of an “accident.”
That being so, that is the only issue we should review, unless of course, this court wishes to totally ignore its own holding of only two years ago that “[t]he jurisdiction of an appellate court is limited to questions actually decided by a trial court.” Schafer v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 348 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), derived in part from Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 68 n. 2 (Minn.1979) (“The trial court’s record is conclusive on appeal and this court is limited to reviewing questions presented to and decided by the lower court, and to the trial court’s record.”).
For reasons of its own, the majority chose to slide around the “accident” issue, upon which the trial court concentrated, and slip into the “use and maintenance” issue, ignored by the trial court. I suspect the majority was worried about a conflict with Meric v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 343 N.W.2d 688 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), if it found that a punch in the nose in Wieneke was not an accident, but the murder in Meric was. But the majority anguished too much. Meric did not address the issue of whether the murder was an accident within the meaning of insurance coverage, *601and there is a difference in the two issues. Witness the policy language:
The bodily injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.
(emphasis added). This language suggests a two-part analysis. Since the accidental nature of injuries and the “use or maintenance” of a vehicle are separable issues, and the trial court did separate, we should stay on track with the trial court on the “accident” issue.
In fact, I think it would have been safer to do so in order to reach the result of the majority. I think one could argue that Wieneke’s losses did, in fact, arise out of the maintenance or use of an automobile. After all, it was both drivers provocative conduct in maneuvering their respective vehicles that precipitated the assault. Sounds close to “use” of an automobile to me. See Nadeau v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., 350 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn.1984) (the use of a vehicle was a “necessary and contributing cause” of a pedestrian’s injuries because the injuries would not have occurred “but for” the fact that the other party’s car was being driven toward her).
On the other hand, I do not doubt for one moment that Wieneke’s injuries were not caused by accident. He was punched in the nose. The assailant was convicted of fourth degree assault. That, believe me, was no accident. The day is not saved by Wieneke’s argument that the accidental nature of injuries should be viewed from the “victims” point of view. This state has not yet gone so far as to adopt that viewpoint. See Red & White Airway Cab Co. v. Transit Casualty Co., 305 Minn. 353, 357, 234 N.W.2d 580, 582 (1975).
We should have affirmed on the “accident” issue.