dissenting.
By the stroke of its pen, the majority today has not only rewritten the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act so as to render it meaningless and senseless, it has obliterated the explicit legislated right of contribution which exists among joint tortfeasors pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8324 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b).
Concluding that a verdict may be reduced only by the proportionate share of the settling tortfeasor, the majority states that “[t]he actual amount of the release, if it exceeds this sum, is of no consequence in the satisfaction of the judgment of the remaining defendants.” This analysis is simply incredible. Section 8326 provides that, “[a] release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid.” [Emphasis added]. When the legislature has by unambiguous and concise language established this right under Section 8326, it is not within judicial prerogative to modify the legislative judgment.
The language of § 8326 is identical to its precursor, Section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Act of July 19, 1951, P.L. 1130. Pennsylvania was among those jurisdictions which adopted the text of the 1939 uniform act which bears the same title. See, 12 Uniform Laws Annotated, pp. 59, 60. Section 4 of our 1951 Act and 42 Pa.C.S. § 8326 contain the verbatim language of § 4 of the 1939 version of the uniform act.
*497In Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), this Court analyzed Section 4 of the 1951 Act. We were presented then with the same issue which the Appellant now raises thirty years later. In these thirty years the statutory language has not changed, but, today, the interpretation has.
In Daugherty, the plaintiffs brought actions, subsequently consolidated for trial, against defendant Hershberger for injuries sustained in an automobile accident with Hershberger and another driver. Prior to the filing of the actions against Hershberger, the plaintiffs entered into a settlement with the other driver. The executed releases discharged the driver from liability, and provided that the damages recoverable against Hershberger were reduced to the extent of the driver’s pro rata share.
Hershberger later joined the other driver as an additional defendant. Verdicts were entered against both Hershberger and the driver totalling $11,720. Under the settlement, the plaintiffs had received $13,500. The consideration paid to plaintiff Daugherty for the release was $5,145.23; the verdict for Daugherty assessed damages at $5,549.49.1 Because the consideration paid for the release exceeded the driver’s pro rata share of 50%, a dispute arose as to the amount of the verdict for which Hershberger was liable.
The plaintiffs claimed that since the releases provided for a pro rata reduction, they were entitled to recover 50% of their verdicts from Hershberger regardless of the amount of the consideration paid by the other driver. Hershberger contended that he should be held liable only for the difference between the consideration paid and the amount of the verdict entered for each of the plaintiffs. We held that the language of Section 4 of the 1951 Act was wholly unambiguous, and concluded on review thereof that Hershberger’s position was correct.
Section 4 was paraphrased by our Court as follows:
*498In other words, if the proportion of reduction provided by the release is greater than the amount of the consideration paid for the release, such proportion of reduction prevails, but if, on the other hand, the consideration paid for the release is greater than the proportion of reduction provided by the release, then the amount of the consideration paid for the release prevails.
386 Pa. at 373, 126 A.2d at 733 [Emphasis added].
We acknowledged therein that the Commissioners’ note to § 4 of the 1939 uniform act, which became Section 4 of our Act in 1951, had also paraphrased its language by stating that “a release of one tortfeasor will benefit the others by reducing the claim against them in the amount of the consideration paid therefor, or in the amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, whichever is larger.” 386 Pa. at 373, 126 A.2d at 733.
The majority now overrules our decision in Daugherty, but, understandably, does not explain how the “wholly unambiguous” language of the statute has taken on a new meaning since that decision. Understandably, because there is no rational basis for this sudden shift in our Court’s interpretation of the legislative language. Nor is there any logical explanation for its rejection of the Commissioners’ statement of what was accomplished by the 1939 uniform act, which our legislature adopted. What does underlie this about-face is the majority’s sentiment that only its interpretation would favor settlements and that this should be encouraged as a policy matter. To support its interpretation, the majority creates the specter of a failing judicial system which undermines settlement as a method of dispute resolution. This is disingenuous, as this Court’s interpretation in Daugherty, which the majority now rejects, has not crippled settlement of cases during the 30 years since it was decided.
Whatever its merit, however, the majority’s view of which is the best method of encouraging settlements in cases involving multiple defendants is of no consequence when *499the statutory language states otherwise. The judiciary’s function is to apply the law as it is stated, not to restate it to conform with its own beliefs. When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
Section 8326 is phrased in the alternative. The statute provides that a claim against a non-settling tortfeasor is reduced “in the amount of the consideration paid” or “in any amount or proportion by which the release provides ... if greater than the consideration paid.” The larger of the two figures is the amount by which the claim is reduced. The amount of consideration paid is discernible from the release itself, while “proportion” would be determined by the factfinder.
By its holding, the majority has excised that provision of § 8326 which refers to the consideration paid. It has determined that the provision is no longer necessary, and that reducing the claim by the calculated proportion will suffice. The majority’s judicial judgment of the amount by which a release will be reduced has been substituted for the legislature’s judgment. This is improper. The legislature clearly intended that the greater amount of the two figures would reduce the claim, whether it be the consideration paid or the proportionate share.
Because the unambiguous language of § 8326 has remained unchanged since Daugherty, so should our interpretation. Even if the majority thinks that § 8326 has somehow become “ambiguous” with the passage of time, its analysis violates the rules of statutory construction. “In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute, the following presumptions, among others, may be used: (4) That when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4).
*500Attempting to bolster its analysis, the majority cites cases from the highest courts in New Jersey, Texas, and Colorado. Unlike Pennsylvania, however, neither New Jersey nor Texas has adopted the statutory language of § 4 of the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as recommended by the national commission. Texas is among those states which has not adopted the uniform act in any form. New Jersey, which enacted legislation involving contribution among tortfeasors, did not adopt the act recommended by the national commission. New Jersey’s legislation does not expressly deal with the effect of a settlement on the right to contribution. Unless the legislative language of § 8326 is to be ignored completely, the case law of states such as New Jersey and Texas, which have not adopted similar language, is of no import. Ironically, recognizing the statutory differences, the New Jersey Superior Court has stated that generally foreign precedent would be inapposite in interpreting its statute. Tefft v. Tefft, 192 N.J.Super. 561, 471 A.2d 790 (1983).
Of the three jurisdictions, only Colorado had adopted a statutory provision comparable to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8326. The majority attempts to rely upon the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Kussman v. City and County of Denver, 706 P.2d 776 (Colo.1985) to support its holding that the non-settling tortfeasor is liable for his full proportionate share. This reliance is misplaced because in Perlmutter v. Blessing, 706 P.2d 772 (Colo.1985) and Greenemeier v. Spencer, 719 P.2d 710 (Colo.1986), the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted its own statutory language governing the effect of a release in the same way this Court did in Daugherty.2 Thus, while the majority quotes from the *501Colorado Court’s decision in Kussman, the Colorado Supreme Court itself has unequivocally rejected the majority’s interpretation.
The majority’s error is made in the first instance because it quotes an excerpt from the Kussman decision without regard to the issue raised therein. In Kussman, the plaintiff was injured while a passenger in a van which she owned. The van collided with a fire truck owned by the city of Denver. In the plaintiff’s action against the city, the city claimed that the operator of the van was solely liable for the injuries, and that the operator’s negligence should be imputed to the plaintiff in order to defeat her claim. The city also joined the operator as a third-party defendant. During trial, the plaintiff gave the operator a covenant not to sue in exchange for a payment of $35,000. The jury found that the city was 51% negligent and the operator, 49%. Under Colorado law, the jury also imputed the operator’s negligence to the plaintiff as the owner of the van. The damages were determined to be $153,037. Because the plaintiff was found 49% at fault due to the imputed negligence, judgment was entered against the city for 51% of the total damages, or $78,048.
The city filed a motion to amend the judgment, contending that it was entitled to offset the $78,048 judgment with the operator’s $35,000 settlement with the plaintiff. The motion was denied. The issue raised before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the operator and the city were “liable in tort for the same injury”, i.e. joint tortfeasors, which would permit the city to set off the $35,000 settlement from its liability. The court held that they were not joint tortfeasors and as a result could not offset the judgment with the settlement, stating:
Here, the city, taking advantage of the comparative negligence law, section 13-21-111, defended itself by imputing [the operator’s] negligence to the plaintiff; as a result, the liability for the plaintiff’s injury was divided into two independent components: the city’s liability and the plaintiff’s liability. Once the liability was divided according to *502fault and judgment rendered against the city for no more than its independent portion of the liability to the plaintiff, the predicate for contribution — a joint or several liability for the entire damages resulting from the plaintiffs injury — was erased.
706 P.2d at 780.
Unlike the instant case, the damages assessed by the jury against the city in Kussman could not be reduced by the amount of consideration paid for the covenant not to sue because the city and the operator were not joint tortfeasors.
The majority has also apparently overlooked the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Perlmutter, which was handed down on the same day as Kussman. In Perlmutter, the Colorado court reviewed § 13-50.5-105 of its Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 13-50.5-101 to -106, 6 C.R.S., which provided for the set-off of settlement funds paid by one tortfeasor from the claim against other tortfeasors jointly or severally liable for the same injury.
Section 13-50.5-105 provided:
(1) When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
The Colorado Supreme Court also found this language to be unambiguous. As we had in Daugherty, the court stated that subsection (a) of this statute meant that, “Where the only injuries involved in an action are those for which all tortfeasors are jointly or severally liable, the application of this section is clear: either the settlement amount or the amount provided for in the settlement document, which*503ever is greater, must be deducted from the total judgment against the remaining tortfeasors.” 706 P.2d at 775 [Emphasis added].3
Finally, in Greenemeier, the Colorado Supreme Court was squarely faced with the factual circumstances presented by the instant case. The plaintiffs brought a suit against two minors and their parents for injuries sustained when one of the plaintiffs was struck by a pellet from a BB gun fired by the minors. Before trial, the plaintiffs reached a settlement of $100,000 with one of the minors and his parents. The jury returned a verdict against the minor who had not settled in the amount of $8,000 to one plaintiff, and of $51,000 to the other plaintiff. Of the $51,000, the sum of $1,000 was for exemplary damages. Upon the defendant’s motion, the trial court reduced the two compensatory damage awards to zero. The trial court held that § 13-50.5-105 required that the amount of compensatory damages received by the plaintiffs at trial be reduced by the amount of settlement they had received from the settling tortfeasor prior to trial.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, reiterating its analysis in Perlmutter:
In Perlmutter v. Blessing, 706 P.2d 772, 775 (Colo.1985), we noted that where, as in the present case, “the only injuries involved in an action are those for which all tortfeasors are jointly or severally liable, the application of [section 13-50.5-105(l)(a) ] is clear: either the settlement amount or the amount provided for in the settlement document, whichever is greater, must be deducted from the total judgment against the remaining tortfeasors.” This type of reduction was recognized in Colorado even before our legislature adopted the Act in 1977. See Cox v. Pearl Investment Co., 168 Colo. 67, 74, 450 *504P.2d 60, 63 (1969) (noting that in order to avoid overcompensating a plaintiff, a nonsettling defendant is entitled to have the amount of the judgment against him reduced by the amount paid in settlement).
719 P.2d at 713.
In Daugherty, we recognized that at common law a release of one tortfeasor necessarily worked a release of all others, irrespective of the parties’ intent. The 1951 Act altered the effect of a release as to other tortfeasors. It enabled an individual to settle with one joint tortfeasor and still have recourse to the remaining tortfeasors, subject to the limitations set forth in the Act.
The 1951 Act provided also for a right to contribution among joint tortfeasors, which was reenacted in 1976 as part of the current Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. A tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability is entitled to contribution. The amount of contribution is calculated by reference to the percentage of negligence attributable to that tortfeasor. For purposes of contribution only, negligence was apportioned previously among tortfeasors in equal shares — i.e. 50% if two, 33Vs% if three, etc. A plaintiff’s right to recovery has never been limited by such an apportionment of negligence among tortfeasors.
In the past, the only factor which affected the plaintiff’s right to recovery was the plaintiff’s own negligence. The adoption of a comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, eliminated contributory negligence of a plaintiff as a bar to recovery where such negligence is not greater than that of the defendant.
It is not true as has been suggested, however, that the refinement in determining the proportionate. share of a defendant’s negligence under the comparative negligence statute has invalidated the legislative language in 42 Pa. C.S. § 8326 relating to the amount of the consideration paid for the release. Nor is it necessary to speculate as to the effect of the comparative negligence statute on a defendant’s right to contribution. The statute itself is specific, *505“The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b).
In other words, the comparative negligence statute simply altered the method for determining the amount of contribution which a defendant may seek. Rather than calculating the pro rata share of liability by dividing 100% by the number of defendants, the factfinder’s assessment of the pro rata share controls. Under the comparative negligence statute, contribution is based upon the comparative fault of the tortfeasors. This is sometimes referred to as “comparative contribution.” See, Restatement, Second, Torts § 885.
Not only has the majority redrafted the statute, it has ignored the consequences of its holding. First, it has rendered invalid any right to contribution by a settling tortfeasor who has paid more than his percentage share. If the non-settling tortfeasor is required to pay all of his percentage share to the plaintiff, he cannot be required to pay contribution to the settling tortfeasor. Previously, the non-settling tortfeasor was required to compensate the settling tortfeasor for the amount by which the plaintiff’s claim had been reduced due to the release. Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa.Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962).
The following examples illustrate that the majority’s analysis contravenes the stated legislative intent that there exist a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8324. Each of the examples assumes that A is the settling tortfeasor and that a jury has awarded $100,000 in damages. The first set of examples states the Plaintiff’s total recovery under the majority’s analysis. It is notable that in not one of the following instances would A, the settling tortfeasor, have a right to contribution.
*506Proportionate share of damages assessed against A
Proportionate share of damages assessed against B
Amount of consideration paid by A for the release
Amount paid by B to Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s total recovery
Example (1) 0% 100% $ 30,000 $100,000 $130,000
Example (2) 70% 30% $ 30,000 $ 30,000 $ 60,000
Example (3) 30% 70% $ 30,000 $ 70,000 $100,000
Example (4) 20% 80% $ 30,000 $ 80,000 $110,000
Example (5) 30% 70% $110,000 $ 70,000 $180,000
Under the Daugherty analysis, which would require the verdict to be reduced by A’s proportionate share or the amount of consideration paid for the release, whichever is greater, the same five examples would result in the following:
Proportionate share of damages assessed against A
Proportionate share of damages assessed against B
Amount of consideration paid by A for the release
Amount paid by B to Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s total recovery
Example (1) 0% 100% $ 30,000 $100,000 $130,000
Example (2) 70% 30% $ 30,000 $ 30,000 $ 60,000
Example (3) 30% 70% $ 30,000 $ 70,000 $100,000
Example (4) 20% 80% $ 30,000 $ 70,000 $100,000
Example (5) 30% 70% $110,000 $ 0 $110,000
As can be seen by comparison of the charts, the' first three examples will result in the same total recovery for the plaintiff and the same distribution of payments among defendants under either analysis. The fundamental differences between the majority’s view and my view are demonstrated by Examples (4) and (5). In those instances, the majority totally disregards the amount of consideration paid for the release by A and requires B to pay the plaintiff the total amount of damages represented by his proportionate share. As a result, A could never seek contribution from B although A had paid more for the release than his proportionate share of damages.
The language of § 8326 and the Daugherty analysis, however, that the claim against the other tortfeasors would be reduced in the amount of consideration paid for the *507release or the amount or proportion by which the release provides if greater than the consideration paid, alter the result in Examples (4) and (5). In Example (4), the greater of those two amounts is $30,000 — the amount paid for the release. Thus, in reducing the plaintiff’s recovery by $30,-000, B would be required to pay the plaintiff the sum of $70,000. The plaintiff would receive the total damages which he suffered of $100,000, while A could recover $10,-000 from B by exercising his right to contribution. B would then be obligated to pay a total sum of $80,000 — which represents his proportionate share of damages of 80%.
In Example (5), the greater of the two amounts is $110,-000 — again, the amount of the release. The plaintiff’s recovery would be reduced by $110,000, and B would not be required to pay any amount to the plaintiff. The plaintiff would receive $10,000 in excess of the total damages due to the favorable settlement, while A could recover $70,000 from B by exercising his right to contribution. Once again, B would then be obligated to pay the amount which represents his proportionate share of damages of 70%.
It is only under the holding which the majority enunciates can a plaintiff recover more than the fair compensation for his injuries fixed by a jury’s verdict or trial judge’s determination of damages. Under our prior case law, a plaintiff would recover 100% of his damages. Now, under the majority analysis, the plaintiff may recover more than the fair value of his damages, and have more than one satisfaction for the same injury.
The majority contends that a settling tortfeasor would receive a “windfall” by way of contribution. Although the right to contribution is a benefit to a settling tortfeasor when the settling tortfeasor’s payment satisfies more than his proportional share of the obligation to the plaintiff, it is by no means a windfall. Both the settling and the non-settling tortfeasor will have paid his respective proportional share of liability. The non-settling tortfeasor will do so in part by satisfying his obligation to pay contribution. What the majority has termed a windfall is in fact a statutory *508right to contribution. If the majority disapproves of the right to contribution among joint tortfeasors, its quarrel is with the legislature.
In the instant case, the amount of the consideration paid for the release by Appellee Giant Eagle was $22,500. The jury determined that the proportion of damages attributable to Giant Eagle’s negligence was 60% of $31,000 or $18,600. The greater of the two amounts was the consideration of $22,500. I would affirm the holding of the lower courts and find that the Appellant’s claim against Appellee Stanley Door was properly reduced by $22,500. Giant Eagle would be entitled then to seek contribution from Stanley Door in the amount of $3,900 — i.e., $22,500 less $18,600.
. Unlike plaintiff Daugherty, for several of the plaintiffs, the amount paid by the driver for the releases was greater than the assessment of the individual's damages. As to those plaintiffs, Hershberger requested that the verdicts be discharged altogether.
. Subsequent to the time the Colorado Supreme Court handed down its decisions in these cases, the statute was amended by the legislature. The statute which became effective July 1, 1986, now provides that the claim against the non-settling tortfeasors is reduced "to the extent of any degree or percentage of fault or negligence attributable by the finder of fact." 6 C.R.S. § 13-50.5-105(l)(a). There, it was the Colorado legislature which rewrote the language of its statute. Here, it is the majority which usurps the legislature's authority and redrafts the Pennsylvania statute.
. It should be noted that the Colorado statute differed from § 8326 of the Pennsylvania statute in one respect. The Colorado statute reduced the claim against the non-settling tortfeasors by the amount of the consideration or the amount provided for in the release, whichever is greater. Section 8326 provides that the claim will be reduced by the amount of consideration, or in the amount or proportion stated in the release.