concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In a recent address to a joint session of the United States Congress, President Obama admonished that our nation’s “collective failure to meet [the] challenge [of health-care reform] — year after year, decade after decade — has led us to the breaking point.” “Millions are unable to obtain health care coverage,” he asserted; “medical costs are rising”; and the existing system is “placing an unsustainable burden on taxpayers.” According to the President, the failure to take immediate corrective action will be dire: “Our deficit will grow. More families will go bankrupt. More businesses will close. More Americans will lose their coverage when they are sick and need it the most. And more will die as a result.” In outlining his strategy for addressing this crisis, the President advanced a multifaceted plan. Although his proposal focused on expanding health insurance coverage, he also recognized that reform of medical malpractice laws might aid in reducing our nation’s health-care costs, while also improving the quality of care delivered by physicians and received by their patients.
That medical malpractice reforms might have salutary effects on the delivery of affordable health care in Illinois was a view shared by our General Assembly when it enacted Public Act 94 — 677 in 2005. In enacting that law, the General Assembly specifically found:
“This health care crisis, which endangers the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Illinois, requires significant reforms to the civil justice system currently endangering health care for citizens of Illinois.” Pub. Act 94 — 677, §101(4), eff. August 25, 2005.
The types of reforms which the legislature determined to be necessary were those which would
“enhance the State’s oversight of physicians and ability to discipline physicians, *** increase the State’s oversight of medical liability insurance carriers, *** reduce the number of nonmeritorious healing art malpractice actions, *** non-economic damages in healing art malpractice actions, *** encourage physicians to provide voluntary services at free medical clinics, *** encourage physicians and hospitals to continue providing health care services in Illinois, and *** encourage physicians to practice in medical care shortage areas.” Pub. Act 94 — 677, §101(5), eff. August 25, 2005.
The majority’s opinion contains a brief description of the measures adopted by the General Assembly to implement these objectives. To fully understand what the legislature hoped to accomplish, however, additional discussion of the particulars of the program may be helpful.
Section 310 of Public Act 94 — 677 amended the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)) to subject medical malpractice insurance carriers to greater oversight and reporting requirements. Pub. Act 94 — 677, §310, eff. August 25, 2005.
Section 315 revised the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (225 ILCS 60/1 et seq. (West 2004)) to modify certain aspects of the disciplinary process for physicians and create an internet-based system for providing public access to information regarding such matters as physicians’ criminal and disciplinary histories, whether a physician’s hospital privileges have been revoked or involuntarily restricted, and any medical malpractice judgments or arbitration awards which may have been entered against a physician. Pub. Act 94 — 677, §315, eff. August 25, 2005.
Section 330 (Pub. Act 94 — 677, §330, eff. August 25, 2005) amended the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1 — 101 et seq. (West 2004)) by making various changes to the affidavit and written report requirements set forth in section 2 — 622 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622 (West 2004)), including addition of a requirement that the reviewing health-care professional’s written report contain the health-care professional’s name, address, current license number and state of licensure. Section 330 of the Act also added a new section 2 — 1704.5 to the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1704.5 (West 2006)), which allowed either party to elect to have payments for future medical expenses and cost of life care made to the prevailing plaintiff in a medical malpractice action through purchase of an annuity. Another new provision of the Code added by section 330 of the Act was section 2 — 1706.5 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1706.5 (West 2006)). That statute created standards for economic and noneconomic damages, including establishment of limitations on the total amount of noneconomic damages which could be awarded to plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action.5 Two other changes to the Code made by section 330 of the Act were:
(a) inclusion in section 8 — 1901 (735 ILCS 5/8 — 1901 (West 2006)) of a provision rendering inadmissible “[a]ny expression of grief, apology, or explanation” made by a health-care provider to a patient, a patient’s family or a “patient’s legal representative” regarding “an inadequate or unanticipated treatment or care outcome” provided within 72 hours of when “the provider knew or should have known of the potential cause of such outcome”; and
(b) revision of section 8 — 2501 (735 ILCS 5/8 — 2501 (West 2006)) regarding expert witness standards.
Section 340 of the Act amended section 30 of the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS 49/30 (West 2006)) to expressly include retired physicians within its immunities and to add a provision allowing free clinics to receive reimbursement from the Illinois Department of Public Aid subject to the condition that any such reimbursements shall be used exclusively to pay the overhead expenses of operating the clinic and may not be used to provide a fee or other compensation to physicians or health-care professionals receiving an exemption from liability under the law’s provisions. Pub. Act 94 — 677, §340, eff. August 25, 2005.
Finally, article 4 of the Act (Pub. Act 94 — 677, §§401 through 495, eff. August 25, 2005, codified at 710 ILCS 45/401 et seq. (West 2006)), created a new Sorry Works! Pilot Program Act. The program was intended to assess whether prompt apologies by hospitals and physicians for errors in patient care accompanied by prompt offers of fair settlements have an effect on the costs the hospitals and physicians ultimately expend on healing art malpractice claims. The program was to be of limited duration, no more than two years unless terminated sooner by the program’s oversight committee. 710 ILCS 45/415 (West 2006). It also had limited participation. In its first year, it was to include just one hospital. The following year, provided the program was not terminated, one additional hospital could be added. 710 ILCS 45/405 (West 2006).
While the need for health-care reform has gained nearly universal recognition, the means for achieving that reform have been the subject of intense debate. Some fear that government-mandated changes will distort the health-care market, impede access to healthcare resources and interfere with the physician-patient relationship. Others insist that unless the government takes strong and immediate action to overhaul the current system, the costs of medical care will exceed our society’s ability to bear them, leaving increasing numbers of our citizens without access to vital health-care services.
The sentiments expressed by President Obama in his recent address to Congress and the action taken by our General Assembly through enactment of Public Act 94— 677 are clearly premised on the latter view. Whether this view is a sound one is a judgment our court is not competent to render. Public policy determinations of this kind are ultimately a matter for the legislature. Household Bank, FSB v. Lewis, 229 Ill. 2d 173, 182 (2008). It is not our function to weigh the wisdom of legislation or decide whether the policy it expresses offends public welfare. Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 557 (2009). This is no less true in matters pertaining to health care. To the contrary, we have repeatedly noted that the General Assembly has wide regulatory power with respect to the health-care professions and that it is within the broad discretion of the legislature “ ‘to determine not only what the public interest and welfare require, but to determine the measures needed to secure such interest.’ ” Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40-41 (2001), quoting Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 364 (1985).
In his partial dissent in Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d 52 (2006), another case involving physicians, Justice Freeman recently reminded us that
“ ‘[t]he primary expression of Illinois public and social policy should emanate from the legislature. This is especially true regarding issues like the present one, where there is disagreement on whether a new rule is warranted. The members of our General Assembly, elected to their offices by the citizenry of this State, are best able to determine whether a change in the law is desirable and workable.
*** The General Assembly, by its very nature, has a superior ability to gather and synthesize data pertinent to the issue. It is free to solicit information and advice from the many public and private organizations that may be impacted. Moreover, it is the only entity with the power to weigh and properly balance the many competing societal, economic, and policy considerations involved.’ ” Mohanty, 225 Ill. 2d at 96 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Charles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 493 (1995).
Our appellate court expressed the same principles this way:
“the authority to determine appropriate public policy is vested in the legislature, not the courts. [Citations.] This court has explained the reason that courts should be very cautious in establishing public policy:
‘Courts are ill equipped to determine what the public policy should be. Seldom are all interested parties, all facts, and all issues present in a single case, where the court can rationally balance all the factors necessary to establish a policy good for society. Further, establishing public policy may entail the balancing of political interests. This is a function of the legislature, not the courts.’ [Citation.]” Board of Education of Dolton School District 149 v. Miller, 349 Ill. App. 3d 806, 811 (2004).
Because the formulation and implementation of public policy are principally legislative functions, the courts afford substantial deference to legislative enactments. Under Illinois law, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 135 (2006). The burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the statute. The burden is a heavy one. The party challenging the law must clearly establish that it violates the constitution. People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007). If it is reasonably possible to uphold the constitutionality of a statute, a court must do so. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 306-07 (2008). We cannot nullify a legislative enactment merely because we consider it unwise or believe it offends the public welfare. Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 558 (2009). For us to second-guess the wisdom of legislative determinations would, in fact, be prohibited by article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which expressly states that “[n]o branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” In my view, the majority’s opinion today flatly violates this prohibition. While my colleagues purport to defend separation of powers principles, it is their decision, not the action of the General Assembly, which constitutes the improper incursion into the power of another branch of government.
One point on which I agree with the majority is that the circuit court erred in holding the statutory provision at issue here unconstitutional “as applied.” For the reasons given by the majority, the only question properly before us is whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face. See 237 Ill. 2d at 228.
A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, such as the one brought here, is the most difficult to mount because the circumstances in which a statute is facially invalid are so limited. The fact that the enactment could be found unconstitutional under some set of circumstances does not establish its facial invalidity. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d at 305-06. To successfully challenge a statute as unconstitutional on its face, one must show that the statute would be invalid under any imaginable set of circumstances. As long as there exists some situation in which a statute could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail. In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d 517, 536-37 (2006).
Reduced to its essence, the majority’s argument is that Public Act 94 — 677 is unenforceable because the limitation on noneconomic damages contained in section 330 of the Act, codified as section 2 — 1706.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1706.5 (West 2006)), constitutes an impermissible encroachment upon the inherent power of the judiciary to correct jury verdicts through remittitur. In the majority’s view, this conclusion is compelled by our prior decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), which invalidated Public Act 89 — 7 based on a provision in the law which amended the Code of Civil Procedure by placing a $500,000 cap on compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries in “all common law, statutory or other actions that seek damages on account of death, bodily injury, or physical damage to property based on negligence, or product liability based on any theory or doctrine.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1115.1(a) (West 1996).
Before addressing the merits of the majority’s analysis, there is a preliminary matter I feel constrained to raise. While I agree that a significant constitutional question is presented by the issue of whether the limits on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions imposed by section 330 of Public Act 94 — 677 violate separation of powers principles under our decision in Best, I question whether this particular case is an appropriate vehicle for resolving the question. That is so for two reasons. The first is jurisprudential. The second pertains to justiciability.
Best was decided more than a decade ago. Since that time, our court has applied the standards governing constitutional challenges to state statutes with heightened diligence. We made the point recently in People v. Hampton, where we held:
“Shortly after the appellate court’s opinion was entered in this case, this court reaffirmed our long-standing rule that ‘cases should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching constitutional issues only as a last resort.’ In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006). We reminded courts that they must avoid reaching constitutional issues when a case can be decided on other, nonconstitutional grounds. In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 178. Constitutional issues should be addressed only if necessary to decide a case. People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 473 (2006), quoting People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State of Illinois, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 131 (1994). As noted in E.H., this court has gone so far as to add a requirement to our rules that courts include a written statement that the decision cannot rest upon an alternate, nonconstitutional basis before deciding a case on constitutional grounds. In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 178, citing 210 Ill. 2d R. 18(c)(4) (effective September 1, 2006).” People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238, 243-44 (2007).
Applying these principles in Hampton, we held that the appellate court had prematurely considered the constitutionality of the statute challenged in that case and vacated the portion of its judgment addressing that constitutional issue. People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d at 245. The same result is appropriate here.
In the case before us, the circuit court did enter an order under Rule 18(c)(4) in which it held that its judgment could not rest on an alternative, nonconstitutional ground. At this point, however, no basis for that finding exists. Should defendants prevail or should the damages awarded by the jury be less than the limits imposed under Public Act 94 — 677, judgment can certainly be entered without addressing the law’s constitutionality.
To be sure, an immediate ruling on the validity of the law may yield efficiencies for the resolution of this particular case or other cases in which Public Act 94— 677’s limits on noneconomic damages hover as a potential constraint on a party’s recovery. We have clearly held, however, that interests of efficiency or judicial economy do not justify addressing a constitutional issue before it is necessary to reach it. People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d at 244-45.
Jurisprudential restraint regarding constitutional questions is not a principle we are free to follow or ignore as we see fit, for it goes to the very foundations of our tripartite system of government. As we explained in Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 176 (2007),
“[t]he Illinois Constitution establishes three coequal branches of government, each with its own powers and functions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1. The constitution declares that the legislative branch makes laws, and that the judicial branch decides cases. *** The determination of the constitutionality of a statute when not required to decide the case can impinge upon the lawmaking function of the legislature. [Citation.] The policy of prudential judicial restraint is grounded in those considerations that form the unique character of judicial review of government action for constitutionality. The policy is based on the delicacy of that function, the necessity of each branch of government keeping within its power, and the inherent limitations of the judicial process. [Citation.]”
By proceeding to the constitutional issue in this case, when doing so is not yet necessary for resolution of the case, the majority has disregarded these fundamental principles. Under the reasoning of Ultsch, its decision impermissibly trenches upon the authority of the General Assembly.
A second and equally fundamental concern regarding whether it is appropriate for us to reach the constitutional question at this stage of the proceedings is justiciability. Article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 expressly provides that circuit courts have original jurisdiction over “all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction.” In order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, a plaintiff’s case, as framed by the complaint or petition, must therefore present a justiciable matter. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). See also In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 426 (2009).
Generally, a “justiciable matter” is “ ‘a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’ [Citation.]” In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 424. In ascertaining whether a justiciable matter has been presented, courts consider various criteria including standing and ripeness. See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 488 (2008). In the circuit court, Dr. Levi-D’Ancona raised both these issues. He argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the statute or, in the alternative, that plaintiffs’ challenge was not yet ripe for adjudication. The circuit court rejected Dr. Levi-D’Ancona’s standing and ripeness challenges in so far as they pertained to plaintiffs’ claim for a declaratory judgment that the portion of Public Act 94 — 677 adding section 2 — 1706.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure contravened the separation of powers provision of our state’s constitution (111. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). In my view, however, that was error.6
Standing is an aspect of justiciability in which the primary focus is upon the personal stake in the outcome of the controversy of the person seeking the adjudication of a particular issue. The person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must have some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. See Illinois Municipal League v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 140 Ill. App. 3d 592, 598 (1986). This requirement is not excused in declaratory judgment actions. To the contrary, we have expressly held that standing is a preliminary question in all declaratory judgment actions. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402, 419 (2005).
The doctrine of standing ensures that issues are raised only by parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy. Under the law of this state, standing is shown by demonstrating some injury to a legally cognizable interest. The claimed injury, whether actual or threatened, must be distinct and palpable, fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions, and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the relief requested. In the context of a declaratory judgment action, “ ‘there must be an actual controversy between adverse parties, with the party requesting the declaration possessing some personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected by the grant of such relief.’ ” Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d at 419-20, quoting Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 493 (1988).
While the essence of the standing inquiry is whether a particular party is entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute, ripeness is concerned with the fitness of the issue for judicial decision at a particular point in time. See Preferred Personnel Services, Inc. v. Meltzer, Purtill & Stelle, LLC, 387 Ill. App. 3d 933, 938 (2009). In evaluating a ripeness challenge to a declaratory judgment action, the court considers whether a ruling on the dispute would be premature, for a “court cannot pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.” See Stokes v. Pekin Insurance Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 278, 281 (1998) (upholding dismissal of action seeking declaration that insurance policy limits exceeded $100,000 on the grounds that underlying liability had yet to be determined and that bare allegations in complaint were insufficient to establish existence of actual controversy).
Where, as here, plaintiffs attack a statute as unconstitutional, they must bring themselves within the class as to whom the law is allegedly constitutionally objectionable. Whether the requisite standing exists must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 171 (1993). It is therefore pertinent to inquire who is and who is not complaining. Courts do not rule on the constitutionality of a statute where the complaining party is only theoretically affected by the alleged invalidity of the provision. See Illinois Municipal League v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 599. To have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a statute, one must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the statute. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d at 419-20.
The plaintiffs in this case have not yet prevailed on any of their medical malpractice claims against any of the defendants named in their complaint. The case remains at the pleading stage, and the allegations of malpractice contained in the complaint have been denied. Whether defendants will ultimately be found liable for plaintiffs’ injuries and, if liable, whether plaintiffs will succeed in establishing a basis for an award of noneconomic damages in excess of the limits imposed by that portion of Public Act 94 — 677 adding section 2 — 1706.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure is therefore entirely speculative.
In the circuit court, the sole factual predicate advanced by plaintiffs in support of their assertion that they are already facing sufficient harm to satisfy standing requirements was the allegations set forth in their complaint. Plaintiffs’ position is that those allegations are comparable to the allegations we found sufficient in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d at 383-84, when rejecting a ripeness challenge to the validity of the statute at issue there. There is, however, a fundamental difference between how the issue was raised in this case and how it came before us in Best. In Best, the particular question of ripeness was decided in the context of motions to dismiss under section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 2006)) filed by the opposing parties. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d at 382. The allegations in the complaint could therefore be taken as true. Here, by contrast, the matter was decided in the context of separate motions filed by plaintiffs and defendant Dr. Levi-D’Ancona under section 2 — 615 motions which were directed at their own respective pleadings. By electing to proceed in this way, plaintiffs and Dr. Levi-D’Ancona have conceded that the allegations in their respective pleadings are false in so far as they have been controverted by opposing pleadings. See Christensen v. Wick Building Systems, Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 908, 912 (1978). As we have noted, Dr. Levi-D’Ancona has vigorously contested the factual basis for plaintiffs’ claims against him. The factual basis which enabled our court to reject the ripeness challenge in Best is therefore absent here.
Our court has recognized that an issue which is otherwise nonjusticiable may nevertheless be examined when the magnitude or immediacy of the interests involved warrant action by the court. This so-called “public interest” exception arises most often when a matter has become moot and, in that context, requires (1) the existence of a question of public importance; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers in the performance of their duties; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. People v. Jackson, 231 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2008).
While this court has never extended the doctrine to cases where the problem with justiciability pertains to standing or ripeness, our appellate court has ruled that the reasoning of our “public interest exception” cases should also permit an exception to the ripeness doctrine. See In re General Order of October 11, 1990, 256 Ill. App. 3d 693, 696 (1993). Assuming, without deciding, that the appellate court’s view is correct, invocation of the doctrine is not warranted here.
The public interest exception is construed narrowly and requires a clear showing of each element before it may be applied. People v. Jackson, 231 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2008). That standard cannot be met in this case. While it is evident that plaintiffs and the numerous entities which have filed friend of the court briefs are keenly interested in our views on the validity of Public Act 94— 677’s caps on noneconomic damages, the law has been in effect since 2005. It is now 2010. To my knowledge, there has yet to be a single documented instance from any circuit in which any victim of medical malpractice has seen his or her award of noneconomic damages actually reduced pursuant to this statute.
Had such a reduction occurred, it would be easy to identify. There would be a specific court order reducing the plaintiff’s recovery. That is so because, under the portion of section 330 of Public Act 94 — 677 (Pub. Act 94 — 677, §330, eff. August 25, 2005) adding section 2 — 1706.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure, the court is prohibited from informing the trier of fact of the existence of the statutory caps. The jury is therefore free to award any amount supported by the evidence and the principles governing liability. The caps are implemented by the court only if the jury’s award exceeds the statutory maximum.
In some venues, the absence of affected judgments may be attributable to counsel’s decision to forebear from proceeding to trial until they see how this case is resolved. I do not believe, however, that this explanation can account for the apparently universal absence of cases in which the statute has been applied to a plaintiff’s detriment. Opponents of the statutory caps theorize that the caps are most likely to be triggered where substantial economic damages have been suffered. I point out later in this dissent that this assumption is flawed, but let us assume for purposes of the present discussion that it is valid. Given that resolution of this case could have no effect whatever on compensable economic damages, recovery of which is free from any statutory máximums, and considering the compelling financial incentives which always exist for recouping substantial economic losses as expeditiously as possible, I think it doubtful that every lawyer in every serious medical malpractice case in this state has refrained from prosecuting meritorious claims for economic damages merely because of the prospect that the amount of noneconomic damages his or her clients may recover may ultimately be subject to the caps at issue here. In any event, whatever the explanation, one can at least say this: there is nothing in the record before us today that would justify bypassing the normal requirements for justiciability.
Under these circumstances, the majority’s rush to address the constitutionality of Public Act 94 — 677 is not only inconsistent with established principles of appellate review and judicial restraint, it violates a central requirement imposed by article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9). This is clearly impermissible. We have no business telling the General Assembly that it has exceeded its constitutional power if we must ignore the constitutional constraints on our own authority to do so.
Even if I agreed that this matter was properly before us for a decision on the merits, I could not concur in the majority’s opinion. The majority bases its analysis on that portion of this court’s decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), which found that the cap on noneconomic damages contained in Public Act 89 — 7, eff. March 9, 1995, violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). As Justice Bilandic noted in his special concurrence in Best, however, that opinion’s discussion of “the constitutionality of the damage’s cap under the separation of powers doctrine *** [was] wholly unnecessary and constitutes dicta.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 471 (Bilandic, J., specially concurring). Dicta is not binding authority. Geer v. Kadera, 173 Ill. 2d 398, 414 (1996). Even a “judicial dictum” does not preclude reconsideration of a point of law. Nothing in any of this court’s decisions, including its recent decision Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266 (2009), holds otherwise.
I note, moreover, that the legislation at issue here is substantially different from Public Act 89 — 7. Public Act 89 — 7 was a comprehensive tort reform package which imposed limits on noneconomic damages “[i]n all common law, statutory or other actions that seek damages on account of death, bodily injury, or physical damage to property based on negligence, or product liability based on any theory or doctrine.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1115.1(a) (West 1996). By contrast, Public Act 94 — 677 represents an attempt by the General Assembly to deal in a focused and particular way with the health-care crisis it believed was threatening the health and welfare of our citizens.
A similar situation was recently faced by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, where it was called upon to consider the constitutionality of four tort-reform statutes implemented by Ohio’s legislature in 2005. The plaintiff in that case argued that the statutes were functionally equivalent to laws which the courts had previously invalidated on, inter alia, separation of powers grounds, and that, under stare decisis, the court should be compelled to declare the new statutes invalid for the same reasons. In rejecting that argument, the court wrote:
“While stare decisis applies to the rulings rendered in regard to specific statutes, it is limited to circumstances ‘where the facts of a subsequent case are substantially the same as a former case.’ [Citation.] We will not apply stare decisis to strike down legislation enacted by the General Assembly merely because it is similar to previous enactments that we have deemed unconstitutional. To be covered by the blanket of stare decisis, the legislation must be phrased in language that is substantially the same as that which we have previously invalidated.
A careful review of the statutes at issue here reveals that they are more than a rehashing of unconstitutional statutes. In its continued pursuit of reform, the General Assembly has made progress in tailoring its legislation to address the constitutional defects identified by the various majorities of this court. The statutes before us here are sufficiently different from the previous enactments to avoid the blanket application of stare decisis and to warrant a fresh review of their individual merits.” Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, at ¶¶23-24.
In my view, these considerations militate in favor of undertaking a new analysis, independent of what we may have said in Best, regarding validity of the damages caps established by section 330 of Public Act 94 — 677. However, even if I accepted, for the sake of argument, that the rationale of Best was otherwise controlling, I still could not join the majority’s opinion.
The doctrine of stare decisis is never an inexorable command. When it is clear a court has made a mistake, it will not decline to correct it, even if the mistake has been reasserted and acquiesced in for many years. People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007). Indeed, while adherence to stare decisis is important to the stability of the law, when doubts are raised in the mind of the court as to the correctness of a prior decision, it is the court’s duty to reexamine the question involved in the prior case. Doggett v. North American Life Insurance Co. of Chicago, 396 Ill. 354, 360-61 (1947). Good cause exists to depart from stare decisis when serious detriment to the public interest is otherwise likely to result or where the precedent is poorly reasoned or has proven unworkable. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 506 (2006). As so defined, good cause exists to reject this court’s separation of powers analysis in Best.
Best’s conclusion that legislative caps on noneconomic damages offend the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution rests entirely on the notion that such caps are the equivalent of a remittitur, which courts alone have the authority to grant. For the reasons which follow, this proposition is untenable.
First, remittitur is not a power specifically vested in the courts by our constitution or the Constitution of the United States. It was introduced into American jurisprudence by Justice Story in Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (D. Mass. 1822), a case he decided while sitting on circuit in the federal district court in Massachusetts. While the doctrine has gained acceptance in most United States jurisdictions, it has itself been challenged as an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to trial by jury. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484, 79 L. Ed. 603, 610, 55 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1935) (recognizing validity of doctrine based on historical practice in the federal courts after 1822, but observing that “it *** may be that if the question of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would be decided otherwise”).
Debate over the propriety of judicial remittitur has been recurrent. As recently as 1985, for example, the doctrine of remittitur was abolished in Missouri by that state’s supreme court, which noted that its “application in the appellate courts has been questioned since its inception in Missouri as an invasion of a party’s right to trial by jury and an assumption of a power to weigh the evidence, a function reserved to the trier(s) of fact.” Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985). The doctrine exists in that state today only because it was subsequently authorized by the Missouri legislature. See Myers v. Morrison, 822 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Mo. App. 1991).
The view taken by the majority in this case that judicial remittitur enjoys special constitutional protection is therefore unsupported by the doctrine’s origins and history. If anything, the opposite is true. The doctrine is constitutionally suspect. Accordingly, while remittitur may sometimes be employed by Illinois courts, it cannot, in any meaningful way, be viewed as an essential component of the judicial power vested in those courts by the Illinois Constitution of 1970.
Second, the majority’s analysis perpetuates the misconception, followed in Best, that legislatively imposed limits on damages in civil cases are comparable to traditional judicial remittiturs. They are not. When a court reduces a jury award to comply with a statutory damages cap, it is in no sense reexamining a jury’s verdict or imposing its own factual determination regarding what a proper award might be. Rather, it is simply implementing “a legislative policy decision to reduce the amount recoverable to that which the legislature deems reasonable.” See Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1277-78 (D. Kan. 2003); see also Myers v. Central Florida Investments, Inc., No. 6:04—cv-1542— Orl — 28DAB, slip op. at 20 (M.D. Fla. October 23, 2008). Because reduction of an award to comport with legal limits does not involve a substitution of the court’s judgment for that of the jury, but rather is a determination that a higher award is not permitted as a matter of law, it is not a remittitur at all. See Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 1999).
Justice Miller correctly recognized this point in his partial dissent in Best. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 481 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). State courts of review considering damages caps in the wake of Best have uniformly reached the same conclusion. Rejecting Best, they have held that such caps are distinguishable from judicial remittiturs and constitute a legitimate exercise of legislative power. See Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, at ¶¶73-76 (statutory limit on noneconomic damages did not exceed legislature’s power and impermissibly intrude on judicial power to decide damages); Garhart v. Columbia/ Healthone, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 581-82 (Colo. 2004) (“[w]e *** join those states that have upheld damages caps as not infringing impermissibly on the judicial role in the separation of powers”); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 168-69, 594 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2004) (statutory damages caps are a proper exercise of legislature’s policymaking authority, and because they do not grant the legislature the authority to reduce excessive awards on a case-by-case basis, they are not a form of remittitur); Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶38, 103 P.3d 135 (statutory cap on noneconomic damages upheld against separation of powers challenge on the grounds that it was a permissible exercise of the legislature’s power to declare what the law shall be, not an improper usurpation of the judiciary’s function to decide controversies); Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health System, Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 956, 663 N.W.2d 43, 77 (2003) (damages cap does not act as a legislative remittitur or otherwise violate principles of separation of powers because it does not ask legislature to review a specific dispute and determine the amount of damages. Instead — without regard to the facts of a particular case — the cap imposes a limit on recovery in all medical malpractice cases as a matter of legislative policy); Waste Disposal Center, Inc. v. Larson, 74 S.W.3d 578, 590 (Tex. App. 2002) (legislature had authority under state constitution to impose statutory damages cap and such cap is not an impermissible limit on judiciary’s constitutional powers or jurisdiction); Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1055 (Alaska 2002) (“damages caps cannot violate the separation of powers, because the caps do not constitute a form of remittitur”); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 254 Mich. App. 50, 82, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (2002) (statutory Emit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions was legitimate exercise of legislature’s authority to enact substantive law and did not impermissibly infringe on power of the judiciary to instruct jury and provide forum for redress of grievances); Verba v. Ghaphery, 210 W. Va. 30, 35, 552 S.E.2d 406, 411 (2001) (legislature may set reasonable limits on damage caps in civil actions without violating separation of powers principles); Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 471, 4 P.3d 1115, 1122 (2000) (statutory cap on noneconomic damages does not impermissibly infringe on the judiciary’s traditional power of remittitur and was within the legislature’s power to enact); Guzman v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2001 WI App. 21, ¶17, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776 (statute setting cap on noneconomic damages does not interfere with court’s discretion to order remittitur, and legislature’s action in adopting damages cap does not violate separation of powers); Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md. App. 313, 335-39, 725 A.2d 579, 590-92 (1999) (it is within the power of the legislature to enact statutory caps, and such caps do not interfere with a litigant’s right to a jury trial or infringe upon the judiciary’s control over court proceedings); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services of Richmond, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 21-23, 509 S.E.2d 307, 319 (1999) (legislative damage caps do not invade the province of the judiciary).
In a law review note written shortly after Best was decided, a student at Northwestern University Law School opined that the court’s remittitur analysis offered “a powerful new weapon in the arsenal of those opposed to damages caps.” Note, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, The Remittitur Doctrine, and the Implications for Tort Reform, 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 227, 272 (1999). As the foregoing discussion suggests, however, the weapon has proved to be a dud. With the exception of the majority’s opinion today, Best’s remittitur analysis has not only been rejected by the federal courts, it has failed to carry the day in any reported decision in any other state in the United States since it was filed 12 years ago.
The majority makes the point that we should not follow a particular course of conduct merely because “everybody is doing it.” 237 Ill. 2d at 249. This is sound advice indeed, and I have always encouraged my children to follow it. Here is another useful tip: “It can be no dishonor to learn from others when they speak good sense.” Sophocles, Antigone (trans. E. Wyckoff). In my opinion, the view taken by the other states and by the federal courts, namely, that statutory damages caps are not equivalent to remittitur, is eminently sensible and should be adopted in Illinois.
The separation of powers analysis in Best is flawed for another reason as well. It fails to acknowledge the legislature’s constitutional power to make, amend, alter and abolish the laws of this state. See Waste Disposal Center, Inc. v. Larson, 74 S.W.3d at 590.
The power of our legislature to change the law is not limited to laws enacted by the General Assembly itself. It also extends to the common law. Our Common Law Act (5 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2008)) expressly provides: Legislative authority in Illinois is vested in our General Assembly. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IY §1. Consistent with these principles, it has long been recognized that “[t]he Illinois General Assembly has the inherent power to repeal or change the common law, or do away with all or part of it.” People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 395 (1990); Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 519 (2000). Indeed, our legislature has been “formally recognized as having a superior position to that of the courts in establishing common law rules of decision.” People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 395.
“The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British parliament made in aid of, and to supply the defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 43d Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry Eighth, and which are of a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.” (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 50/1 (West 2008).
In accordance with its place in our constitutional and statutory order, the legislature possesses broad discretion to determine whether a proposed statute which would restrict or alter an existing remedy is reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 245 (1988). It may not exercise that discretion in a way which is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. As the majority points out, however, whether there is a rational basis for damages caps was not part of Best’s separation of powers analysis and is not relevant to the question before us today. 237 Ill. 2d at 238-45.
Limitation or abolition of common law remedies by the legislature sometimes triggers challenges under article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution, which provides:
“Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §12.
The courts have held, however, that even this provision does not prevent the legislature from doing such things as limiting the time within which an action may be brought, even if the statute could have the effect of barring a party’s cause of action before the discovery of the ground for it; elevating the standard of care for tort liability from ordinary negligence to wilful and wanton negligence; or, most importantly for this case, restricting the type or amount of damages a party may recover. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d at 245.
The majority posits that the authority which the legislature would otherwise have to change the common law is constrained in this case by the separation of powers doctrine. For the reasons previously discussed, however, the cap on noneconomic damages imposed by section 330 of Public Act 94 — 677 in no way usurps the power of the judiciary. It is an altogether proper exercise of the legislature’s authority to change the common law. Given that the legislature is fully empowered to alter common law remedies, it cannot contravene separation of powers principles when it exercises that power as it did in this case. See Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho at 471, 4 P3d at 1122 (“[bjecause it is properly within the power of the legislature to establish statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and otherwise modify the common law without violating separation of powers principles, it necessarily follows that the legislature also has the power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating the separation of powers doctrine”).
Faced with universal rejection of Best’s separation of powers analysis, the majority clings to the decision based on the principle that “ ‘[t]his court’s jurisprudence of state constitutional law cannot be predicated on *** the actions of our sister states ***.’ ” 237 Ill. 2d at 250. But the passage they cite, which is from People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 313 (2006) (Caballes II), is taken out of context. At issue in Caballes was whether a canine sniff constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution. While some other states had found that canine sniffs were searches under their constitutions, the United States Supreme Court declared that they do not constitute a search for purposes of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Caballes II reaffirmed that Illinois follows a limited lockstep approach and that under that approach, the search and seizure provisions of the Illinois Constitution are to be interpreted the same way as corresponding provisions of the federal constitution. Caballes II, 221 Ill. 2d at 315.
In reaching this conclusion regarding the relationship between cognate provisions of the Illinois and federal constitutions, we relied both on prior Illinois precedent and on the recognition that, in the end, it is the intent of the framers of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and those who adopted it which controls our interpretation of its provisions, including whether those provisions are to be interpreted more expansively than federal law. Caballes II, 221 Ill. 2d at 313. It is because the intent of the framers and the voters who approved the constitution must always be the guiding factor in construing that document that we made the statement, abbreviated by the majority, that our “jurisprudence of state constitutional law cannot be predicated on trends in legal scholarship, the actions of our sister states, a desire to bring about a change in the law, or a sense of deference to the nation’s highest court.” Caballes II, 221 Ill. 2d at 313.
In the matter before us, no one is suggesting that our view of the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution be predicated on anything other than the intent of those who framed and adopted the Constitution. The preeminence of that intent, however, does not preclude reference to how other courts have analyzed similar provisions under similar circumstances. In interpreting and applying the law of Illinois, our court regularly considers how courts in other jurisdictions have construed similar provisions of their law. See, e.g., People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill. 2d 177, 195 (2000); PR.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 238-39 (1998); Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 29-30 (1996); People ex rel. O’Malley v. 6323 North LaCrosse Ave., 158 Ill. 2d 453 (1994); People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418, 426 (1992); Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219 (1986); People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 394 Ill. 228, 236 (1946). Moreover, as the foregoing authorities demonstrate, we have found it appropriate to consider the well-reasoned decisions of other jurisdictions not only when interpreting statutory provisions, but also when examining the protections afforded by the Illinois Constitution. We do this not because the views of the other states are in any way controlling, but simply because the points they make may provide insight into the intent of those who drafted and approved our own laws.
No principle of appellate review bars us from following that same course here. Contrary to the apparent view of the majority, taking into account how other state courts have dealt with similar legal issues in similar circumstances is no threat to Illinois’ sovereignty or the authority of Illinois’ courts. It is simply good sense.
In summarizing the court’s decision in Best, the majority repeated the argument made by the plaintiffs in that case that caps on noneconomic damages were objectionable because they “impermissibly penalized the most severely injured persons.” 237 Ill. 2d at 232. A similar sentiment has been expressed with regard to the damages cap at issue in this case. It is a moving appeal to the human desire to provide for those in need. But at some point one must ask: is it true? Whether and to what extent a person sustains noneconomic injury is affected by many factors besides the severity of the physical harm he or she has suffered. In some cases, such as high wage earners whose injuries force them to miss work, major economic damages may be accompanied by relatively modest noneconomic loss. In other instances, a less serious but more traumatic injury may result in significant noneconomic damage but relatively minor economic loss. The total damages under both scenarios could be similar, yet the extent of the underlying physical injury could be substantially different. Contrary to the assumption of those who oppose Public Act 94 — 677, there would be no direct correlation between magnitude of the physical injury and the size of noneconomic loss sustained. As a result, application of the damages cap would not necessarily penalize the most seriously injured plaintiffs.
Of course, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which a severe injury is accompanied by both heavy economic losses and profound noneconomic damages. If the cap on noneconomic damages is truly problematic, however, one would expect to see situations in which its application has resulted in hardship. That has not happened. As I pointed out earlier in this dissent, we have yet to see a single instance in which the caps have even been triggered.
One must also wonder whether opponents of caps on noneconomic damages have fully considered the possible consequences of declaring imposition of such caps to be beyond the legislature’s authority. What the majority does not see or fails to acknowledge is that by focusing on the fortunes of individual plaintiffs, it looks at only a small part of the economic landscape. The cap on noneconomic damages is premised on the assumption that the potential for unlimited awards of such damages will imperil the availability of medical care to the population as a whole. There is nothing in the record in this case by which we can ascertain whether this assumption will prove correct in practice, but we cannot say the assumption is an unreasonable one. If it is correct, the cumulative harm from reduced access to medical treatment could easily overshadow the benefits a few individual plaintiffs stand to realize from abolition of damages caps. Should that happen, the equities will look far different than opponents of the caps have portrayed them.
Faced with this prospect, the General Assembly may respond to today’s decision by eliminating all noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. Nothing in the majority’s separation of powers analysis would preclude it from doing so. Indeed, the legislature could, without violating separation of powers principles, go so far as to abolish civil actions for medical malpractice completely and replace them with a claims system comparable to the one it has established for workers compensation. If the majority persists in invalidating damages caps, the legislature may be left with no alternative. If our legislature fails to act, while caps are eliminated in other states, imposition of restrictions by the federal government, which would not be constrained by state constitutional provisions, is a possibility. For those committed to insuring that victims of medical malpractice receive the maximum possible compensation for their injuries, these loom as sobering possibilities.
Illinois and the country are at a crossroads in the deepening struggle to manage the health-care crisis. As the legislative branch experiments with workable solutions, the courts must be vigilant about ensuring that the laws enacted by the General Assembly comport with constitutional requirements. In exercising our authority, however, we must remain mindful that the constitution constrains the courts as well.
In his partial dissent in Best, Justice Miller lamented that
“[t]oday’s decision represents a substantial departure from our precedent on the respective roles of the legislative and judicial branches in shaping the law of this state. Stripped to its essence, the majority’s mode of analysis simply constitutes an attempt to overrule, by judicial fiat, the considered judgment of the legislature.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 487 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The same is true of the court’s opinion today.
Our job is to do justice under the law, not to make the law. Formulating statutory solutions to social problems is the prerogative of the legislature. Whether there is a solution to the health-care crisis is anyone’s guess. I am certain, however, that if such a solution can be found, it will not come from the judicial branch. It is critical, therefore, that the courts not stand as an obstacle to legitimate efforts by the legislature and others to find an answer. If courts exceed their constitutional role and second-guess policy determinations by the General Assembly under the guise of judicial review, they not only jeopardize the system of checks and balances on which our government is based, they also put at risk the welfare of the people the government was created to serve.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.
In the case of awards against “a hospital and its personnel or hospital affiliates” based on medical malpractice, the total amount of noneconomic damages awarded to all plaintiffs is limited to $1 million. When the action is against “a physician and the physician’s business or corporate entity and personnel or health care professional,” the limit is $500,000. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1706.5 (West 2006).
Although Dr. Levi-D’Ancona did not argue the ripeness and standing issues in the brief he filed in our court, the issues should not be deemed to have been waived. Standing is not a procedural technicality, but rather is an aspect or component of justiciability. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 147 (1997). The same is true of ripeness. We have therefore held that when a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim or a dispute is not ripe for adjudication, the circuit court’s judgment must be set aside for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. People v. Capitol News, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1990). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver and cannot be cured through consent of the parties. In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 417.