Section 9-727 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, codified in the Labor and Employment Article1 requires that “insurers” or “employers” begin payment of workers’ compensation within fifteen days of their award by the Workers’ Compensation Commission. If payments are not timely made, Section 9-728 of the Act2 provides for the assessment of penalties against a delinquent “employer” or “insurer” in progressive percentages of the original award, depending on the number of days the payment is late. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article.
In this workers’ compensation case, Appellant, the Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation (“PCIGC”), was assessed penalties and attorneys’ fees by the Workers’ Compensation Commission for the late payment of a workers’ compensation award to Appellee, Peter L. Yanni, after the workers’ compensation insurer to Yanni’s employer, Legion Insurance Company, was declared insolvent. We are called upon in this case to determine whether the PCIGC is an *478“insurer” and subject to the assessment of penalties under Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article; whether the penalties fall within Section 9—301(d) of the Insurance Article’s definition of a “covered claim” which the PCIGC is required to consider; and whether the PCIGC is immune from the assessment of penalties under Section 9-314 of the Insurance Article, Maryland Code (1995, 1997 RepLVol.), and Section 5-412 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1974, 2002 RepLVol.).
We shall hold that the PCIGC is not obligated to pay the late-payment penalties assessed against it by the Workers’ Compensation Commission because it is not an “insurer,” the penalties do not constitute part of Yanni’s “covered claim,” and because the PCIGC is immune from the imposition of penalties.
I. Background
On October 19, 2000, Peter L. Yanni, employed with MTI Technology Corporation (“MTI”) as a Customer Service Engineer, sustained an injury when a piece of equipment on which he was working began to fall, causing him to twist and wrench his back, for which he subsequently filed a claim for workers’ compensation. MTI was insured for such claims by Legion Insurance Company (“Legion”), which was declared insolvent in July of 2003. PCIGC subsequently assumed responsibility for Yanni’s claim.
On September 29, 2004, the Workers’ Compensation Commission, after conducting a hearing on Yanni’s claim, determined that Yanni had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission awarded Yanni $211.00 in weekly wages, to be paid for 75 weeks, for permanent partial disability, commencing when his temporary total disability terminated.3 Yanni also was awarded $3,165.00 in attorneys’ fees and $528.00 for medical bills.
*479When the PCIGC failed to timely pay the award, Yanni filed issues4 "with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, requesting that penalties be assessed against the PCIGC pursuant to Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code (1991). At the hearing on Yanni’s request for penalties, both parties stipulated to the fact that Yanni’s workers’ compensation award was not paid until November 23, 2004, and the attorneys’ fees until November 29, almost sixty days after the issuance of the award. The Commission ordered PCIGC to pay Yanni penalties in the amount of 35% of his workers’ compensation award, but did not award additional penalties for the delayed payment of attorneys’ fees. Yanni’s counsel subsequently wrote the Commission inquiring into whether they had inadvertently neglected to assess that penalty in its Order; the Commission responded by issuing a new Order, “rescinding and annulling” its earlier order and denying Yanni’s request for any penalties. Yanni filed a second set of issues with the Commission, again requesting penalties against the PCIGC for the late payment of his award and attorney’s fees. A second hearing was held before the Commission, after which the Commission ordered the PCIGC to pay Yanni penalties in the amount of 35% of the original award, plus $500.00 in additional attorneys’ fees.
The PCIGC petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for judicial review of the penalties and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Yanni responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Yanni. The PCIGC noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals presenting one question for review:
*480Is the property and casualty insurance guaranty corporation subject to the assessment of a fine for late payment of benefits under § 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article?
Prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, we issued a 'writ of certiorari on our own initiative. Prop. Guaranty v. Yanni, 394 Md. 479, 906 A.2d 942 (2006).
II. Analysis
In this case we are called upon to determine whether the trial judge properly granted summary judgment to Yanni. The entry of summary judgment is governed by Maryland Rule 2-501, which provides in pertinent part that:
(f) Entry of judgment. The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Maryland Rule 2-501(f). We recently explicated the standard of review for the entry of summary judgment in River Walk Apartments, LLC v. Roger Twigg, 396 Md. 527, 914 A.2d 770 (2007):
The question of whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Berrett, 395 Md. 439, 450, 910 A.2d 1072, 1079 (2006); Miller v. Bay City Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 393 Md. 620, 632, 903 A.2d 938, 945 (2006), quoting Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 203, 892 A.2d 520, 529 (2006); Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 658, 876 A.2d 692, 697 (2005); Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 359, 800 A.2d 707, 721 (2002). If no material facts are in dispute, we must determine whether summary judgment was correctly entered as a matter of law. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 395 Md. at 450, 910 A.2d at 1079; Ross, 387 Md. at 659, 876 A.2d at 698; Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933; Beyer, 369 Md. at 360, 800 A.2d at 721. On appeal from an order entering summary judgment, *481we review “only the grounds upon which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment.” Standard Fire, 395 Md. at 450, 910 A.2d at 1079; Ross, 387 Md. at 659, 876 A.2d at 698, quoting Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10, 816 A.2d 844, 849 (2003), quoting in turn Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001).
Id. at 541-42, 914 A.2d at 778.
The issues before us require us to construe various provisions of the Insurance and the Labor and Employment Articles. In conducting statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to “to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 468, 906 A.2d 915, 936 (2006); quoting General Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352, 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005) quoting in turn Davis, 383 Md. at 605, 861 A.2d at 81; City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427, 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory’.” In re Kaela C., 394 Md. at 468, 906 A.2d at 936; Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor & Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 162, 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005); 468 Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 356 Md. 180, 194, 738 A.2d 856, 860-61, 863 (1999). If that language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. City of Frederick, 392 Md. at 427, 897 A.2d at 237; Davis, 383 Md. at 605, 861 A.2d at 81. If however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. In re Kaela C., 394 Md. at 468, 906 A.2d at 936; Mayor of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316, 896 A.2d at 1045; Canaj, Inc. v. Baker and Div. Phase III, 391 Md. *482374, 403, 893 A.2d 1067, 1084 (2006); Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005).
The PCIGC’s statutory purpose is “to provide a mechanism for the prompt payment of covered claims under certain [insurance] policies and to avoid financial loss to residents of the State who are claimants or policyholders of an insolvent insurer.” Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section 9-302(1) of the Insurance Article. Created by the General Assembly in 1971 as the Maryland Insurance Guaranty Association, the PCIGC was originally structured as a nonprofit, unincorporated legal entity, emulating a model act proposed in 1969 by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners which was adopted by over forty states. Ins. Comm’r of State v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 313 Md. 518, 522 n. 2, 546 A.2d 458, 460 n. 2 (1988); A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983). In 1986, the General Assembly made substantial changes to the Maryland Insurance Guaranty Association by renaming it the Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation, designating it as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation, declaring that it was not an agency or instrumentality of the State, and changing the process for the selection of its Board of Directors. 1986 Md. Laws, Chaps. 161 and 440; See also Insurance Comm’r of State, 313 Md. at 522 n. 2, 546 A.2d at 460 n. 2; A.S. Abell Pub’g Co., 297 Md. at 32, 464 A.2d at 1071.
All companies providing direct property and casualty insurance in the State of Maryland, with the exception of companies offering health, mortgage guaranty, and annuities insurance, companies offering insurance written on a surplus lines basis,5 *483companies transacting insurance written by a risk retention group,6 or companies transacting insurance written by an unauthorized insurer,7 must be a member of the PCIGC in order to transact insurance business in the State. Maryland Code (1995, 2003 RepLVol.), Sections 9-303, 9-304(b) and 9-306(d) of the Insurance Article. Each member insurer is assessed an annual fee by the PCIGC to cover its expenses in paying covered claims of insolvent insurance companies. Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Sections 9-304(b) and 9-306(d) of the Insurance Article.
In this case, Yanni contends that the Workers’ Compensation Commission rightfully assessed late-payment fees against the PCIGC because it is an “insurer,” as the term is used in Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article, as evidenced by Section 9-306(c) of the Insurance Article, which states that it “shall be deemed the insurer to the extent of the Corporation’s obligations on the covered claims and, to that extent, shall have the same rights, duties, and obligations that the insolvent insurer would have.” Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section 9-306(c) of the Insurance Article. Yanni further argues our decision in Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Danner, 388 Md. 649, 882 A.2d 271 (2005), that the Uninsured Employers’ Fund (“UEF”)8 was not an insurer is not persuasive because the PCIGC is a completely different *484creature from the UEF—the UEF is a state agency, and its funds are maintained by the State. Yanni also alleges that the PCIGC is an insurer because it is statutorily required to provide workers’ compensation insurance. Yanni argues that the PCIGC is obligated to pay the late-payment penalties because they represent a portion of the unpaid obligation for compensation owed by the insolvent insurer. Yanni further maintains that to grant the PCIGC immunity from late-payment penalties is inconsistent with the PCIGC’s statutory purpose, citing Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Info. Coordinating Comm./Indus. Educational, 704 A.2d 740 (R.I. 1997), which upheld a late-payment penalty against the state’s insurers’ insolvency fund, despite the fund’s immunity against liability, on the ground that the penalty ensured that the fund discharged its obligations in a timely manner. Yanni contends that, such broad immunity would abrogate claimants’ right to timely payment and leave them without any alternative remedy.
Conversely, the PCIGC argues that, under our holding in Danner, 388 Md. at 649, 882 A.2d at 271, it does not constitute an “insurer” for purposes of Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article. The PCIGC also maintains that, under Section 9-302 of the Insurance Article,9 it is only permitted to pay “covered claims,” which does not include the penalties explicated in Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article. The PCIGC also alleges that it is immune from the assessment of penalties under Section 9-314 of the Insurance Article and 5-412 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which grant it immunity from liability, and under *485Section 9-312 of the Insurance Article, which grants it immunity from taxes.10
The PCIGC is statutorily obligated to pay the “covered claims” of insolvent member
insurance companies that amount to more than $100 and less than $300,000, to the extent of the covered claims existing on or before the determination of insolvency or arising:
(i) 30 days after t he determination o f insolvency;
(ii) before the policy expiration date, if that date is less than 30 days after the determination of insolvency; or
(iii) before the insured replaces the policy or causes its cancellation, if the insured does so within 30 days after the determination of insolvency.
Maryland Code (1995, 2003 RepLVol.), Sections 9-306(a)(l) & (2) of the Insurance Article. With regards to workers’ compensation claims, however, the PCIGC “shall pay the full amount of any covered claim arising out of a workers’ compensation policy.” Maryland Code (1995, 2003 RepLVol.), Section 9-306(a)(2) of the Insurance Article.
In order to execute its statutory duty to assume the “covered claims” of insolvent insurers, the PCIGC is
deemed the insurer to the extent of the Corporation’s obligation on the covered claims and, to that extent, shall have the rights, duties, and obligations that the insolvent insurer would have had if the insurer had not become insolvent.
Maryland Code (1995, 2003 RepLVol.), Section 9-306(c). One of the obligations of a workers’ compensation insurer, such as Legion in the present case, is the prompt payment of an *486award, as required by Section 9-727 of the Labor and Employment Article, which states:
The employer or its insurer shall begin paying compensation to the covered employee within 15 days after the later of the date:
(1) an award is made; or
(2) payment of an award is due.
Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-727 of the Labor and Employment Article. If payments are not timely made, Section 9-728 provides for the assessment of fines:
(a) Within 15 days.—If the Commission finds that an employer or its insurer has failed, without good cause, to begin paying an award within 15 days after the later of the date that the award is issued or the date that payment of the award is due, the Commission shall assess against the employer or its insurer a fine not exceeding 20% of the amount of the payment.
(b) Within 30 days.—If the Commission finds that an employer or its insurer has failed, without good cause, to begin paying an award within 30 days after the later of the date that the award is issued or the date that payment of the award is due, the Commission shall assess against the employer or its insurer a fine not exceeding 40% of the amount of payment.
Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article (emphasis added).
This Court has had occasion to examine what constitutes an “insurer” for purposes of Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article in Danner, 388 Md. at 649, 882 A.2d at 271. We began our analysis by noting that, although not defined in Subtitle Seven of the Workers’ Compensation Act, “insurer” is defined in other subtitles. Id. at 669, 882 A.2d at 283. We looked to the Act’s definition of an “authorized insurer” in Subtitle Four as “a stock corporation or mutual association that is authorized under the Insurance Article to provide workers’ compensation insurance in the State,” quot*487ing Section 9-401 (b) of the Labor and Employment Article, and also to the definition of “insurer” in Subtitle Three as:
(i) a stock corporation or mutual association[11] that is authorized under the Insurance Article to provide workers’ compensation insurance in the State;
(ii) the Injured Workers’ Insurance Fund;
(iv) a governmental self-insurance group[12] that meets the requirements of Title 25, Subtitle 3 of the Insurance Article; or
(v) an individual employer that self-insurers in accordance with § 9-405 of this title.
Id., quoting Section 9-316(a) of the Labor and Employment Article. We held that the Uninsured Employers’ Fund was not an “insurer” because it did not fall within any of the enumerated definitions but, was, rather, a state entity that did not operate for profit, as would a mutual association or corporation. Id. at 669, 882 A.2d at 283. Thus, it could not be assessed late fees under Section 9-728 of the Insurance Article.
Although Yanni is correct in pointing out that the PCIGC is structurally different from the UEF, it still does not meet the definition of “insurer” provided in the Workers’ Compensation Act. The PCIGC is a nonstock, nonprofit corporation, rather than a for-profit stock corporation, mutual association, governmental self-insurance group, or an individual employer that self-insures. Nor is the PCIGC the Injured Workers’ Insurance Fund. Further, the PCIGC does not issue workers’ compensation insurance policies to employers. Instead, the *488PCIGC is limited in its functions to paying “covered claims” of insolvent insurers and assessing member insurers annual fees to cover the cost of its statutory duties.
Yanni, nonetheless, asserts that the late-payment penalties assessed against the PCIGC represent a portion of his “covered claim” to render it liable for those penalties. The PCIGC is only deemed the insurer “to the extent of the Corporation’s obligation on the covered claims,” and is “not obligated to a policyholder or claimant in an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy out of which the claim arises.” Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Section 9-306(c) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added). It is statutorily required to investigate all claims brought against the Corporation, settle and pay all covered claims, and deny all other claims not qualifying as “covered.” Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Sections 9—306(e)(l)(i) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added).
Covered claims are defined in Section 9-301 (d) of the Insurance Article as:
[A]n insolvent insurer’s unpaid obligation, including an unearned premium:
(i) that:
1. A. for insurance other than insurance that covers members of a purchasing group, arises out of a policy of the insolvent insurer issued to a resident or payable to a resident on behalf of an insured of the insolvent insurer; or
B. for insurance that covers members of a purchasing group, arises out of insurance that covers the members of the purchasing group to the extent that the insurance is obtained by the purchasing group, the insurance is written by an authorized insurer, and the claim is made by a person residing or located in the State; or
2. arises out of a surety bond issued by the insolvent insurer for the protection of a third party that is a resident.
*489Maryland Code (1995, 2003 RepLVol.), Section 9-301(d) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added). Covered claims do not include:
(i) an amount due a reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as a subrogation recovery or otherwise; or
(ü) an amount due that arises out of insurance covering the members of a purchasing group if the insurance obtained by the purchasing group is written by an unauthorized insurer.
Id. Covered claims also do not include “a first party claim by an insured whose net worth exceeds $50,000,000 on December 31 of the year before the year in which the insurer becomes an insolvent insurer.” Id.
This Court has repeatedly denied recovery against the PCIGC when a claim did not fall within the statutory definition of a “covered claim.” In Workmen’s Compensation Commission v. Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation, supra, we held that assessments levied against insurers for the purpose of funding the Subsequent Injury Fund13 (“SIF”) and the UEF did not fall within the definition of “covered claims” that the PCIGC was statutorily obligated to pay after having emphasized that “covered claims” are defined as those which “arise out of” insurance policies of the insolvent insurer, we explicated that the SIF and UEF assessments do not “arise out of the insurance policy contracts of the insolvent insurer,” but instead “are obligations arising wholly from statutes.” Id. at 10-11, 570 A.2d at 327. See also Md. Motor Truck Assoc. Workers’ Comp. Self-Ins. Group v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 386 Md. 88, 103, 871 A.2d 590, 598 (2005) (holding that the Maryland Motor Truck Association Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurance Group could not recover from the PCIGC because the group constituted an *490insurer, and Section 9—301 (d)(2)(i) provides that “covered claim” does not include “an amount due to a reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as a subrogation recovery or otherwise”); Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v. Goldstein, 388 Md. 299, 879 A.2d 1025 (2005) (holding that the PCIGC was not required to indemnify or defend a doctor in a contribution action because the doctor’s claim was not presented to the PCIGC prior to the absolute and final bar date required by Section 9-301(d)(l)(ii), and therefore did not constitute a “covered claim”). Cf. Ward Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 325 Md. 1, 599 A.2d 81 (1991) (holding that the PCIGC could not pursue a claim for indemnity against insolvent insurer’s insurer because the claimant the PCIGC had paid was not a resident of Maryland, and therefore the claim was not a “covered claim” and the PCIGC could not step into the insolvent insurer’s shoes).
In the case before us, the penalties assessed against the PCIGC did not “arise out of’ Legion’s original workers’ compensation insurance policy, but rather arose out of statutory obligations. Although the penalties were to be paid directly to Yanni, they are not part of the original claim amount, but, rather, constitute an additional payment, above and beyond the original claim award. Thus, based on the plain language of Section 9-301(d) of the Insurance Article, late fees assessed under Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article do not constitute part of the “covered claim,” and the PCIGC is not obligated to pay them. See Maryland Code (1995, 2003 RepLVol.), Section 9-306(a)(2) of the Insurance Article.
Although it is unnecessary for us to decide the other preserved issue of whether the PCIGC is immune from the assessment of fees in light of our determination that the PCIGC is not an “insurer” and that the penalties are not part of Yanni’s “covered claim,” we nonetheless shall reach the immunity issue because it raises an important issue; an issue which may continue to arise in the PCIGC’s performance of its statutory duty to pay covered claims. This Court has discre*491tion to reach collateral, non-determinative, and even unpreserved issues if they are deemed to be important issues of law that are integral to our holding. See Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, LLC, 391 Md. 374, 382, 893 A.2d 1067, 1072 (2006); Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672, 688, 821 A.2d 22, 31 (2003); Md. Com’r of Labor & Indus. v. Cole Roofing Co., Inc., 368 Md. 459, 479, 796 A.2d 63, 75 (2002); Richard Roeser Prof'l Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 368 Md. 294, 296, 793 A.2d 545, 547 (2002). See also Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 104-05, 887 A.2d 1029, 1035-36 (2005); Oak Crest Vill., Inc. v. Murphy, 379 Md. 229, 242, 841 A.2d 816, 824 (2004); Eng’g Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Md. State Highway Admin., 375 Md. 211, 235, 825 A.2d 966, 980 (2003); Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 649, 814 A.2d 543, 549 (2003).
Yanni urges us to hold that the PCIGC is not immune from the assessment of late-payment penalties because such immunity is inconsistent with the PCIGC’s statutory purpose, to ensure the prompt payment of covered claims and to avoid financial loss to residents of the State who are claimants of an insolvent insurer.
Section 9-314 of Insurance Article provides:
A member insurer, the Corporation or its agents or employees, the Board of Directors, and the Commissioners or the Commissioner’s representatives shall have the immunity from liability described in § 5-412 of the Courts Article.
Maryland Code (1995, 2003 RepLVol.), Sections 9-314 of the Insurance Article. Section 5-412 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states:
There shall be no liability on the part of and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against a member insurer, the Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation or its agents or employees, the Board of Directors, or the Insurance Commissioner or the Commissioner’s representatives for any action taken by them in the performance of their powers and duties under Title 9, Subtitle 3 of the Insurance Article.
*492Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 5-412 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). Both Sections 9-314 of the Insurance Article and Section 5-412 of the Courts and Judicial Proceeding Article grant the PCIGC immunity from liability arising out of its performance of its statutory duties.
Liability is not defined in either the Insurance Article or Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; nor is there any legislative history to shed light on the term. It is, however, defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as a “legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment,” and as “the opposite of immunity. ” Id., Black’s Law Dictionary 932 (8th ed.2004), quoting William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 9 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed.1919) (emphasis added).
We explored the PCIGC’s immunity from liability in A.S. Abell Publishing Co., 297 Md. at 26, 464 A.2d at 1068, and determined that the Maryland Insurance Guaranty Association, the PCIGC’s predecessor, was an agency or instrumentality of the State, such that it was required to disclose certain requested documents under the Public Information Act, and remanded the case for further proceedings. We held, however, that on remand, attorneys’ fees and costs could not be awarded against MIGA under Section 5(b)(6) of Article 76A, the Public Information Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.).14 We explained that,
Ordinarily, a specific enactment prevails over an incompatible general enactment in the same or another statute.[15] *493Additionally, Art. 48A, § 1116 specifically provides that the provisions of Article 48A shall prevail over other statutory provisions relating to insurance matters. Accordingly, Article 48A, § 517,17 granting immunity from liability to MIGA and its agents, prevails over Article 76A, § 5(b)(6), permitting the assessment of attorney fees and costs in cases under the Public Information Act. Similarly, Article 48A, § 517 prevails over Md.Code (1974, 1980 Rep. Vol.), § 7-104(a)(1) and (2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,18 permitting the assessment of appellate costs *494against a State agency. Under these circumstances, there shall be no allocation of appellate costs.
Id. at 40-41, 464 A.2d 1068 (citations omitted). Thus, we interpreted MIGA’s immunity from liability to include immunity from costs, and concluded that the specific provisions of Section 517 of Article 48A, the predecessor to Section 5^12 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, prevailed over the provisions for the assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs of the Public Information Act.
Although the PCIGC has been restructured so that it may no longer be considered an agency or instrumentality of the State,19 the Abell Publishing rationale remains applicable. Thus, applying our jurisprudence in Abell Publishing to the case sub judice, the Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation is immune under the specific provisions of Section 9-314 of the Insurance Article and Section 5-412 of the Courts and' Judicial Proceedings Article, which prevail over the general penalty provisions of Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article.
When faced with a similar issue, the Colorado Court of Appeals has reached the same conclusion. In Mosley v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 119 P.3d 576 (Colo.Ct.App.2005), cert. denied, 2005 WL 2064906 (Colo.2005), the Colorado Court of Appeals explored whether the State’s Insurance Guaranty Association’s (“CIGA”) immunity clause shielded it from paying late-payment penalties assessed under Section 8-*49543-304(1) of the Colorado Workers’ Compensation Act. CIGA’s immunity statute provides:
There shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against, any member insurer, the association or its agents or employees, the board of directors, or the commissioner or his representatives for any action taken by them in the performance of their powers and duties under this part 5.
Colorado Revised Statutes (1971), Section 10-4-517. The court concluded that CIGA’s immunity provision prevailed over the penalty provision of the Colorado Workers’ Compensation Act because, following well-established rules of statutory interpretation, “to the extent there is any conflict between the two statutory provisions, § 10-4-517, as the more specific and later-enacted statute, controls.” Id. at 579. The court further explained that,
This interpretation of the statute furthers, rather than hampers, the legislative purpose of § 10-4-502, which is to avoid “excessive delay in payment and financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of an insurer.” Indeed, the consequences of adopting claimant’s statutory construction would be directly contrary to the purposes of the CIGA Act because requiring CIGA to pay penalties for post insolvency acts would result in increased premiums for individual policyholders and depletion of CIGA funds to pay for covered claims of all claimants whose insurers had become insolvent.
Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
In Caulfield v. Leonard, 676 So.2d 1117 (La.Ct.App.1996), the Louisiana Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion when it was called upon to also address the issue of whether the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association’s (“LIGA”) was immune from late-payment penalties under Section 12:1220(B)(2) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated. Section 12:1220 provides:
A. An insurer, including but not limited to a foreign line and surplus line insurer, owes to his insured a duty of good *496faith and fair dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly.... Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.
B. Any of the following acts, if knowingly committed or performed by an insurer, constitutes a breach of the insurer’s duties imposed by Subsection a:
(2) Failing to pay a settlement within thirty days after an agreement is reduced to writing.
C. In addition to any general or special damages to which a claimant is entitled for breach of the imposed duty, the claimant may be awarded penalties assessed against the insurer in an amount not to exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars, whichever is greater....
F. The Insurance Guaranty Association Fund ... shall not be liable for any special damages awarded under the provisions of this Section.
Id. at 1119, quoting Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated 22:1120 (1990) (emphasis added). Section 12:1391 of the Louisiana Insurance Code, LIGA’s immunity provision, states:
There shall be no liability on the part of and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against any member insurer, the association or its agents or employees, the board of directors, or the commissioner or his representatives for any action taken by them in the performance of their powers and duties under this Part.
Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated 12:1391 (1970, 1991 Repl. Vol.). The Louisiana court harmonized the penalties provision of Section 12:1220(B)(2) of the Insurance Code with the immunity provisions of Section 12:1391, stating:
La.R.S. 22:1220(F) specifically provides that LIGA is immune from an assessment of special damages. In light of LIGA’s broad grant of immunity under La.R.S. 22:1391, *497La.R.S. 22:1220(F) cannot be read, by implication, as allowing the imposition of general damages and/or penalties thereunder.
Id. at 1120. The court noted that, “to expose LIGA [to penalties] could potentially threaten the very existence of the insurance guaranty fund which has as its avowed statutory purpose the avoidance of excessive delay in payment and the avoidance of financial loss to claimants or policyholders.” Id. at 1120. The court therefore held that LIGA is not liable for penalties in failing to timely pay claims.
Yanni urges us to adopt the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s holding in Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Info. Coordinating Comm./Indus. Educ., 704 A.2d 740 (R.I.1997), which upheld a late-payment penalty against the state’s insurer’s insolvency fund, despite the fund’s immunity against liability, on the ground that the penalty ensured that the fund discharged its obligations in a timely manner. Yanni argues that this approach provides the only remedy for claimants whose award has not been timely paid.
In Callaghan, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether the Rhode Island Insurer’s Insolvency Fund (“RIIIF”), which mirrors Maryland’s PCIGC, was susceptible to the assessment of late-payment penalties under Section 28-33— 17(f)(5) of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Act for the RIIIF’s late payment of cost-of-living adjustments to Callaghan’s workers’ compensation award. Section 27-34-16 of the General Laws of Rhode Island provides:
there shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against, any member insurer, the fund, or its agents or employees, the board of directors, or the commissioner or his or her representative for any action taken or not taken by them in the performance of their powers and duties under this chapter.
Rhode Island General Laws (1956,1988 Repl.Vol.), Section 27-34- 16. The Rhode Island Court defined liability as “ ‘a broad legal term ... [that] has been referred to as of the most comprehensive significance, including almost every character *498of hazard or responsibility, absolute, contingent, or likely,’ ” and determined that the RIIIF’s immunity statute could not be given such a broad application because it would abrogate the fund’s obligation to pay the penalties. Callaghan, 704 A.2d at 747. The court reasoned that, to give the RIIIF such broad immunity
would contravene the legislative purpose behind the [RIIIF] Act, namely to provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of an insurer.
Id. In addition to being a minority view, the Rhode Island opinion is distinguishable from our jurisprudence because the opinion did not explore whether there exists an alternative remedy to the enforcement of the timely payment of insolvent insurer’s covered claims, which could include the filing a complaint with the State insurance commissioner.
We explored the authority of the Insurance Commissioner with regard to the PCIGC in Insurance Commissioner of State v. Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation, 313 Md. at 522-23, 546 A.2d at 460, in which claimants sought payment of their Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) claims from the PCIGC when their insurance provider became insolvent. The PCIGC contended that the claims were not “covered claims” and refused to pay them. The Insurance Commissioner disagreed and ordered the PCIGC to pay them. We affirmed the authority of the Commissioner, stating that, under certain circumstances, the Commissioner retained the authority to order an insurer to pay a claim, citing to specific statutory provisions of the Insurance Article:
Section 55(2)[20] provides: “[t]he Commissioner may refuse to issue or after a hearing refuse to renew, or may *499revoke or suspend an insurer’s certificate of authority, in addition to other grounds therefor in this article, if the insurer: (i) Violates any provision of this article other than those as to which refusal, suspension or revocation is mandatory____(iv) Without just cause unreasonably refuses or delays payment to claimants of the amount due them.” Section 55A[21] provides: “In lieu of or in addition to revocation or suspension of an insurer’s certificate of authority the Commissioner may ... (2) require that restitution be made by such insurer to any person who has suffered financial injury or damage as a result of such violation.”
Id. at 527-28, 546 A.2d at 462-63. Thus, we held that, because the PCIGC stands in the shoes of the insurer with regard to covered claims, and it had violated the Insurance Article by failing to pay a covered claim, it was “therefore subject to the Commissioner’s powers under §§ 55(2)(i) and 55A.” Id. at 527, 546 A.2d at 462.
Thus, a remedy afforded to Yanni in his pursuit of the prompt payment of his “covered claim” was to have filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner at the expiration of the fifteen-day payment period. The Commissioner would then have had the opportunity to investigate the claim and *500intervene on Yanni’s behalf. This option explored in our jurisprudence was not explored by the Rhode Island court.
We, therefore, hold that the penalties should not have been assessed against the PCIGC because it is not an “insurer” for purposes of Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article. We also hold that the PCIGC is not obligated to pay the late-payment penalties because the penalties do not fit within the statutory definition of “covered claims” of Section 9-301(d) of the Insurance Article. Further, even if the PCIGC were an “insurer,” and the penalties were part of the “covered claim,” it is immune from the assessment of late-payment penalties under the provisions of Section 9-314(a) of the Insurance Article and Section 5^412 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Thus, we reverse summary judgment for Yanni and remand to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for the entry of summary judgment for PCIGC. See Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 317, 841 A.2d 858, 868 (2004); Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 318, 753 A.2d 533, 544 (2000).
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO GRANT APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO DENY APPELLEE’S CROSS-MOTION FOR ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
HARRELL, J., joins in the judgment as to the immunity issue only.
. Section 9-727 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code (1999), provides in pertinent part:
Payment of award.
The employer or its insurer shall begin paying compensation to the covered employee within 15 days after the later of the date:
(1) an award is made; or
(2) payment of an award is due.
. Section 9-728 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code (1999), provides in pertinent part:
Failure to pay award—Penalties.
(a) Within 15 days.—If the Commission finds that an employer or its insurer has failed, without good cause, to begin paying an award within 15 days after the later of the date that the award is issued or the date that payment of the award is due, the Commission shall assess against the employer or its insurer a fine not exceeding 20% of the amount of the payment.
(b) Within 30 days.—If the Commission finds that an employer or its insurer has failed, without good cause, to begin paying an award within 30 days after the later of the date that the award is issued or the date that payment of the award is due, the Commission shall assess against the employer or its insurer a fine not exceeding 40% of the amount of payment.
. In terms of temporary total disability, the Commission stated:
All lost time was paid at the temporary total disability rate of all lost time; based on an average weekly wage of $1,200.00.
. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, employers disputing a claim filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission, or claimants seeking to enforce or modify a workers' compensation award, must file “issues” with the Commission setting forth their demand. See Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-713 (a)(2) of the Labor and Employment Article. See also Jung v. Southland Corp., 351 Md. 165, 717 A.2d 387 (1998).
. "Surplus lines” insurance refers to
the full amount or kind of insurance needed to protect the interest of the insured that:
(1) cannot be obtained from an authorized insurer; or
(2) for the particular kind and class of insurance to provide coverage against liability of persons described in § 24-206(1) of this article, cannot be obtained from three or more authorized insurers that write that kind and class of insurance on a broad basis.
*483Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section l-101(pp) of the Insurance Article.
. A risk retention group is defined as "a corporation or other limited liability association that is formed under the laws of a state, Bermuda, or the Cayman Islands,” and "the primary activity of which consists of assuming and spreading all or part of the liability exposure of its group members.” Maryland Code (1997, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section 25-101(j) of the Insurance Article.
. "Unauthorized insurer” means an insurer that does not hold a certificate of authority. Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section 1-101(rr) of the Insurance Article.
. "The [Uninsured Employers' Fund] was created in 1967 to provide for the payment of workers’ compensation awards against uninsured employers.” Workmen’s Comp. Comm’n v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 319 Md. 1, 3, 570 A.2d 323, 324 (1990).
. Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section 9-302 of the Insurance Article provides:
The purposes of this subtitle are:
(1) to provide a mechanism for the prompt payment of covered claims under certain policies and to avoid financial loss to residents of the State who are claimants or policyholders of an insolvent insurer; and
(2) to provide for the assessment of the cost of payments of covered claims and protection among insurers.
. Because we shall hold that the PCIGC is immune from the assessment of late-payment penalties under Section 9-314 of the Insurance Article and 5-412 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, we do not reach the issue of whether the penalties constitute taxes and, if so, whether the PCIGC also may be immune under Section 9-312 of the Insurance Article.
. A “mutual association” is defined as a nonstock, unincorporated organization made up of different member organizations that share profits, benefits, expenses and liabilities. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1493 (1993).
. A “governmental self-insurance group” is a group of two or more government employers, consisting of counties, municipal corporations, boards of education, and/or community colleges, organized under the provisions of Section 9-404 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code (1999), that self-insure. Maryland Code (1999), Sections 9-401(c) and 9-404 of the Labor and Employment Article.
. The Subsequent Injury Fund is a statutorily created fund that insures “that an employer who has hired a handicapped worker, will be subject to workers’ compensation liability only for the effects of an injury which the worker suffers while in the employer’ service, and not for the combined effects of the previous handicap and the subsequent injury.” Workmen's Comp. Comm., 319 Md. at 2, 570 A.2d at 323.
. Section 5(b)(6) of Article 76A provides that:
The court may assess against any defendant governmental entity or entities reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the court determines that the applicant has substantially prevailed.
Maryland Code (1957, 1980 Repl.Vol.), Article 76A, Section 5(b)(6).
. See Md.-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Com’n v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 194-95, 909 A.2d 694, 707 (2006) (stating that "[i]t is a well-settled rule of statutory interpretation that 'when two statutes, one general and one specific, are found to conflict, the specific statute will be regarded *493as an exception to the general statute’.”). See also Massey v. Sec'y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 389 Md. 496, 512 n. 4, 886 A.2d 585, 594 n. 4 (2005), citing Smack v. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 306, 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003); Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 270, 884 A.2d 1171, 1187 (2005); Farmers & Mer. Nat’l Bank of Hagerstown v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 63, 507 A.2d 172, 180 (1986); Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r, 302 Md. 248, 268-69, 487 A.2d 271, 281 (1985).
. Section 11 of Article 48A provided:
Provisions of this article relative to a particular kind of insurance or a particular type of insurer or to a particular matter shall prevail over provisions relating to insurance in general or insurers in general or to such matter in general.
Maryland Code (1957, 1980 Repl.Vol.), Article 48A, Section 11. Section 11 of Article 48A was recodified in 1995 without substantive changes as Section 1-207 of the Insurance Article. 1995 Md. Laws, Chap. 36.
. Section 517 of Article 48A provided:
There shall be no liability on the part of and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against any member insurer, the Association or its agents or employees, the board of directors, or the Commissioner of his representatives for any action taken by them in the performance of their powers and duties under this subtitle.
Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Section 517 of the Article 48A. Section 517 of Article 48A was recodified in 1990 without substantive changes as Section 5-336 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 1990 Md. Laws, Chap. 546, and then renumbered to Section 5-412 in 1997. 1997 Md. Laws, Chap. 14.
. Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Rep. Vol.), § 7-104(a)(l) and (2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings provided:
(a) In general.—(1) Costs shall be allowed to or awarded against the State or one of its agencies or political subdivisions which is party to an appeal from an executive, administrative, or judicial decision, in *494the same manner as costs are allowed to or awarded against a private litigant.
(2) The State, its agency, or the political subdivision shall pay the costs awarded against it.
. In 1986, the General Assembly added subsection (b) to Section 9-314 of the Insurance Article, 1986 Md. Laws, Chap. 116, which provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the Corporation is not any may not be deemed a department, unit, agency, or instrumentality of the State.
Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section 9-314 of the Insurance Article.
. Section 55(2) of Article 48A was recodified in 1995 as Section 4— 113(b) of the Insurance Article, 1995 Md. Laws, Chap. 36, which provides:
*499The Commissioner shall deny a certificate of authority to an applicant or; subject to the hearing provisions of Title 2 of this article, refuse to renew, suspend, or revoke a certificate of authority if the applicant or holder of the certificate of authority: (1) violates any provision of this article other than one that provides for mandatory denial, refusal to renew, suspension, or revocation for its violation.
(5) refuses or delays payment of amounts due claimants without just cause.
. Section 55A of Article 48A was recodified in 1995 Section 4—113(d) of the Insurance Article, 1995 Md. Laws, Chap. 36, which provides:
Instead of or in addition to suspending or revoking a certificate of authority, the Commissioner may:
(2) require the holder to make restitution to any person who has suffered financial injury because of the violation of this article.