with whom WATHEN, Chief Justice, and ROBERTS, Justice, join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The law of statutory construction is well established that “we examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as its legislative history, only when the plain language is ambiguous.” Berube v. Rust Engineering, 668 A.2d 876, 877 (Me.1995) (citing Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, we have repeatedly stated that we will uphold the Commission’s interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act “unless the statute plainly compels a different result.” Id. (quoting Nielsen v. Burnham & Morrill, 600 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Me.1991)). In my opinion, the Court has failed to consider either of these principles.
The language of section 51(2) plainly applies to the facts of the instant case: The employer, Fleet Bank, sponsored a shuttle-bus “having as its sole purpose the mass transportation of employees to and from work_” 39 M.R.S.A. § 51(2). Nothing in the language of the statute requires either minimum travel distances or energy savings before such a program may qualify for statutory immunity. Nor does the statutory language suggest that “to and from work” requires that transportation be provided the entire distance from the employee’s home to place of work to fall within the purview of the statute. The Court’s interpretation imper-missibly imposes requirements not within the plain language of the statute. The Commission determined that section 51(2) is applicable to Fleet’s shuttle-bus program, and the statutory language does not “plainly corn-pelf ] a different result.” Berube, 668 A.2d at 875. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission.