concurring:
I concur in the majority’s opinion because I believe that appellant failed to establish either that the underlying issue was meritorious or that the particular course of action chosen by counsel was unreasonable. Like my colleagues, I believe counsel here acted pursuant to a reasonably based trial strategy. For that reason, I would affirm the judgments of sentence.
I hesitate, however, to join the majority’s discussion regarding Commonwealth v. Buehl, 540 Pa. 493, 658 A.2d 771 (1995) *491and the standard for ineffectiveness claims under the PCRA. Unlike my colleagues, I am persuaded by Justice Cappy’s expression in Buekl, in which he opined that “the verbiage set forth in § 9543(a)(2)(h) is by constitutional mandate and logical application, nothing more than a recitation of the Pierce [traditional] standard of prejudice.” Id. at 522, 658 A.2d at 786.
Recognizing that this difference of opinion has no substantive effect on either the result or rationale in the instant case, I join the majority in all respects with the exception of footnote 8.