dissenting. The majority hold that the order of the commissioner “correctly directs that the scheduled benefits are to begin at the end of the claimant’s temporary partial disability.” But the statute provides that such benefits start “at the termination of the total disability” and that these benefits “shall be in lieu of all other benefits except. . .” certain benefits not here involved. Try as I may, I cannot bring myself to defy the statute in the name of being liberal or humane. Whatever virtue may arise from being liberal, I feel sure that it is less than that from being fair-minded. I do not believe that I am at liberty to act in a way contrary to the express wording of the statute. I do not question but that a legislature might reasonably set up a system such as is contemplated by the majority opinion. However a legislature might with equal reasonableness have designed a workmen’s compensation plan under which all pyramiding of benefits is prevented. See 58 Am. Jur. Workmen’s Compensation, §293. It seems to me that the express language of our act can only be taken as having been intended to effect just such a purpose. When one is confronted with the statutory expression “at the termination of the total disability occasioned by such injuries,” it is a fair question to ask: What are these words doing there? The majority opinion does not satisfactorily account for their presence. The language is not consistent with their holding.
I can conceive of a case where a workman suffers, first, total disability, then partial disability, then by reason of a relapse, a further period of total disability, followed by a permanent state of partial disability or impairment. In such circumstances, I would have no difficulty in holding that compensation for permanent partial impairment should begin from the later period of total disability with no reduction therefrom by reason of the first period of temporary disability. I agree that from the record before us we are unable to say what the true factual situation may be. Since the record fails to disclose anything of the sort suggested, the commissioner’s order, in my opinion, cannot be sustained under the statute. Compare, Birmingham v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., N.J., 95 Atl. 242; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ariz. 516, 158 P.2d 887.
*26The Connecticut cases cited by the majority do not have to contend with a statute containing the language which ours does. For that reason, they lend no authority whatever for rejecting the clear language of our statute. I find no case which goes so far as .to hold contrary to the provisions of the statute. See Workmen’s Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Development (Sec. G-6) by Samuel B. Horovitz, Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 41, December 1961. I am of the opinion that the commissioner’s order is repugnant to the controlling, statute and should, therefore, be reversed.