concurring.
The principle of law relied upon by the majority is unassailable, to wit: under our Declaratory Judgment Act the terms unambiguously require the inclusion of all interested parties. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7540(a). The arguments made by appellee that in certain instances the interests of justice would be served by relaxing this rule are not properly made before us, since the General Assembly has provided us with no exceptions to the clearly worded statute.
However, I wish to remark upon the rather disengenuous arguments made by Vale in an effort to have this Court issue an advisory opinion. In their brief filed in response to the jurisdictional issue raised by this Court, Vale indicates that they are no longer a defendant in the underlying tort action filed by Sandra Smith. Thus, though they could have argued that once they were no longer subject to liability, Ms. Smith was in reality no longer a party to the dispute between Vale and its insurers, such an argument would have raised the spectre of mootness, since none of the parties who claim injury from the Smith suit could possibly suffer. Consequently, Vale attempted to impress us with the facts and figures of how an opinion in this case would resolve other cases.
Since there is no longer a case here we will dutifully wait until one arises.