(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for many of the same reasons articulated in my dissent in State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, No. A05-247 (Minn. Dec. 6, 2007). The majority concludes that suppression is required under Minn.Stat. § 626.14 (2006) and the United States Constitution. I conclude that the technical statutory violation at issue in this case does not warrant suppression under section 626.14 and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
I.
It is well established that even absent a breach of a defendant’s constitutional rights, the violation of procedural rules may result in the suppression of evidence. State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn.1993) (citing State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn.1991)). But, only “serious violations which subvert the purpose of established procedures” justify suppression. Id. Suppression is not required for “[procedural defects which are minor and relatively insignificant,” id., or for statutory violations that are merely “technical” in nature, State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 841 *160(Minn.1978). See also State v. Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Minn.App.2004) (execution of a daytime warrant less than two minutes outside the daytime period is a de minimis statutory violation that does not justify suppression), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004).
In our paradigm nighttime search case of State v. Lien, the police obtained a search warrant authorizing a nighttime search despite failing to make a particularized showing that a nighttime search was necessary either to preserve evidence or to protect the safety of the officers executing the warrant. 265 N.W.2d at 886. After observing the defendant enter his home and several other people enter and leave his home, the officers executed the warrant shortly after 9 p.m. Id. The officers could not see inside the home because the curtains were down, but they entered the slightly open door and conducted a search, finding and seizing illegal drugs and other evidence. Id. Although we concluded that a nighttime search should not have been authorized, we held that the evidence obtained in the search was admissible. Id. at 840 — 41.
Our decision not to suppress the evidence in Lien was based on our conclusion that the error, rather than being constitutional in nature, was a mere “statutory violation which under the circumstances does not mandate exclusion of the evidence seized.” Id. at 885, 841. In support of this conclusion, we noted that “the intrusion was not the kind of nighttime intrusion — with people being roused out of bed and forced to stand by in their night clothes while the police conduct the search — that our statutory rule against nighttime execution of search warrants is primarily designed to prevent.” Id. at 841. It was significant that the warrant “was executed at a reasonable hour when most people are still awake,” and we emphasized that the error was committed by the magistrate and that the police acted in “good faith.” Id. at 840, 841.
The rationale of Lien controls this case. Jordan was not inconvenienced, significantly or otherwise, because he was not present in his home at the time of the search.1 Furthermore, Jordan’s absence renders the time at which the warrant was executed irrelevant in this case. (If the time of execution were relevant, 6 a.m. is at least arguably a reasonable time for the warrant to be executed. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(a)(2)(B), which defines [d]ay-time hours for the purpose of executing search warrants as 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.) Finally, as in Lien, the error here was attributable to the judge, who determined that the information contained in the officer’s affidavit justified inclusion of a nighttime entry provision in the warrant, rather than to the police.
Unlike the majority, I do not consider the fact that the police did not know that Jordan was absent from the premises to be relevant. The Lien court made an objective inquiry, considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances concerning the effect of the unlawful nighttime search on the occupant. See 265 N.W.2d at 841. What the majority dismisses as after-the-fact knowledge is simply the result of a fact-specific examination of the circumstances of the case. Our inquiry should concern the effect of the unlawful nighttime search on the defendant, regardless of when the police became aware of specific facts.
*161To reach its conclusion that the statutory violation requires suppression, the majority describes the purpose of section 626.14as “protect[ing] the broader interest of a homeowner in the security of his home, whether he is present or not.” This description of the statute’s purpose represents an expansion of our case law, as we have never described the purpose of section 626.14 so broadly. Previously, we have described the purpose of section 626.14as simply the protection of individuals from the invasion of their privacy and from the inconvenience and discomfort occasioned by nighttime searches. See State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (describing the purpose of the statute as “protecting] the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions during the night”) (internal quotations omitted); Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 839-40, 841 (stating that [ujnderlying the Minnesota statutory rule * * * is the belief that a nighttime search of a home involves a much greater intrusion upon privacy and is presumably more alarming than an ordinary daytime search of a home and explaining that the statute was primarily designed to prevent intrusions where people are roused out of bed and forced to stand by in their night clothes).
The majority’s justification for its broad definition of the statute’s purpose is unpersuasive. First, the majority’s observation that “the statute does not mention the presence of the homeowner” is irrelevant, for “we decline to read into the statute a provision the legislature ‘purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.’ ” Metro. Sports Facilities Commn. v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513, 516-17 (Minn.1997) (quoting Green Giant Co. v. Comm/r. of Revenue, 534 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1995)). Second, the majority’s claim that its broad definition serves the statutes purpose of regulating] the conduct of police is doubtful, because the officers in this case obtained a warrant authorizing the nighttime search. As we stated in Lien, “Little more can be expected of a police officer who gathers evidence, presents it to a magistrate, and receives a warrant.” 265 N.W.2d at 840 n. 1 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
Because the invalid execution of the warrant constituted a mere technical violation of section 626.14 and did not subvert the purpose of the statute, suppression of the evidence is not required.
II.
The majority also1 concludes, that the search violated Jordan’s Fourth Amendment rights and that suppression is thus required under the United States Constitution. Here, as in Jackson, it is unclear to me why the majority addresses the constitutional issue after concluding that the statutory violation warrants suppression. We avoid constitutional analysis if an issue can be decided without reaching a constitutional question. See Bourke, 718 N.W.2d at 926; In re Senty-Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266, 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”). The majority offers no justification for deciding to address Jordan’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Because I do not believe that the statutory violation requires suppression, it is necessary for me to address Jordan’s claim under the Fourth Amendment. I would dismiss Jordan’s constitutional argument on the basis of Lien, where we stated that the error of conducting an improperly authorized nighttime search under section 626.14in that case was not of a “constitutional nature.” 265 N.W.2d at 841. We concluded in Lien that the execution of the *162warrant did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because the warrant was executed at a reasonable hour and the search did not entail rousing people out of bed and making them stand by in their night clothes while the search was conducted. Id.
Indeed, because Jordan was not present during the search, the constitutional challenge here is weaker than the claim we faced in Lien, where Lien was present. When considering whether a defendant can bring a claim asserting an infringement of his or her Fourth Amendment rights, we focus on whether the search at issue violated an interest of the defendant that was intended to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn.2006). Because [t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn.2003) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)), Jordan “ ‘has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search,’ ” Gail, 713 N.W.2d at 859 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). Put most simply, Jordan’s absence from the home meant, under these facts, that he had no interest protected by the Fourth Amendment that was violated by the search.
We recognized in Jackson that “the Supreme Court has never held that a nighttime search implicates the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” 742 N.W.2d at 175. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Gooding v. United States suggests that the time of day a search occurs does not have constitutional implications. 416 U.S. 430, 94 S.Ct. 1780, 40 L.Ed.2d 250 (1974). In Gooding, the Court held that the federal statute governing searches for controlled substances does not require a special showing for a nighttime execution of a search warrant. Id. at 458, 94 S.Ct. 1780. Although the Court resolved the case on statutory grounds -and did not specifically address the Fourth Amendment issue, Gooding has been interpreted as suggesting that the fact that a search occurs during the night does not implicate specific Fourth Amendment concerns. See State v. Seyferth, 134 Wis.2d 354, 397 N.W.2d 666, 668 (1986) (The [Gooding ] majority’s failure to acknowledge that, despite the limited nature of the issue in the case before it, the subject area has significant constitutional ramifications strongly suggests hostility toward the proposition that fourth amendment reasonableness might address the timing of searches, including those conducted pursuant to warrants. (quoting George E. Dix, Means of Executing Search and Seizures as Fourth Amendment Issues, 67 Minn. L.Rev. 89, 105 (1982))).
The court of appeals relied on a number ■of decisions from other jurisdictions in concluding that Jordan did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home at the time of the search. State v. Jordan, 726 N.W.2d 534, 539-41 (Minn.App.2007). The majority attempts to distinguish this authority on the basis that in those cases “the police actually knew that the suspect would not be present.” In evaluating whether Jordan’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, however, it is the effect of the search on Jordan that we must consider, not what the police knew at the time they executed the warrant. It is irrelevant whether certain facts became apparent before or after the search.
The majority’s definition of the right at issue is also a concern. The majority sweepingly declares that a homeowner has a right to be free from unauthorized nighttime searches where family and friends *163are present in the home but the homeowner is not. As in Jackson, the majority ignores the fact that the nighttime search of Jordan’s home was actually authorized by a warrant. The majority attempts to bypass this problem by citing to Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), which establishes that a homeowners Fourth Amendment rights may be violated where he or she is not present at the time the search occurs. But Alderman involved warrant-less electronic surveillance, not an improperly authorized nighttime search clause in a warrant supported by probable cause.2 Furthermore, the cases relied on by the majority in which we have identified a Fourth Amendment violation despite the absence of the defendant are distinguishable from this case. The search in State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783 (Minn.2007), was not conducted pursuant to a warrant; the seizure in State v. Pietraszewski, 285 Minn. 212, 172 N.W.2d 758 (1969), exceeded the scope of the warrant; and in State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn.2005), we recognized the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a self-storage unit under the Minnesota Constitution but not under the U.S. Constitution.
A nighttime search of a home conducted pursuant to a warrant with an improperly authorized nighttime search clause does not implicate an absentee homeowners Fourth Amendment rights, at least under these facts.
. The evidence was suppressed against Jordan’s guests because they "were roused from their sleep in the early morning hours and forced to stand by idly as law-enforcement authorities searched the home.” State v. Jordan, 726 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Minn.App.2007).
. The Court in Alderman noted the government’s admission that in some instances "the equipment was installed under a broader grant of authority to the F.B.I., in effect at that time, which did not require specific authorization.” Alderman, 394 U.S. at 170 n. 3, 89 S.Ct. 961; see also Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Construction and Application of National Security Exception to Fourth Amendment Search Warrant Requirement, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 646, 651 (1978) (explaining that Aider-man involved a warrantless national security wiretap).