dissenting in part.
I would reverse the conviction for unlawful assembly on the steps of the Rayburn House Office Building because binding precedent requires that the government prove not only that the protesters have incommoded or obstructed the entrance to the building, but also that they have engaged in, or threatened, a breach of the peace. See Adams v. United States, 256 A.2d 563, 564 (D.C.1969) (citing Williams v. District of Columbia, 136 U.S.App. D.C. 56, 64, 419 F.2d 638, 646 (1969)). Appellants were not charged with breaching the peace,1 the government did not present evidence of breach of the peace, and the trial court made no such finding. Rather, and as the majority acknowledges, the trial judge noted that “there was no contrary evidence to the assertion that it was a peaceful demonstration ... respectfully carried out as a means of expression.” The judge found that the appellants’ protest
clearly block[ed] a series of doors [on the Independence Avenue side of the Rayburn Building], 70 percent, even though it doesn’t physically prevent anyone from walking in, does incommode.
*919Again there’s no question that those who were arrested were there and were in front of the doorways and didn’t leave when they were instructed to. So the ... question is this; was this a violation of the statute [that] could pass constitutional scrutiny? And in the court’s view it was; clearly they could seek to keep the access clear.
The presence of the coffins was not the subject of arrest. It was those lying up in the, right at the entry level. And that does strike me as an area that police could reasonably seek to keep clear. And so I find these defendants guilty.
The evidence adduced at trial showed that some of the protesters, “[approximately 20 or so,” according to Captain Thomas Lloyd, were lying close to the entrance of the building. As a result, he testified, although “a couple persons were successful” in getting into the building, “[m]ost, the other people did choose to go to another entrance.” Captain Lloyd testified that he “didn’t physically see somebody approach [the entrance to the building] and who was unsuccessful. I did see people avoid the area based on the people line, you know, along the doorways.” Some persons entering or leaving the Rayburn building had to “walk over” or “hop” over the protesters who were lying down pretending to be casualties of war, with sheets over them. The trial judge explicitly commented that there had been no breach of the peace, stating that “one of the things that has characterized these cases is that clearly everyone involved was conducting themselves with courtesy and respect for each other which maximizes the value of the speech and the demonstration and minimizes the relevant conflict.” In my opinion, under circumstances where there has been no actual or threatened breach of the peace, the conviction cannot stand.2
What the evidence here shows, consistent with the trial judge’s remarks, is that appellants’ war protest was taken in .stride by the people entering and leaving the Rayburn Building, who went about their business by, at most, making slight alterations such as by “walking over” the demonstrators or choosing to use another entrance. That this was so is not surprising because notwithstanding the belief expressed by Captain Lloyd that police intervention was necessary to “let Congress complete their mission,” the “mission” of members of Congress and of many persons who visit the Capitol routinely includes intense and sometimes even heated dialogue about issues of policy that affect the Nation. Whether our country should be at war is one of the issues that historically has compelled citizens to petition the Congress and mount demonstrations in and around the Capitol.
In Williams, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted the section of the disorderly conduct statute which makes it unlawful for “any person ... to curse, swear, or make use of *920any profane language or indecent or obscene words, or engage in any disorderly conduct, in any street....” D.C.Code § 22-1307 (2001), formerly D.C.Code § 22-1107 (1981);3 see Williams, 136 U.S.App. D.C. at 59, 419 F.2d at 641. Because “of the serious constitutional problems posed by a notably broad statute regulating speech,” Williams, 136 U.S.App. D.C. at 62, 419 F.2d at 644, the court held that the statute “could be validly applied only if it were construed to require something more than simply the utterance of profane or obscene language in a public place.” Id. at 63, 419 F.2d at 645. The “something more”, was the added requirement that the objectionable language “be spoken in circumstances which threaten a breach of the peace.” Id. at 64, 419 F.2d at 646. The majority distinguishes Williams on the ground that it involved pure speech, and not conduct — a distinction that finds validity in First Amendment jurisprudence. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (noting that “the fact that free speech is intermingled with [regulated] conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection”). But that distinction was made untenable by this court’s decision in Adams, which, following Williams, also narrowly interpreted the specific section of the statute at issue here, which makes it unlawful “to congregate and assemble in any street, ... or in or around any public building, ... and engage in loud and boisterous talking or other disorderly conduct, ... or to crowd, obstruct or incommode, the free use of any such street, ... or the free entrance into any public or private building....”4 *921D.C.Code § 22-1307; see Adams, 256 A.2d at 564. In Adams, the court did not refer to the defendants’ actions as an exercise of the right to free speech as there was in Williams; rather, as far as can be gleaned from the sparse discussion, the court was addressing a situation where defendants were “eongregat[ing] and assembl[ing] on a public street and crowding], obstructing] or incommoding] the free use of such street.” 256 A.2d at 564. In my view, the decision in Adams controls the outcome in this case, and requires reversal of appellants’ convictions relating to the demonstration on the steps of the Rayburn House Office Building.
Even if Adams could be meaningfully distinguished — and I do not believe that it can be — the majority’s attempt at doing so causes further concern. The purpose and place of appellants’ conduct are critical. Unlike in Adams, where there is no suggestion that the location of the street that was blocked, or the circumstances surrounding the obstruction, were in any way related to expressive conduct, whatever “incommoding” occurred here took place at the Nation’s principal public forum, and was incidental to a public display of expressive conduct (“political theater”) intended for members of and visitors to the United States Congress. See Lederman v. United States, 351 U.S.App. D.C. 386, 391—94, 291 F.3d 36, 41-44 (2002) (recognizing that areas surrounding the Capitol are traditional public fora). The majority’s attempt to distinguish Adams on the ground that what concerned the court there was the possible application of the disorderly conduct statute to punish students or sightseers who “innocently congregate and assemble on a public street” even if they do so “in such a manner as to crowd, obstruct, or incommode” the public’s use, 256 A.2d at 565, means that police action that could be justified as neutral regulation of conduct is being unequally applied to persons exercising their First Amendment rights, but not to tourists. That, it is clear, the District may not do, whether the distinction is explicitly in the language of the statute, or in a gloss supplied by court interpretation, or a practice employed by regulatory authorities. See Wheelock v. United States, 552 A.2d 503, 508 (D.C.1988) (“Appellants’ conduct cannot constitute the basis for penalizing the exercise of their constitutional rights unless it interfered with the rights of others to a greater degree than tourists do.”); Cox, 379 U.S. at 557, 85 S.Ct. 453 (“The pervasive restraint on freedom of discussion by the practice of authorities under the statute is not any less effective than a statute expressly permitting such selective enforcement.”); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (“A statute can be impermissi-bly vague ... if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).
Because we are bound, as a division, to follow our Adams precedent, see M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), I would reverse appellants’ conviction based on their demonstration on the steps of the Rayburn House Office Building. If the full court wishes to reexamine the question, it may do so en banc.
. Appellants raise for the first time on appeal that the information failed to "sufficiently apprise the accused of the charge against him so he may properly prepare his defense.” Horowitz v. District of Columbia, 291 A.2d 202, 203 (D.C.1972). Appellants were charged by an information that quoted the statute, but did not specify the conduct for which they were being charged:
UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY: did congregate and assemble in any street, avenue, alley, road, or highway, or in or around any public building or inclosure, or any park or reservation, or at the entrance of any private building or inclosure, and engage in loud and boisterous talking or other disorderly conduct, or insult or make rude or obscene gestures or comments or observations on persons passing by, or in their hearing, or to crowd, obstruct, or incommode, the free use of any such street, avenue, alley, road, highway, or any of the foot pavements thereof, or the free entrance into any public or private building or inclosure, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-1307 (2001).
Because the insufficiency of the information was not raised at trial, we would reverse on that ground only if there is "demonstrable prejudice,” Craig v. United States, 490 A.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C.1985), which appellants, who challenge their convictions on First Amendment grounds, have not shown.
. After the entrance to the Rayburn Building was described to Captain Lloyd as having "an outer entrance and then you go in there’s like a little alcove, then there's an actual entrance to the building,” he testified that the protesters were lined up "against the first ... entrance as you described it, to the building.” This would have been the “outer entrance” and not the “actual entrance” to the Rayburn Building. The majority quotes Captain Lloyd’s testimony from an earlier proceeding that the demonstrators were lying "right at the doors, actually you know, blocking the doors” and consequently, "the entrances they were blocking completely.” This testimony, however, was inconsistent with Captain Lloyd’s observation that several people did enter the building during the demonstration. The trial judge found that persons were not “physically prevented” from entering the building.
. Section 22-1307, which was enacted in 1892, has been described as a “disorderly conduct statute which was not at its birth a model of craftsmanlike drafting and which has certainly not improved with age.” Williams, 136 U.S.App. D.C. at 59, 419 F.2d at 641. The statute provides in full:
It shall not be lawful for any person or persons within the District of Columbia to congregate and assemble in any street, avenue, alley, road, or highway, or in or around any public building or inclosure, or any park or reservation, or at the entrance of any private building or inclosure, and engage in loud and boisterous talking or other disorderly conduct, or to insult or make rude or obscene gestures or comments or observations on persons passing by, or in their hearing, or to crowd, obstruct, or incommode, the free use of any such street, avenue, alley, road, highway, or any of the foot pavements thereof, or the free entrance into any public or private building or inclosure; it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to curse, swear, or make use of any profane language or indecent or obscene words, or engage in any disorderly conduct in any street, avenue, alley, road, highway, public park or inclosure, public building, church, or assembly room, or in any other public place, or in any place wherefrom the same may be heard in any street, avenue, alley, road, highway, public park or inclosure, or other building, or in any premises other than those where the offense was committed, under a penalty of not more than $ 250 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or both for each and every such offense.
D.C.Code § 22-1307.
I note that in light of numerous state statutes similar to the one we have regularly had to struggle with in the District of Columbia, the Model Penal Code has sought to “systematize the chaotic provisions of prior law penalizing a wide variety of petty misbehavior under such vague headings as 'disorderly conduct' or ‘vagrancy’; [and] to safeguard civil liberty by careful definition of offenses so that they do not cover, for example, ... peaceful picketing, or disseminating religious or political views.” Model Penal Code § 250.1 explanatory note (1981); see id. § 250.2 (disorderly conduct); id. § 250.7 (obstructing highways and other public passages).
. I disagree with the majority's characterization that evidence "fairly support[s] an inference that the defendants had assembled in front of the Rayburn Building entrance intending to impede entry into the building.” As quoted above, the trial court found only *921that appellants conducted a "peaceful demonstration” and acted "respectfully,” but did not leave "when they were instructed to do so.” The trial court did not find that they assembled at the Rayburn House Office Building "intending” to impede entry.