dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I write separate ly because I believe Martin should receive credit for the 189 days he served on home detention. I also write separately to clarify a statement made in the majority opinion.
In Dishroon, we held that although a defendant serves time at home while on home detention, he or she is still being restricted of his or her liberty and therefore, he or she has the right to be credited for the time he or she actually served. See Dishroon, 722 N.E.2d at 889. Our decision in Diskroon was handed down on January 24, 2000. On January 16, 2001, Senate Bill No. 358 was first read. It provides that a person on home detention, as a condition of probation, shall receive credit for time served. Specifically, Senate Bill No. 858 (P.L. 166) states that effective July 1, 2001, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) shall be amended to read, "[ilf the court finds that the person has violated a condition of home detention at any time before termination of the period and the petition to revoke probation is filed within the probationary period, the court shall ... provide credit for time served as set forth under IC $5-38-2.5-5." Clearly, the purpose of this bill was to clarify, not change, our decision in Dish-roon. Thus, I believe Palmer, to the extent that it disagrees with our holding in Dishroon, is incorrect. Further, I find the distinction laid out in Paimer that home detention in the community corrections and the probation contexts are different, particularly deciding when a defendant on home detention is entitled to credit time, is also erroneous. Regardless of what context an individual is serving time on home detention, he is being restricted of his liberty and should be entitled to credit for the time served, thus, I further disagree with the Paimer decision. Our legislature has now made it clear that a person on home detention as a condition of probation shall receive credit for time served. Thus, I believe that Martin should receive credit for the 189 days he spent on home detention.
Further, the majority opinion, citing the Palmer case, states that "the purpose of home detention is to rehabilitate the probationer." Op. at 480. In so much as the majority believes the fact that the purpose of home detention is to rehabilitate the probationer determines whether or not credit time is due, I wish to reiterate that under the Indiana Constitution, all sentences and "punishment" are deemed to have the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant. "The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice." Ind. Constitution, Art. 1, § 18. As such, to the extent that the majority reasons that the fact that the *432rehabilitative purpose of home detention therefore precludes credit time, I disagree. If this were the case, based on the fact that all punishment is rehabilitative in Indiana, then credit for time served would never be granted to any defendant serving time, whether in a correctional facility or at home.
Because I believe that Dishroon is proper precedent for this case and because the legislature has acknowledged that a defendant on home detention shall receive eredit for time served, Martin should receive credit for the time he served on home detention. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.