dissenting:
This Commonwealth appeal comes before the court challenging the trial judge’s determination that section 303.-7(b)(1)1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides for the inclusion of juvenile adjudications and prior misdemeanor convictions in a prior record score, cannot be used except to determine where, within a specific range, a sentence should fall.
Appellee, Tilghman, entered a negotiated guilty plea to burglary on June 29, 1984. At the time of sentencing on December 13, 1984, his prior record score was set at “3” because of a juvenile conviction for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and a four to twenty-three month sentence was imposed. The appellee filed a motion for modification of sentence on December 19, 1984 and the original sentence was vacated by the court on December 20, 1984. After the reconsideration hearing on February 21, 1985, the trial judge lowered appellee’s prior record score to “0” and sentenced appellee to twenty-four months probation. Upon denial of the Commonwealth’s motion for modification, this appeal followed.
The basis for the trial court’s decision was first that nothing in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2154 (the enabling act adoption *343provisions) authorizes a more severe range of sentences for persons previously convicted of misdemeanors, and similarly, because of the use of the word “convictions” rather than “adjudications”, only the consideration of juvenile matters is authorized, not their use in prescribing a harsher range of punishment. The court concludes as well that prior misdemeanor convictions and juvenile adjudications cannot be included as aggravating circumstances under an expressio unius theory according to which the term prior record does not fall within the rubric of “aggravating circumstances’ since it is not specifically mentioned.
Appellant, characterizing the court’s reasoning as casuistry, argues that both legislative history and principles of statutory construction compel the conclusion that the intent of the legislature was to include juvenile adjudications in fashioning punishment, otherwise the uniformity at which the guidelines are directed is undermined by the court’s inability to fashion sentences on the basis of complete data. The Commonwealth also argues that the latter occasioned appellee’s sentence, one which, it is contended, is based on a failure to consider the statutorily mandated totality of the circumstances. The conclusion reached by appellant is that in view of appellee’s background, including drug and alcohol problems, juvenile history, (other than the IDSI) and adult history, the sentence is inappropriately lenient.
While the issue that “previously convicted” would encompass “juvenile adjudication” was not raised by the Commonwealth in the court below, we have no problem with considering the issue. The majority, as does the appellee, relies heavily on 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354 of the Juvenile Act, Effect of adjudication; subsection (a) states: “An order of disposition or other adjudication ... is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction.... ” The trial court, presented this issue for our determination when it decided “previously convicted” did not mean juvenile adjudication. Despite the Commonwealth’s agreement with the trial court that conviction as used in section 2154(2) does not comprehend adjudica*344tions of delinquency as well as adult convictions, in our review we may determine whether or not the trial court was correct in that determination. We have not raised the issue sua sponte, it was presented to us by the trial court’s findings and by implication as a major thrust of the Commonwealth’s brief in relying on a totality of circumstances argument. Even had the issue not been raised below, the constitutionality of a statute may be raised for the first time by the appellee, even if the appellant is prohibited from doing so, to sustain a judgment. In re Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210 n. 5, 331 A.2d 652 n. 5 (1975) citing Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899 (1955). Appellee’s counter statement of questions involved was the correctness of the trial court in concluding that the sentencing commission could not use prior juvenile adjudications as convictions for adult sentencing purposes under the guidelines. For the above reasons, the issue is properly before us.
The intent of subsection 6354(a) is to assure that a juvenile adjudication does not carry the taint of criminal conviction as to civil liberty. It is circumscribed by the phrase “does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.”
This is in keeping with the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile legislation — to prevent juvenile adjudications from interferring with a person obtaining employment, voting, getting into school, obtaining credit or any of the myriad of other aspects of life where a “conviction-adjudication” would cause a penalty.
In an entirely separate subsection, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354(b) Effect in subsequent judicial matters, the legislature indicated the intent to clearly distinguish it from subsection (a); subsection (b) provides:
(b) Effect in subsequent judicial matters. — The disposition of a child under this chapter may not be used against him in any proceeding in any court other than at *345a subsequent juvenile hearing, whether before or after reaching majority, except:
(1) in dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence investigation and report; or
(2) if relevant, where he has put his reputation or character in issue in a civil matter.
Clearly, the legislative intent was to insulate the juvenile from the consequence of his behavior so far as any civil liability might arise but not to throw the shield around him once he became an adult, if he continued in a life of crime. The legislation is finely tuned so that the person who remains law abiding is protected and the person who is not and is convicted of crimes, after reaching majority, loses the shield. The law clearly distinguishes between pre-conviction and post-conviction consequences. In a civil action, if he places his reputation or character in issue, the prior juvenile record may be introduced to contest it. (Section 6354(b)(2)). By limiting it to civil matters, by implication, it may not be introduced to impeach, credibility in criminal matters, because it comes under section 6354(a) as a civil disability and may not be treated as a conviction for evidentiary purposes due to the specific exclusion. He retains the mantel of protection of subsection (a) for criminal matters until he has been convicted as an adult. The exclusion is removed for criminal dispositional purposes by section 6354(b)(1). See Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 591 (1973).
Simply stated, juvenile adjudications are not to be treated as convictions of crimes for any purpose except in dispositional proceedings after conviction as an adult of a felony, for purposes of presentence investigation and report or if relevant where he puts his reputation or character in issue in a civil matter.
Clearly, Katchmer may be distinguished from this case as there, reputation and character were in issue as to an informational witness in a criminal matter, and since neither subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) existed. The predecessor to *346subsection (a) was controlling, and the issue presented in the case sub judice, was not considered.
The trial court overreaches in applying Katchmer, supra, to the present situation. Katchmer interpreted only that language in the Juvenile Court Law, Act of June 2, 1933, P.L. 1433, § 19, 11 P.S. 261 (repealed by Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, § 337, 11 P.S. § 50-337 (Supp. 1973-74)) which provides:
§ 261. Children before juvenile court not to acquire disabilities
No order made by any juvenile court shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by the criminal laws of the Commonwealth, nor shall any child be deemed to be a criminal by reason of any such order or be deemed to have been convicted of crime. The disposition of a child or any evidence given in a juvenile court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court. 1933, June 2, P.L. 1433, § 19.
While in Katchmer the Supreme Court ruled on this section, which was applicable at the time, Justice Nix recognized the addition to the law that came about by passage of the act of 1972, stating in Katchmer:
We need not here consider the effect of section 324 of the Juvenile Act of 1972, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L.-, no. 333, § 27, 11 P.S. 50-324 (Supp.1973-74).
Id., 453 Pa. at 465, n. 4, 309 A.2d at 594 n. 4.
The first section of section 6354 is derivitive of section 261 of the act of 1933, the second section, (b)(1) and (2), is the addition that occurred under the amendments of 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, § 27, Act 1977, August 3, P.L. 155, No. 41. Katchmer did not and could not rule on these sections, and they bring a significant and substantially restricted protective mantel to be cast over juvenile offenders.
The turbulance of the 70’s impelled the legislature to remove from the protection afforded juveniles the effect of adjudication as opposed to conviction, when it added the two categories enumerated in sections (b)(1) and (2). This was *347in keeping with the national trend toward crime and offenders which resulted in mandatory sentencing in some cases, and sentencing guidelines to restrict the discretion of judges, and to some degree, to assure imposition of minimum sentences. The sentencing guidelines, as developed by the Sentencing Commission, were entirely consistent with this legislation, and the Commission’s legislative mandate, to bring about consistency and uniformity of sentencing, and to give appropriate weight to prior convictions. If it failed to give some weight to juvenile convictions (which it has moderated) as opposed to prior adult convictions, the sentencing guidelines become badly skewed. The Sentencing Commission, in comments to this section, in its published guide indicated it adopted this section after it had extensive discussion with the Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, individual judges, legislators, attorneys 'and other criminal justice professionals, and after several public hearings. The Commission, to accommodate concerns about ambiguity of juvenile adjudications, required that the Juvenile Court Order must expressly find that the juvenile committed a felony or one of the weapons misdemeanors listed in section 303.7(a), Pa.C.Sent.2d (September 1, 1986), p. 52. It is not uncommon or unheard of for a juvenile offender to spend five to ten years in custody before he is sentenced on his first adult offense. To give no weight to serious crimes, which are applicable only if there has been an adult adjudication or conviction, would be to treat a very serious former juvenile offender in some instances, as a first time offender when applying the guidelines. This does not serve the public nor does the correctional system, represented by probation, parole and institutional officials, have an equitable basis for treatment. The uniformity which was the underlying purpose and legislative intent, is defeated. Commonwealth v. Smith, 333 Pa.Super. 179, 481 A.2d 1365 (1984), is equally applicable here as in the situation where prior juvenile adjudications were to be considered by the court in presentence reports. To deny the weighing, which the guidelines would provide, is to permit the consideration of the adjudication without quantifying its effect or *348as expounded below, may prevent their consideration at all. This destabilizes the sentencing process.
In ascertaining the legislative intent, we must look to 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921, Legislative intent controls:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
If the term “conviction” as used in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354(a) controlled in all respects, there would be an internal conflict because in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) only if the adjudications are construed to be convictions would they carry the weight which permits them to be seriously considered in sentencing or as character rebuttal in civil cases. Prior arrests alone, which did not result in a conviction, may not be considered in sentencing. Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa.Super. 203, 313 A.2d 342 (1973) (consideration of prior arrests without a conviction ignores the presumption of innocence and was error); Commonwealth v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948) (on remand 361 Pa. 35, 63 A.2d 77 (1949) (considering prior criminal charges which did not result in convictions and were dismissed or resulted in acquittal is inconsistent with due process of law); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 312 Pa.Super. 379, 458 A.2d 1010 (1983) (no error in reviewing prior arrest record when trial judge acknowledges he had no convictions); Commonwealth v. Craft,- 304 Pa.Super. 494, 450 A.2d 1021 (1981) (trial court did not give undue weight to prior arrests); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 349 Pa.Super. 415, 503 A.2d 435 (1986) (prior convictions must precede commission of principle offense to be included in prior record score calculations). In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 333 Pa.Super. 42, 481 A.2d 1212 (1984), this Court permitted review of prior arrests without conviction, and subsequent convictions to the one at issue as reflecting on defendant’s character as a convicted repeat offender. However, the underlying assumption is that the trial court had knowledge that the arrest did not result in conviction as the court may *349not treat the arrest as a conviction in sentencing. Nowhere is this more clear than in decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (uncounselled guilty plea resulting in conviction is illegal, and conviction may not be used in a sentencing on a subsequent offense). In Commonwealth v. Charles, 339 Pa.Super. 284, 488 A.2d 1126 (1985) (citing Commonwealth v. Calvert, 463 Pa. 211, 344 A.2d 797 (1975), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) and Burgett, supra), this Court held likewise, that invalid convictions could not support enhancement of sentence on subsequent offenses. While some ambiguity has crept into the law as between prior arrests and convictions and their use in sentencing, the overwhelming weight of the law is that prior convictions must be established, as opposed to arrests, if any weight is to be given at sentencing. I have found no case which holds that a sentence may be enhanced or treated more severely upon consideration of arrests alone.
Only a conviction carries the weight which may result in a more serious sentence than would otherwise be the case. In the context of this case, a juvenile adjudication, in light of the expressed mandate of the legislature, is a consideration in sentencing. As such, it can not be construed as less than a conviction; it otherwise could not be given weight or “consideration” in sentencing.
In a similar fashion, the legislature, in a further exception to admission of the juvenile disposition of a person in a subsequent non juvenile proceeding, provided: Section 6354(b)(2) ... [I]f relevant, where he has put his reputation or character in issue. In doing so, the credibility of the witness is being attacked with time honored rules of evidence as to what records are available for this purpose. Again, only if the juvenile disposition is construed to be a conviction for purposes of this section, may the section be given the intended legislative effect. Quoting from Jenkins, Pennsylvania Trial Evidence Handbook, section 17.4, this becomes clear:
*350§ 17.4 CONVICTION OF CRIME
The credibility of any witness may be impeached by showing the conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving a crimen falsi: Com. v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134 (160 A. 602 (-)). The phrase crimen falsi relates to misdemeanors, not to felonies. The félony does not have to involve a crimen falsi in order to impeach credibility: Com. v. Gold, 155 Pa.Super. 364 (38 A.2d 486 (1944)). The term crimen falsi involves the element of falsehood. It includes everything which has a tendency to affect injuriously the administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud: Com. v. Schambers, 110 Pa.Super. 61, (167 A. 645 (-)); Com. v. Jones, 334 Pa. 321, (5 A.2d 804 (1939)). A crime involving crimen falsi tends to cast doubt on the veracity of the perpretrator: Com. v. Gold, 155 Pa.Super. 364, (38 A.2d 486 (1944)). The issue of what misdemeanor affects credibility is a question that is ordinarily for the trial judge.
There are many other ways of attacking credibility by impeachment as to reputation and character, none of which involves the use of a prior record. If a juvenile disposition is admissible, it must comply with the standard stated in section 17.4 above.
Carrying this one step forward, the legislature would appear to be acting at cross purposes by permitting juvenile records to be admitted for dispositional purposes in criminal cases, while denying the right to apply the same information to the guidelines of the Sentencing Code. Thus the term convicted in section 2154(a) does comprehend the adjudications which were removed from the protection of section 6354(a) by sections 6354(b)(1) and (2).
In support of this view is the very illuminating Opinion by Larsen, J. in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 510 Pa. 106, 507 A.2d 57 (1986). There, it was determined that juvenile shoplifting offenses could apply toward enhancement in retail theft of juveniles over sixteen, as the legislature excluded them from protection of the Juvenile Act.
*351The Juvenile Act does not seek to rehabilitate every juvenile who commits an unlawful act; rather, the Act’s purpose is to “remove from children committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior, and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(2) (emphasis added). Since appellants’ summary offenses were not delinquent acts within the meaning of the Juvenile Act, appellants had no right to the rehabilitative benefits offered under the Act, and the use of appellants’ summary offenses to enhance the grading and sentencing of their subsequent crimes does not violate the purposes of the Act.
Further, appellants had no right to receive any particular type of treatment simply because they were juveniles when they committed their first offenses. Inclusion within, or exclusion from, the provisions of the Juvenile Act is a matter within the discretion of the legislature. Here, the legislature has made it very clear that individuals in appellants’ positions are not eligible for consideration under the juvenile act ...
We hold, therefore, that the fact that appellants were juveniles at the time of their first offenses does not preclude the use of the convictions for those offenses to enhance the grading and sentencing for appellants’ current convictions.14 (Emphasis added)
*352Id., 510 Pa. at 116-17, 507 A.2d at 62.
It would appear that the “adjudication” versus “conviction” controversy is merely a quibble over semantics. Its irrelevancy is discernible from the omission of these terms from the definition section of the Code, and the matter requires no resolution, as it poses no real problem. The legislature intended the term “conviction” to be applied in a different fashion according to its application under the Juvenile Act and the Sentencing Code.
Section 303.7(b)(l)(ii) clearly specifies the two conditions under which a juvenile record is to be included in sentencing computations:
1) where there was an express finding that the adjudication was based on the commission of a felony ...
2) where the adjudication occurred on or after the defendant’s fourteenth birthday.
Both of these criteria are fully established in appellee’s case. The essence of these sections of the code is to assure legally supportable findings that a child, with sufficient capacity (14 years of age) to know of the serious nature of his behavior, is held accountable as a recidivist. Whether the term used to describe that finding is adjudication or conviction, it is the finding of a commission of the felony that triggers computation. Adjudication meets that purpose as definitively as conviction. A child adjudicated delinquent is subject to penalty no less than a person convicted of a crime, regardless of the name given the procedure or judgment and thereby is entitled to due process consideration including the same degree of proof required in a criminal proceeding. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 358, 375 (1970). Since an adjudication of delinquency requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the finding of delinquency, Winship supra, an adjudication is no less conclusive than a convic*353tion in establishing the felonious act which is the basis for subsequent computation of sentence to a later crime. This Court held in Smith, supra, that, “The intention of the Legislature is clear in its adoption of the policy which not only allows but requires examination of a defendant’s juvenile record in fashioning appropriate sentences.” Id. at 181, 481 A.2d at 1366. There we also held that it was appropriate to apply the prior juvenile adjudication for felonious offenses in computing the prior record score.
The rules of construction require us to give total effect to the legislative intent, section 1921, supra. Since I would find there is no ambiguity in the statute and that the sentencing commission acted properly and within its authority, I would reject the considerable argument made by the majority that laboriously attempts to construe it otherwise. Even had there been ambiguity as to the meaning of “conviction” as compared to adjudication, pursuant to the application of matters under section 1921(c)(1-8),2 there can be no doubt as to the legislative intent in granting the powers to the Sentencing Commission and its proper exercise of those powers. We have held that sentencing guidelines are constitutional in Commonwealth v. Kuphal, 347 Pa.Super. 572, 500 A.2d 1205 (1985). If the trial court and majority position had any validity whatsoever, it was nullified by the action of the legislature, when, by almost unanimous vote of both houses, upon mandatory review of the Sentencing Commission and its activities as required under the Sunset Law, the Commission was reinstated for a *354period of 10 years. In it’s 1985 Annual Report, the Commission reported as follows:
Sunset Review Process
During 1985 the Commission was scheduled for sunset review in accordance with the provisions of the Pennsylvania Sunset Act. This Act specifies procedures for reviewing agencies and determining whether they should be continued, altered or terminated. During Fiscal Year 1984-85 a sunset performance audit of the Commission was conducted by the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee. The Committee’s final report recommended continuation of the Commission with several recommended minor changes. The report was turned over to the Senate Judiciary Committee for sunset review.
The Senate Judiciary Committee held public hearings on the Commission in October 1985 and released their report in January 1986. The report concluded that:
1) Termination of the Commission would harm the public welfare;
2) There is insufficient overlap of functions to warrant the elimination of the commission or transfer of its duties to another agency;
3) There is at present no more economical way of accomplishing the Commission’s objectives;
4) The guidelines have been successful in addressing the need for more uniform and appropriate sentences;
5) The continuation of the Commission’s functions would be in the public interest;
6) The Commission has encouraged and made continuous use of public input; and
7) There does not appear to exist a less restrictive alternative method of providing the same services to the public.
The Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed the continuation of the Commission with a few recommended changes. These recommendations formed the basis of Senate Bill 1343 of 1986 reestablishing the Commission for another *355ten years. The bill was passed 47 to 1 in the Senate, 195 to 1 in the House (as amended) and 48 to 1 when it was returned to the Senate for concurrence. The bill was signed by the Governor as Act 41 of 1986 on April 30, reestablishing the Commission for another ten years effective May 1, 1986.
In reestablishing the Commission, the General Assembly made several changes to the Commission’s legislative mandate: The Commission was reestablished as an agency of the General Assembly; the Commission was required to meet at least four times each year; the Commission’s quorum requirement was reduced from nine members to seven members; the Commission was directed to establish a plan and timetable to collect and disseminate information relating to incapacitation, recidivism, deterrence and overall effectiveness of sentences imposed; and the Commission was given clear authority to monitor compliance with the guidelines and mandatory sentences and to require the completion and submission of forms promulgated by the Commission.
1985 Annual Report, The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, p. 3. It must be presumed if the Commission had overstepped its authority in implementing the guidelines under consideration here, or if the legislative intent in implementing them had been misconstrued, the legislature would have required correction before reinstating the Commission and adopting the work of the Commission a second time with these matters included. We cannot presume these sections to be invalid.
The legislative intent is to strip away the cloak of juvenile immunity from the serious juvenile offender and legislation in the past session does just that, making the current discussion, in many respects, academic. In a bill (Act No. 165 of 1986) signed by Governor Thornburg on December 11, 1986 (effective in sixty (60) days from December 11), a new class of juvenile offenders is created, the “dangerous juvenile offender.” The new law creates a statewide central repository for fingerprints, photographs and juvenile *356records to aid in arrest and prosecution of juvenile offenders. It authorizes public disclosure of police records and files relating to the new class of offenders, allows police to fingerprint and photograph any child aged ten or older charged with an act, if commited by an adult, that would be a felony; it repeals the Youthful Offender Act thus assuring that criminals aged 18-20 received the same minimum sentence mandated for adult criminals. In commenting on the need for the bill, Governor Thornburg quoted a study showing that in 1985 in Pennsylvania, 23 per cent of all people arrested for violent crimes were under the age of 18 and that 20 per cent of the juveniles apprehended committed 68 per cent of serious juvenile crimes.
Act 165 also specifically directs the Sentencing Commission to include juvenile adjudications of delinquency in the prior record score of the guidelines and “define[s] ‘prior conviction’ as any finding of guilt or adjudication of delinquency whether or not sentence has been imposed prior to the commission of the current offense.” Pennsylvania Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 51, Dec. 20, 1986, p. 4868. The comments in the Bulletin indicate the legislation was in direct response to the finding in this case in the court below. (Commonwealth v. Tilghman, January Term 1984, No. 2193, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County). It is an extraordinary matter for the legislature to enact clarifying legislation on issues which have not been acted upon by the appellate courts, and when done under these circumstances, it can only mean it is responding to the lower court misconstruing its intent. The legislation also specifically equates “adjudication” with “conviction” and, therefore, the difficulty such an interpretation posed for the majority appears of little consequence to the legislature.
The Commission, through its Chairman, Honorable John O’Brien, states:
[I]t is the Commission’s view that ... the juvenile adjudication of delinquency guideline provisions have continued to apply as they were written in the Code, because no appellate court has overturned them. The Commission is *357republishing all of these provisions, and will resubmit them to the General Assembly as a safeguard in case a court reaches a different interpretation.
Pennsylvania Bulletin, supra at 4868.
I would, therefore, find the trial court did in fact err in its revision of sentence to exclude appellee’s juvenile adjudication from his prior record score.
With respect to appellant’s second claim, that is, the court’s failure to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining the penalty, a review of the record reveals the court did in fact take note of the factors which appellant would emphasize, but drew an inappropriate conclusion. I feel that given the increase in the prior record score, a consistent sentence within the agreed upon range would be four to twenty-three months total confinement, the penalty originally specified.3,4
*359I would, therefore, vacate judgment of sentence and reinstate the sentencing order of December 13, 1984.
*360ATTACHMENT A
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. § 303.7 Prior Record Score
(b) Adjudications of delinquency and other prior convictions.
(1) The offenses scored in this subsection are as follows:
(i) All prior convictions for felonies and all prior convictions for the weapons misdemeanors listed in subsection (a)(3).
(ii) Each prior offense which resulted in a juvenile adjudication of delinquency where:
(A) There was an express finding by the juvenile court that the adjudication was for a felony or one of the weapons misdemeanors listed in (a)(3).
(B) The offense occurred on or after the defendant’s 14th birthday, and
(C) The currently sentenced offense is a felony.
No other juvenile adjudication of delinquency shall be counted in the prior record score.
Appellants’ citation to cases, in which this Court has held that a "juvenile record” may not be used to impeach a witness, is inapposite. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 591 (1973); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354. A "juvenile record” may not be used to impeach a witness because adjudications of delinquency are not criminal convictions, not simply because the individuals who have been so adjudicated were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed their delinquent acts.
In addition, we note that the Juvenile Act itself provides that an adjudication of delinquency may subsequently be used against an individual for certain specified purposes; even if a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent under the Act, he is not entitled to commit subsequent crimes without his delinquent acts being taken into account. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354(b) ("The disposition of a child under this chapter *352may not be used against him in any proceeding in any court ... whether before or after reaching majority, except: (1) in dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence investigation and report....”). (Emphasis added)
. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. Legislative intent controls
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
. "Where a case requires a correction of sentence, this Court has the option of remanding for resentencing, or amending the sentence directly.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 316 Pa.Super. 115, 126, 462 A.2d 821, 826 (1983). I would choose to do the latter.
. The majority's analysis fails in a number of respects which I will attempt to clarify: 1) Numerous discussions I have had with Judge O'Brien on this issue personally confirms that the Legislature and the Sentencing Commission intended to have juvenile adjudications applied as convictions in determining the prior record score, who reminded this writer that he and other juvenile court judges had testified to this need, to which the Legislature and the Sentencing Commission responded; 2) In the Pennsylvania Bulletin, Vol. 17, March 27, 1987, No. 13, in a proposal to amend the sentencing guidelines, 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.7 and 303.8, Commentary to Annex A, Judge O’Brien again states:
The Commission on Sentencing requests comments on the proposal which follow in Annex A. This proposal would amend the sentencing guidelines, 204 Pa.Code §§ 303.7 and 303.8.
JOHN W. O’BRIEN,
Chairman
Commentary on Annex A:
Annex A proposes amending 204 Pa.Code § 303.7(g) (relating to prior conviction) by incorporating into the guidelines the statutory definition of "previously convicted or adjudicated delinquent” which is required by Act 1986, December 11, P.L. No. 165, § 3, (effective February 9, 1987) [42 Pa.C.S. § 2154(a)(2) ]. The definition in this act supersedes the definition of "prior conviction" con*358tained in the existing § 303.7(g), and the proposed amendment simply makes the guidelines consistent with the statute. Persons applying the guidelines should currently be using the definition contained in this Act, not the definition contained in the guidelines. (Emphasis added)
In the face of Judge O’Brien’s previous statements and the reaffirmation of that position in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, supra, as recently as March 27, 1978, the construction placed by the majority on the Commission’s overreaching and failure of legislative intent reflects a logic and analysis that is reminiscent of "Alice in Wonderland” and the novel "1984”; 3) While the mysticism that we ascribe to statutory construction, which ignores unequivocal intent in the face of inartful language and internal inconsistency, can be justified, the writer refuses to ascribe erroneous interpretation to the language of a statute and guidelines to which he contributed by testimony solicited by the drafters and which resulted in incorporated changes. Excerpts of that testimony, presented to the Sentencing Commission on December 8, 1980 in Pittsburgh, are as follows:
Our experience is that these crimes are serious and particularly with theft of automobiles and burglaries, and to some degree, purse snatch robberies, there is a pattern behind the crime and a multiplicity and continuation of the pattern over a long period of time that indicates a determined criminal intent. To disregard this pattern and the nature of those crimes as well as the assault crimes, which have some element of intimidation about them, is to ignore very serious behavior that should be considered when the child engages in similar activity upon reaching maturity. It is my recommendation that all felonies committed by juveniles should be considered toward the enhancement of the Offender Score when he becomes an adult, although I have no objection to considering only those offenses which occurred after 14, and to have a period of repose to the effect that after six years without involvement with the courts or the justice system, the record should not be considered.
Finally, there was some concern expressed by some Commission members as to the validity of Juvenile Court findings. Under the Juvenile Act, we must weigh the evidence in the same manner as does the Criminal Court and we are required to make specific findings on each charge, so that a delinquency finding on a specific charge has as much validity for sentencing purposes as a criminal conviction. The Sentencing Code should not give these findings any less consideration.
TAMILIA, J.
Testimony before Sentencing Commission December 8, 1980
The Legislature and Sentencing Commission did respond to this testimony and that of numerous judges throughout Pennsylvania and passed legislation in line with these recommendations. The original guidelines (1982 version) reflect the writer’s statement on adjudications in juvenile court proceedings, and to remove opposition from Commission members who had concerns about juvenile adjudications, made it a requirement of 303.7(b)(l)(ii) which reads, "All prior juve*359nile adjudications of delinquency where there was an express finding that the adjudication was based on the commission of a felony or one of the weapons misdemeanors....’’ (Emphasis added) Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual, July 1982.
This testimony and these comments were duly noted in an editorial in The Pittsburgh Press on Monday, December 15, 1980 (Attachment A). It is ironic that the Sentencing Commission and Legislature heeded the admonitions of judges and press in formulating the guidelines, whereas the majority would turn this around and do precisely what the editorial writers abjured in December 1980. The writer may be in the minority, but he is neither "myopic” concerning the legislative intent nor in error of his analysis of that legislation and Sentencing Commission implementation. Some of the contents of the above note are unorthodox but since the truth is never irrelevant, I believe the latitude permitted to a dissenting opinion permits it.