In Re Adoption No. 9979

ELDRIDGE, Judge,

concurring.

I agree with the majority that the circuit court’s December 14, 1989, order is invalid and must be vacated on due process grounds. There are several procedural deficiencies requiring reversal of the order.

Although vacating the order appealed from on due process grounds, the majority opinion extensively deals with the meaning and application of Maryland Code (1984, 1990 Cum.Supp.), § 5-327 of the Family Law Article. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of § 5-327.,

I.

The adopting parents, who filed the petition for adoption below and are the appellants here, are a married couple residing in Montgomery County, Maryland. The natural parents are a married couple residing in New Jersey. The natural mother, prior to her present marriage, had placed another child with the appellants for adoption. In connection with the earlier adoption, the appellants contacted an attorney who was known to arrange independent adoptions. They placed advertisements in newspapers, and, through such an advertisement, they met the natural mother. The *53parties were pleased with each other, and the first adoption was finalized in 1987. Appellants and the natural mother maintained contact and friendly relations after the adoption.

Sometime in 1988, the natural mother again contacted the appellants, stating that she had gotten married and was again pregnant. Because of strained financial circumstances, however, both natural parents believed that it would be in the best interests of the child if the child were placed for adoption with the appellants.1 The child was born February 23,1989. A petition for adoption and motion for temporary custody were filed by the appellants in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on March 2, 1989.2 Shortly thereafter, documents signed by the natural parents were filed which recited that the natural parents joined in the petition for adoption. Neither the petition for adoption nor any of the other documents filed in court contained any intimation whatsoever that there might be a claim or demand for money against the natural mother. In fact, as just pointed out, the natural mother was a co-plaintiff.

The circuit court referred the matter to the court’s investigators’ unit on March 16, 1989. On May 22, 1989, temporary custody of the adoptee was granted to the appellants, although the child had actually been in their custody since his release from the hospital on February 28, 1989. The investigator’s report was filed with the circuit court in October 1989. The investigator apparently requested that the appellants file a certification of the expenses paid on *54behalf of the natural mother. This was submitted to the court along with the investigator’s report.3

The hearing on the adoption petition was held in the circuit court on October 25, 1989. Other than court personnel, the only persons present were the adopting parents and one of their attorneys. Neither the natural parents nor their attorney was in attendance. The adopting parents were called by their attorney to testify on their own behalf. During their testimony, both adopting parents were questioned by the trial judge regarding a modest expense paid on behalf of the natural mother for maternity clothing. Both adopting parents testified that they had no objection to paying for the clothing and that they had not been informed that maternity clothing was not an allowable expense under Maryland law. The trial judge indicated that he believed that the payments were contrary to Maryland law. Appellants’ attorney responded that such payments were regularly approved of in adoption cases throughout the State, and that in no other adoption in which he had been involved had a court ever indicated that such an expense was not permissible.4 The circuit court proceeded on October 25, 1989, to enter a final decree of adoption. The court, however, gave the appellants’ attorney ten days in which to find authority to justify the payment of the *55maternity clothing expense; otherwise, the court said, an order would be entered requiring that the appellants’ attorney pay the appellants $488 representing the expense for maternity clothing. The trial judge thus stated to the appellants’ attorney:

“I am signing the decree of adoption. I am going to give you 10 days to give me authority to justify the payment of the maternity clothes expenses and if I am not convinced, I am going to order you to reimburse the [appellants] the $488.” (Emphasis added).

Nevertheless, the signed adoption decree made no reference whatsoever to the matter of maternity clothing; moreover, the decree contained nothing which would indicate that the court was attempting to retain jurisdiction.

The appellants’ attorney, on November 14, 1989, submitted a legal memorandum regarding the matter of reimbursement for maternity clothing. On December 14, 1989, the trial judge signed an order requiring the natural mother to pay $488 to the appellants as reimbursement for the maternity clothing expenditure. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the record indicates that no copy of the order was sent to the natural mother or to her attorney.

The adopting parents filed an appeal, and this Court issued a writ of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.

II.

I fully agree with the majority that the order requiring the natural mother to pay $488 was invalid on due process grounds because of the lack of notice to the natural mother. Furthermore, there were other procedural irregularities which require reversal of the December 14, 1989, order.

A.

The trial judge sua sponte injected the $488 “claim” into the case for the first time at the October 25, 1989, hearing on the petition for adoption. Neither the natural mother *56nor her attorney were present at that hearing. In addition, even if they had been present at the October 25th hearing, or had been informed later of what the trial judge had said at the hearing, neither the natural mother nor her attorney would have been on notice of a possible monetary “claim” against the natural mother. On the contrary, the trial judge on October 25th stated that if the reimbursement for maternity clothing were unlawful, he would enter an order requiring the adopting parents’ attorney to pay the money to the adopting parents.

It was not until the final order in the matter, and the order now being appealed, that there was notice to anyone of a monetary “claim” against the natural mother. Even then, there was no notice given to the natural mother or to her attorney. A copy of the December 14, 1989, money judgment or order to pay money was not sent by the court to the natural mother or to her attorney. As far as we know, the natural mother still does not know of the monetary “claim” against her. She has not had any opportunity to defend, including any opportunity to defend in this Court.

Under the circumstances, it would appear that the December 14th order is utterly void. It clearly constitutes a denial of due process. As stated in Travelers v. Nationwide, 244 Md. 401, 410-411, 224 A.2d 285, 290 (1966):

“The violation of a constitutional right may make the proceedings in which the violation took place either voidable or void.
* # * * * *
“In this case, however, the violation of the constitutional right of Plaza and Paul went to the fairness of the conduct of the trial and accordingly the money judgment obtained in violation of that right was invalid.
“Where a judgment was outside the cause of action stated in the complaint and the defendant was not given a fair opportunity to defend against the claim on which the judgment was based, the judgment is invalid and subject to collateral attack.”

*57In Sullivan v. Insurance Comm'r, 291 Md. 277, 285, 434 A.2d 1024, 1028 (1981), Judge Rodowsky for the Court quoted the Restatement of Judgments § 6 (1942), that “ ‘[a] judgment is void unless a reasonable method of notification is employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard afforded to persons affected/ ” See, e.g., Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 265-266, 11 S.Ct. 773, 776, 35 L.Ed. 464 (1891); Blue Cross v. Franklin Sq. Hosp., 277 Md. 93, 101, 352 A.2d 798, 804 (1976) (“due process requires that a party to a proceeding is entitled to both notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issues to be decided in a case”); Burns v. Midland, 247 Md. 548, 553, 234 A.2d 162, 165 (1967); Belt, Adm’r. v. Blackburn, Adm’r., 28 Md. 227, 243 (1868).

B.

Another procedural deficiency requiring reversal of the December 14, 1989, order is that the pleadings in this case did not assert a claim for monetary or any other relief against anyone. The natural mother was not a defendant; rather, she was a co-plaintiff seeking relief regarding the status of the child. The pleadings were never amended to assert a claim against the natural mother. Under such circumstances, a money judgment or order to pay money against the natural mother was entirely unauthorized. See, e.g., Travelers v. Nationwide, supra, 244 Md. at 407, 224 A.2d at 288; Poe v. Munich Re-Insurance Co., 126 Md. 520, 95 A. 164 (1915).

In addition, the adopting parents clearly did not want, and do not now want, a money judgment in their favor for $488. I am totally unaware of any principle of law which authorizes a trial court to force money upon a competent adult against that person’s will.

C.

Finally, once the decree of adoption was entered on October 25,1989, the trial judge had no authority thereafter to enter a money judgment or order to pay money.

*58Adoption was unknown at common law and exists in Maryland solely by statute. See, e.g., In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 463, 540 A.2d 799, 800 (1988); McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 236, 533 A.2d 690, 691 (1987); Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 4, 497 A.2d 142, 143 (1985); Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 312, 262 A.2d 729, 731 (1970); Falck v. Chadwick, 190 Md. 461, 467, 59 A.2d 187, 189 (1948); Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 81, 195 A. 306, 309 (1937). In an adoption proceeding, a trial judge’s authority is limited by the adoption statutes. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that “ 'the measure of the chancellor’s authority is the [adoption] statute.’ ” Dawson v. Eversberg, supra, 257 Md. at 312, 262 A.2d at 731, quoting Spencer v. Franks, supra, 173 Md. at 81, 195 A. at 309. See Ex parte Lagumis, 186 Md. 97, 102, 46 A.2d 189, 191 (1946). See also Anderson v. Barkman, 195 Md. 94, 99, 72 A.2d 709, 711 (1950); Alston v. Thomas, 161 Md. 617, 621, 158 A. 24, 25-26 (1932).

Furthermore, an adoption proceeding is concerned with a limited matter, the status of the person to be adopted. Spencer v. Franks, supra, 173 Md. at 83, 195 A. at 310; Waller v. Ellis, 169 Md. 15, 25, 179 A. 289, 293 (1935).

In a child adoption proceeding, in making the determination regarding the status of the child, the underlying issue before the court is whether it is in the best interests and welfare of the child to grant the adoption petition. In re Lynn M., supra, 312 Md. at 463, 540 A.2d at 800; Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 420, 240 A.2d 251, 254 (1968); Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275 (1960); King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 43, 145 A.2d 281, 284 (1958); Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 103, 133 A.2d 408, 410, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882, 78 S.Ct. 149, 2 L.Ed.2d 112 (1957); Ex parte Anderson, 199 Md. 316, 322, 86 A.2d 516, 519 (1952); Falck v. Chadwick, supra, 190 Md. at 467, 59 A.2d at 190; Waller v. Ellis, supra, 169 Md. at 23, 179 A. at 293 (“the whole purpose of the [adoption] is to insure the welfare of the infant”). Obviously, whether or not the adopting parents may have violated any criminal statute, *59including § 5-327, might reflect upon their fitness to be parents and thus would be a relevant consideration in determining the best interests of the child. In the present case, however, the trial judge decided that it was in the best interests and welfare of the child to grant the petition for adoption, and the judge signed a final decree of adoption on October 25, 1989.

Once the trial court has determined that it is in the best interests of the child to grant the petition, and has then signed the adoption decree, the statutes contemplate that the adoption proceeding is at an end. Waller v. Ellis, supra, 169 Md. at 25, 179 A. at 293 (“upon the passage of a decree of adoption,” then “the jurisdiction of the court under the statute is at an end”). See Falck v. Chadwick, supra, 190 Md. at 467, 59 A.2d at 189 (after “the decree of adoption is entered,” the “Court is not invested with continuous authority in the cause thenceforth”).

In Spencer v. Franks, supra, the trial court, after granting the petition for adoption, went on to grant certain visitation rights and made certain provisions concerning custody. This Court reversed the visitation and custody orders, holding that they were beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction and void. This Court stated (173 Md. at 81-82, 195 A. at 309-310):

“The power to decree an adoption did not exist at common law, and is purely a creation of statute. Hillers v. Taylor, 108 Md. 148, 155, 156, 69 A. 715 [1908]; Zimmerman v. Thomas, 152 Md. 263, 265, 136 A. 637 [1927]. So, the measure of the chancellor’s authority is the statute. The statute, however, confers jurisdiction with respect to the single subject matter of adoption, with a permitted change of the child’s name, if the petition contains a prayer to that effect. The record shows that all the requirements of the statute were satisfied for the passage of a decree declaring the minor child the adopted child of the petitioners, with a change of name. Backus *60v. Reynolds, 159 Md. 601, 152 A. 109 [1930], The statute authorized no other decree____”

And later (173 Md. at 83, 195 A. at 310):

“It was not the intention of the statute that after the decree of adoption the court should be invested with continuous authority in the cause thenceforth____ With the entry of the final decree of adoption and its enrollment, the chancellor has, for most purposes, exhausted the jurisdiction of the court.”

The Court in Spencer concluded by pointing out that if orders concerning visitation or custody are warranted, they could be the subject of “subsequent original proceedings” but had no place in the adoption case. 173 Md. at 84,195 A. at 311.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the post-decree judgment or order to pay money was beyond the trial court’s authority in an adoption proceeding. Under our decisions, once the decree of adoption was entered, the matter should have terminated.

III.

Although I concur that the trial judge’s December 14, 1989, order must be vacated on procedural grounds, I cannot agree with those portions of the majority opinion regarding the meaning of § 5-327 of the Family Law Article.

By its plain terms, § 5-327 does not apply to the adopting parents’ reimbursement of expenses to the natural parents. Subsection (a)(1) of the statute states (emphasis added):

“(1) An agency, institution, or individual who renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual for adoption may not charge or receive from or on behalf of either the natural parent of the individual to be adopted, or from or on behalf of the individual who is adopting the individual, any compensation for the placement.”

*61The provision was obviously intended to prohibit third party intermediaries from profiting by arranging adoptions. It stretches the bounds of credulity to interpret the phrase “individual who renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual for adoption ...” as including the natural mother who, often due to economic circumstances, may be forced to place her child with another family. Furthermore, the statutory language clearly draws a distinction between an “agency, institution or individual who renders any service” and the natural or adopting parents.

Section 5-327 was originally enacted by Ch. 599 of the Acts of 1947. The Report of the Commission to Study Revision of Adoption Laws of the State of Maryland accompanied the bill that was enacted as Ch. 599. The report provided a syllabus of the bill which, in reference to current § 5-327(a), stated that

“[t]o prevent the barter of children, there is a prohibition against the taking of compensation by anyone for the placement of a child." (Emphasis added).

This clearly pertains to parties who arrange for the adoptive placement of children and then seek to elicit a fee for such service from the natural or the adopting parents.

Commentators who have considered the statute agree that the prohibition on compensation refers to third parties, as opposed to the natural parents. See Comment, Regulatory Options For Surrogate Arrangements in Maryland, 18 U.Balt.L.Rev. 110, 120 (1988) (in discussing the application of § 5-327 to surrogacy arrangements the author states that under the language of the statute discouragement of contracts arranged by third-party intermediaries appears to be an explicit objective of the statute); Messitte and Hunter, Independent Adoptions: Some Considerations, 21 Md.B.J. 28, 29 (Jan./Feb. 1988) (§ 5-327 is aimed at assuring that the prospective adoptors’ attorney/intermediary is not acting as a broker for finding a child); Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 ColumJ.L. & Soc.Probs. 1, 8 (1986) (includes § 5-327 of the *62Maryland Family Law Article in a list of twenty-four state statutes prohibiting baby brokering and “specifically targeted at the elimination of the baby black market”); Strahorn, Changes Made By the New Adoption Law, 10 Md.L.Rev. 20, 27 (1949) (§ 5-327 “prohibits, and makes criminal the receiving of compensation for arranging an adoption, with certain proper exceptions for hospital, medical, and legal fees”).

Other courts in Maryland have interpreted § 5-327 as applying only to third parties. In 1989, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County dismissed a criminal prosecution under § 5-327 against parents who attempted to sell their baby for money and cocaine, holding that § 5-327 applied only to third parties.

In response to the Anne Arundel County case, in January 1989, Senator Paula C. Hollinger introduced Senate Bill 58 in the Maryland Senate. In testimony about the bill before the House Judiciary Committee, she stated:

“I am sure all of you are familiar with the most recent case of baby selling here in Anne Arundel County____ In this instance a Severn couple allegedly tried to sell their baby for $3,500 cash and more than 3 ounces of uncut cocaine. Unfortunately, because current law does not allow for parents selling or bartering their babies, Judge Bruce Williams of Anne Arundel County Circuit Court had to dismiss the case yesterday because current law only addresses the issue of a third party attempting to gain compensation.”

See the Department of Legislative Reference’s file on Senate Bill 58 of the 1989 Session of the General Assembly. As originally introduced, Senate Bill 58 would have broadened the language of § 5-327 to include payments of money or value made to natural parents in exchange for their children, and would, have stiffened the penalties provided by § 5-327. See Department of Legislative Reference’s file on Senate Bill 58. Ultimately, however, the bill was enacted as a completely separate law, and codified at Code (1957, 1987 *63Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, § 35C.5 The fact that this law, aimed at preventing the selling of children by natural parents, was enacted as a separate statute from § 5-327, underscores that the two provisions address different problems and are aimed at different classes of violators. If § 5-327 covered payments made to a natural parent, then Art. 27, § 35C, would be largely superfluous. Moreover, in House Bill 491 of the 1990 session, the language of Art. 27, § 35C, would have been added to the adoption subtitle of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. House Bill 491, however, was not enacted.

The legislative history of § 5-327, and its relation to Art. 27, § 35C, demonstrate that § 5-327 was not intended to apply to payments made to natural parents.6

*64Finally, as the majority opinion points out, § 5-327 is a criminal statute. Consequently it is subject to the well established principles for construing criminal statutes. Even the majority opinion seems to acknowledge that there is “ambiguity in the language of the statute,” and the majority states that “[describing a natural parent who signs a consent and turns over a child for adoption as one who ‘renders any service in connection with the placement of a [child],’ may not be the warmest possible prose____” (Opinion pp. 44-45). Very recently, however, Judge Chasanow stated for a unanimous Court that “[w]here a [penal] statute is ambiguous and the legislative intent is in doubt, the courts are inclined toward the construction most favorable to the accused.” Belman v. State, 322 Md. 207, 213, 586 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1991). The Court recently set forth the same principle in State v. Kennedy, 320 Md. 749, 754, 580 A.2d 193, 195 (1990), stating: “Generally, in construing penal statutes we employ the ‘rule of lenity,’ that is, statutes are strictly construed, in favor of the accused.” And in State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975), Chief Judge Murphy for the Court put it this way: “It is, of course, well settled that penal statutes must be strictly construed, State v. Fleming, 173 Md. 192, 195 A. 392 (1937), ‘by which is meant that courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used,’ State v. Archer, 73 Md. 44, 57, 20 A. 172, 172 (1890).”

In light of the language and legislative history of § 5-327, this statute, containing only a criminal sanction, should not be construed to encompass a small reimburse*65ment for maternity clothing from the adopting parents to the natural mother on the theory that the natural mother “rendeifed] [a] service in connection with the placement of an individual for adoption.”

Judge Rodowsky has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.

. At this time, the appellants had not been seeking to adopt another child.

. Along with the petition for adoption, appellants’ attorney also filed the following documents: consent of both natural parents to the adoption, the natural parents’ waiver of notice and service of process in the adoption proceeding, affidavits of the natural parents attesting to the facts that they had not received any money or anything of value in exchange for their consent and had not been pressured to consent, a delegation of guardianship, and a hospital and medical information release form.

. Requiring the adopting parents to certify all expenses paid by them on behalf of the natural mother appears to be a practice required by some trial judges in adoption proceedings. See Report of the Subcommittee to Study Uniform Procedures for Handling Independent Adoptions, Committee on Juvenile and Family Law of the Maryland Judicial Committee, 58 (Nov. 1, 1988). Nevertheless, neither the adoption statutes nor the procedural rules governing adoption proceedings require the adopting parents to file a certification of expenses. Both House Bill 491 of the 1990 session of the General Assembly and House Bill 880 of the 1991 session would have required such a certification. Neither bill was enacted, however. In light of the statutes, rules, and legislative history, the practice by some trial judges of requiring the certification seems to be of doubtful validity.

. Furthermore, the appellants’ attorney stated that in the first adoption involving the same parties, the Montgomery County Circuit Court did not indicate disapproval of reimbursement for maternity clothing by the appellants to the natural mother.

. Article 27, § 35C, provides as follows:

Ҥ 35C. Child sale, barter or trade prohibited.
"(a) In general.—A person may not sell, barter, or trade, or offer to sell, barter, or trade a child for money or property, either real or personal, or anything else of value.
(b) Violation constitutes misdemeanor; penalty.—A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding 5 years or both for each offense."

. In support of its argument that § 5-327 applies to payments made directly to natural parents, the majority relies on a report of a subcommittee of the Maryland Judicial Conference. See Report of the Subcommittee to Study Uniform Procedures for Handling Independent Adoptions, Committee on Juvenile and Family Law of the Maryland Judicial Conference (Nov. 1, 1988). The report details the manner in which § 5-327 is interpreted by judges in this State, and expresses the opinion of the four trial judges comprising the subcommittee as to how and to whom § 5-327 should be applied. The majority’s reliance on the report as support for its interpretation of § 5-327 is obviously misplaced.

The subcommittee report is nothing more than the particular view of the four trial judges making up the subcommittee as to how § 5-327 should be applied. It is not "legislative history” with regard to § 5-327, as it in no way reflects the views of members of the General Assembly.
Moreover, the original version of § 5-327 was enacted in 1947. See Ch. 599 of the Acts of 1947. The Judicial Conference subcommittee report was written forty-one years later in 1988. Under no circumstance can the report be said to be contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute. Even when the Legislature itself attempts to *64express what its predecessors intended by an earlier enactment, such later expressions are given little weight as to the meaning of the prior law. See American Recovery Co. v. Dep’t of Health, 306 Md. 12, 18, 506 A.2d 1171, 1174 (1986); Collier v. Connolley, 285 Md. 123, 125-126, 400 A.2d 1107, 1108 (1979); Director v. Myers, 232 Md. 213, 218, 192 A.2d 278, 280 (1963); A.G. Crunkleton v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 369, 177 A.2d 252, 255 (1962). If subsequent statements by the Legislature as to legislative intent carry little weight, then the opinions of four trial judges coming many years after the enactment of the statute carry even less weight.