I concur in the result of the lead opinion, but write separately because I disagree with its reasoning and the breadth of its holding. Rather than relying on the general venue statutes, I would hold that the statute addressing transfer motions in actions brought in an improper venue, MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651, precludes enforcement of a venue selection clause where, as in this case, the defendant timely moves for a change of venue in accordance with the court rules. I would leave for another day the question whether the general venue statutes and the court rules preclude Michigan courts from enforcing venue selection clauses under circumstances that do not fall within the scope of MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651.
*318I agree with the determination of the lead opinion that our decision turns on a question of statutory construction. This Court has long recognized that the establishment of venue lies within the Legislature’s power. See Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 62; 503 NW2d 435 (1993); Barnard v Hinkley, 10 Mich 458, 459 (1862). I disagree, however, with the lead opinion’s reliance on the general venue provisions because the Legislature has specifically addressed whether the trial court must grant a timely motion for change of venue where the plaintiff has brought the action in an improper venue.
The statute, MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651, provides:
An action brought in a county not designated as a proper county may nevertheless be tried therein, unless a defendant moves for a change of venue within the time and in the manner provided by court rule, in which case the court shall transfer the action to a proper county on such conditions relative to expense and costs as provided by court rule and [MCL 600.1653; MSA 27A.1653], The court for the county to which the transfer is made shall have full jurisdiction of the action as though the action had been originally commenced therein.
If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted and we enforce the statute as written. Rickner v Frederick, 459 Mich 371, 378; 590 NW2d 288 (1999); McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 458 Mich 214, 217; 580 NW2d 424 (1998). The Legislature’s use of the word “shall” rather than “may” in MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651 indicates a mandatory, rather than discretionary, action. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 542; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). The statute contains no exception for venue in actions founded on a contract that includes *319a venue selection clause. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the trial court must transfer an action brought in an improper venue on the defendant’s timely motion, regardless of whether the defendant had contractually agreed to the venue.
Under the venue statutes applicable to this case, the proper venue is Saginaw County because that is the county in which the tangible personal property is situated, defendant resides, and defendant has his place of business. MCL 600.1621(a); MSA 27A.1621(a), MCL 600.1605(d); MSA 27A.1605(d). Plaintiff nevertheless brought this action in Oakland County, the venue the parties selected in their contract. Defendant then timely moved for change of venue to Saginaw County under MCR 2.223(A). 1 Under these circumstances, MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651 mandates that the trial court grant the motion. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to change venue in this case.
Weaver, C.J., and Young, J., concurred with Corrigan, J. Taylor, J., took no part in the decision of this case.MCR 2.223(A) provides:
If the venue of a civil action is improper, the court
(1) shall order a change of venue on timely motion of a defendant, or
(2) may order a change of venue on its own initiative with notice to the parties and opportunity for them to be heard on the venue question.
If venue is changed because the action was brought where venue was not proper, the action may be transferred only to a county in which venue would have been proper.