¶ 49. (dissenting). This case involves records containing information about a government employee whose salary is paid for with tax dollars. The majority opinion and concurrence ignore the legislature's statutory commands: Government employees are accountable to the public. The conduct of government employees in their official duties is subject to public scrutiny. Under the Wisconsin Open Records Law the people of the state are "entitled" to the "greatest possible information" about the "official acts" of the "employes who represent them."1 "[D]enial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied."2
¶ 50. I dissent because the majority and concurring opinions rewrite the open records law, do away with the legislatively created "presumption of complete public access" to public records and severely damage the core function of the open records law.3
¶ 51. I willingly acknowledge the importance of privacy and reputational interests. What the majority and concurring opinions fail to acknowledge, however, is that the issue correctly framed is a balance between two public interests: privacy and open government. The majority and concurring opinions attempt to confuse the discussion by incorrectly framing the issue as privacy versus efficiency. The ploy is transparent.
¶ 52. The majority and concurring opinions obscure the discussion by refusing to recognize that in enacting the open records law the legislature has already performed the balance between privacy and open government. Both the majority and concurring *805opinions attempt to redo the balance, not because the balance is legally infirm but because these justices would have decided the balance differently from the legislators. They proceed to substitute their own judgment in legislative matters for the clearly expressed judgment of the legislators, and in the process, they undermine Wisconsin's tradition of open government.
¶ 53. The legislature has established the procedure for access to public records. First the requester asks for the records.4 Then the custodian of the records balances the interest of the public to be informed on public matters against the harm to reputation of the government employee.5 If the records custodian denies public access to the records, the legislature allows the requester to go to court to get the records opened.6 But if the custodian decides to release the record, the legislature has not provided the government employee who is the subject of the records with the opportunity to go to court to keep the records closed. The legislature makes the record custodians, not the courts, the decision makers for the release of records.7
¶ 54. I conclude that when a records custodian, other than a district attorney, balances the interests of privacy and open government and decides to release a public record that contains information about a government employee in response to a request made under Wisconsin's open records law, that government employee is not entitled to court review of the custodian's decision. Why do I reach this conclusion? *806Because that's what the legislature mandated. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 55. The opinion today significantly extends Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996). I write to state my disagreement with this extension. Before I proceed, I want the reader to know that I dissented in Woznicki and that I stand behind that dissent. Woznicki is, however, the law in Wisconsin, at least until it is reversed by this court or the legislature amends the law. I therefore accept Woznicki as binding precedent, albeit reluctantly.
¶ 56. The Woznicki court expressly limited its decision to records in the custody of a district attorney and explained why a district attorney is treated differently from other custodians of records. The Woznicki court stated its holding in the first paragraph of the opinion as follows: "We. . .hold that because of special public policy reasons that are raised when a district attorney chooses to release materials gathered during the course of a criminal investigation, the district attorney's decision to release these records is subject to de novo review by the circuit court." Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 181. The Woznicki court restated its holding in the last paragraph of the opinion as follows: "[We] hold that the District Attorney's decision to release these records is subject to de novo review by the circuit court." Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 295.
¶ 57. A portion of the reasoning in Woznicki can unfortunately be directed to all custodians of records. As I explained in my Woznicki dissent, "[although its holding is ostensibly limited to records held by a district attorney.. .the reasoning of the majority opinion is directed to the custodians of all records rather than to a *807district attorney, the custodian in this case." Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 201 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
¶ 58. But the reasoning of Woznicki need not be directed to all custodians. A district attorney serving as a record custodian is distinguishable from other record custodians, as the Woznicki opinion explained. That distinction can and should be maintained.
¶ 59. Extending the notice and judicial review processes set forth in Woznicki to all custodians of records, as the majority does today, contravenes the language, spirit and purpose of the open records law. The open records law explicitly states that "[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right to inspect any record."8 The open records law enacted by the Wisconsin legislature makes no exception for notice to the subject of a record request nor does it provide for judicial review of a custodian's decision to release a record. The majority opinion not only misinterprets the open records law but also writes a huge exception into it. If an exception to the open record law is needed to protect a subject of a record request, the legislature is the branch of government to enact it. This court should not legislate.
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¶ 60. Further, I dissent because the majority opinion fails to sufficiently justify its holding and expansion of Woznicki. One simple example should suffice. The legislative history of the open record law, as set forth in the Journal Sentinel brief, shows that the Wisconsin legislature rejected a proposed requirement that a custodian give the subject of a records request notice before releasing records sought by subpoena. See *808S. Amend. 2 to S. Subst. Amend. 1 to 1981 S. Bill 250 (LRB-0100/1); A. Amend, to 1981 S. Bill 250 (LRBa 2832/3). The Journal Sentinel argues that the only way to reconcile this legislative history with Woznicki is to limit the reach of Woznicki to district attorneys.
¶ 61. In footnote 6 the majority opinion dismisses this legislative history by saying it predates Woznicki. True, some of it does, but this footnote misses the point. One reason this court will re-examine a decision is that the decision has overlooked information in reaching its conclusion. The Woznicki court never considered this legislative history. None of the briefs in the Woznicki case mentioned the legislative history, and the legislative history does not appear in the majority, concurring or dissenting opinions of the Woznicki court.
¶ 62. Ironically, the majority also dismisses post-Woznicki legislative history. The legislature expressed its disapproval for a general pre-release notice requirement under the open records law in the 1997 biennial budget bill. 1997 Wis. Act 27 § 155j. Although Governor Thompson vetoed this provision on grounds that it was "non-budgetary and should be instead debated as a separate bill," he also declared that he "would be glad to work with the advocates of this provision on legislation that would preserve the spirit of our open records law." Governor's Veto Message, A.J. at 352 (Oct. 13, 1997).
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¶ 63. Furthermore, I dissent because the majority opinion brushes aside the Journal Sentinel's practical argument that extending Woznicki will result in impermissible delays. In footnote 11 the majority opinion promises, as did the Woznicki opinion, that inappropriate delay can be dealt with summarily by *809the courts. Yet it sets forth no expeditious procedure for handling Woznicki type proceedings. Furthermore the majority refuses to exercise its power to review the records and decide this case. Instead the majority remands the case to the circuit court for a decision and possible further appeal.
¶ 64. The majority opinion ignores the time-consuming trial and appellate processes that we know are occurring. For instance, in Klein v. Wisconsin Resources Center, 218 Wis. 2d 487, 582 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1998) (cited favorably by the majority opinion at 798), the request for records was made on June 30, 1996. The circuit court enjoined the custodian from releasing the records on July 16, 1996, and entered judgment on February 27, 1997. The court of appeals issued its decision on April 1, 1998, almost two years after the request for the records was made.
¶ 65. In Kailin v. Rainwater, 226 Wis. 2d at 134, cited favorably by the majority opinion in footnote 11 as illustrating a short time period for decision making under Woznicki, the request for the records was made on November 18, 1996. On January 9, 1997, the subject of the record request sought review of the custodian's decision to release the records in the circuit court. The circuit court issued its decision on February 10, 1998. The court of appeals issued its decision on March 31, 1999, more than two years after the request for the records was made. The Kailin case was, to use the majority's phrase, a routine administration of the Woznicki procedure.
¶ 66. Most recently, in Kraemer Brothers, Inc. v. Dane County, 229 Wis. 2d 86, 599 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1999), three years elapsed from the request for the records to the court of appeals decision.
*810¶ 67. In this case, more than two years have passed since the records custodian conducted his review and decided on January 3, 1997, to release the public records. A final decision about the records has not yet been made. The case is remanded for that decision. Under the majority opinion rendered today, similar delays will become commonplace.
¶ 68. This decision significantly erodes the open records law and open government in this state. I therefore dissent.
¶ 69. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.
¶ 70. David T. Prosser, Jr. (dissenting). I dissent.Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (1997-98).
Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (1997-98).
Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (1997-98).
Wis. Stat. § 19.35 (1997-98).
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. Sheboygan Falls Sch. Dist., 199 Wis. 2d 768, 778, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996).
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.35 (4), 19.37 (1997-98).
Wis. Stat. § 19.37 (1997-98).
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) (1997-98).