{concurring). The majority correctly concludes that 1995 Wis. Act 27 is unconstitutional, as it entrusts the former powers of the elected state Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) to appointed "other officers" at the state level. See majority op. at 678. The effect of the legislative act is to strip the SPI of his vested authority, rendering him effectively inferior to those officials appointed to the Education Commission, as overseen by the new Secretary of Education. I write separately to express my concern that the majority opinion has not given full meaning to the intent of the framers of the 1902 constitutional amendment.
I am troubled with the discussion of the context and purpose of the 1902 amendment to Article X, § 1, which provided in part:
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall direct; *701and their qualifications, powers, duties, and compensation shall be prescribed by law. The state superintendent shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at the same time and in the same manner as members of the supreme court, and shall hold his office for four years from the succeeding first Monday in July . . . The term of office, time and manner of electing or appointing all other officers of supervision of public instruction shall be fixed by law. (Emphasis added.)1
The majority relies upon a series of letters from the then-Superintendent of Public Instruction, Lorenzo Dow Harvey, to conclude that "the context of the 1902 amendment, along with the stated intentions of Lorenzo Dow Harvey, demonstrates that the 'other officers' mentioned in the amendment are solely local officials, subordinate to the SPI." Majority op. at 693.
While I recognize the concern expressed by Harvey regarding the status of county superintendents and the perceived abuse of the political office, this was but one of the reasons for the development of the amendment in 1902. The amendment cannot and should not be read to restrict itself to the limited applicability of the office of county superintendent, either in language or purpose. The majority's confined reading of the purpose of the amendment in this case undermines the prudent foresight with which Harvey viewed the maturation of the educational system in the state of Wisconsin. Upon a closer inspection of the Harvey correspondence, it is clear that he believed that the amendment reflected a comprehensive effort to increase legislative flexibility *702to administer future change in the educational system, as expressed by the will of the electorate, when he wrote:
The last sentence, the one complained of, gives the legislature power at any time in the future, to entirely remodel the superintendency system if it sees fit to do so. For instance, if the time should come when the township system of school organization were in effect, and it were desirous to provide for township superintendents as under the laws of Massachusetts, this sentence of the amendment would give the legislature full power to make whatever provision might at the time be necessary. The only purpose of that part of the amendment was to make it broad enough so as to fit any exigencies that might arise at any time in the future history of the state. (Emphasis added.)
Letter from L.D. Harvey to Karl Mathie (Oct. 15,1902). A similar sentiment is represented in another letter of Harvey's, not cited by the majority, in which he stated:
For instance, if the township system of school government should at some time in the future be adopted in the state, and fifty years from now perhaps we should reach a state of development where like Massachusetts, we should want to adopt the township system of supervision, there would be nothing in the way in the constitution to prevent action by the legislature such as the people might desire either for the election or the appointment of these officers. The only purpose in the amendment beyond that of making it possible to put the election of county superintendents in the spring, was to make the provision broad enough to meet any demand of the people at any time in the future in the organization of the school system.
*703Letter from L.D. Harvey to C.G. Shutts (Oct. 15,1902). (Emphasis added.) The essential nature of a representative democracy is that the will of the people as expressed by the legislature should govern. Superintendent Harvey recognized the importance of this fundamental aspect of the state's development, and demonstrated his concern that the question of remodel-ling the superintendency system should be firmly left to the province of the legislature.
His letters regarding the 1902 amendment consistently refer to the township system of supervision as employed in the state of Massachusetts, a discussion omitted from the majority's excerpt of the same letter. Majority op. at 692. Harvey utilized the Massachusetts educational system as a representative model which Wisconsin might wish to adopt at some point in the future. As noted by the Petitioner, this reference is significant. For in 1902, Massachusetts had a relatively weak state board of education, consisting of the governor and eight appointees. The extent of the board's powers, having changed little since its creation in 1837, consisted primarily of mere advocacy and reporting functions. Mass. L. 1837, c. 241. Rather than employing a strong SPI, the Massachusetts legislature vested control over virtually all aspects of the state school system in town school committees. Mass. L. 1898, c. 436. Such a system stood in stark contrast to the early method of supervision of public instruction implemented by the legislature in this state, in which centralized authority was placed in the hands of the SPI.
However, according to Harvey's expressed understanding of the broad nature of the 1902 amendment, a transformation of the present system may have been plausible, as the legislature was to be given full power *704to meet any demand of the people in the future organization of the school system.2
Though recognizing Harvey's concerns regarding the county superintendents, the majority opinion has failed to give full meaning to his envisioned understanding that the legislature would be given "power at any time in the future to entirely remodel the superintendency system if it sees fit to do so." In fact, the majority has concluded that "the legislature may not give equal or superior authority to any 'other officer.' "3 See majority op. at 699-700. Even though the majority alludes to the legislature's ability to make changes in the educational system, majority op. at 700, such change would certainly be restricted to local school officials on a limited jurisdictional basis, for the SPI is to *705remain superior in the supervision of public instruction. Id.
However, this result directly conflicts with the tinderstanding articulated by Harvey with respect to the legislature's future ability to remodel the educational system in this state. Following the reasoning of the majority, a legislative 'overhaul' of the system is acceptable, so long as the reformation does not remove the SPI from a position of superiority over any "other officer" the legislature may create. The placement of such a stifling limitation on the legislature's efforts to improve the educational system in this state is unsupported by the Harvey letters, as Harvey himself could not possibly have contemplated the effect of the majority opinion in this case.
I therefore do not agree with the majority's reasoning that the Harvey letters support the conclusion that the other officers mentioned in the amendment are to be solely local officials, subordinate to the SPI. In construing a constitutional amendment, we are to give effect to the intent of the framers and the persons who adopted the amendment. See Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 729, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967). In order to adopt the majority's conclusion that local officials were to indefinitely remain subordinate to the SPI, one would have to read out or simply disregard the plain language of the Harvey letters. The majority has done so in this case.
Following the method for constitutional analysis established by this court in Polk County v. State Public Defender, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994), we are to next examine the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the earliest law passed following the adoption of the constitution. The majority correctly identifies the first law *706passed after the 1902 amendment in Chapter 37, § 2, Laws of 1903. The act reflected legislative alterations to the office of state superintendent, defining various roles and duties which were to come under the province of the SPI.
While the majority opinion is correct in stating that this specific act did not provide for any "other officer" with supervisory powers equal or superior to the SPI, the act certainly did not limit itself by express reference to maintaining the SPI as the superior officer of public instruction at the state level. There is nothing in the structure or language of the 1903 legislation nor Article X, § 1 which requires that the other officers are to indefinitely remain local officials subordinate to the SPI, absent a constitutional amendment. To the contrary, Article X, § 1 provides for the supervision of public instruction between the SPI and such other officers as the legislature shall direct.4 The majority concludes that because the legislature did not prescribe specific duties to be carried on by any such "other officers" in the initial legislation following the 1902 amendment, it must have intended them to thereafter be inferior. See majority op. at 696-97. To do so is to *707ignore the plain language of the 1902 amendment which provided for the election or appointment of any other officers of supervision of public instruction as fixed by law, as well as the innovative flexibility granted the legislature through this amendment, as explained by Superintendent Harvey.5
The ability of the legislature to create other state officers who exercise supervisory authority over public instruction was addressed by this court in Burton v. State Appeal Bd., 38 Wis. 2d 294, 156 N.W.2d 386 (1968). In Burton, the legislature had created an appeal board to hear appeals of school district reorganization orders from agency school committees. The issue in this case was whether the members of the appeal board were "officers" under Article X, § 1. This court found that the board was legislatively created and once appointed, the board members were not subordinate to anyone, including the SPI. The court stated:
We thus conclude that the members of the State Appeal Board have been vested by the legislature with the power to exercise a portion of sovereign power of the state and that, as holders of such power which may be exercised by them without the control of a superior power other than the law itself, they are officers.
Burton, 38 Wis. 2d at 305.
*708The majority attempts to diffuse the significance of the Burton decision by suggesting that the board members were subject to the SPI's authority because they were appointed to the board by the SPI, and served only to review a single appeal. Majority op. at 699-700, n. 10. While these factual distinctions may be true, the majority's narrow reading of this case misses the point. Once appointed, the members of the appeal board exercised their appellate jurisdiction at the state level as provided by the legislature, a feat which could not be duplicated under the majority's holding today. Burton, 38 Wis. 2d at 301. For in the present case, the majority has concluded that any legislatively-created "other officers" are to be inferior to the SPI.
The Burton decision should be read as this court's affirmance of the versatility of the 1902 amendment in holding that the legislature was acting in compliance with the constitution when it granted supervisory power over public instruction to "other officers" at the state level. Hie creation of the appeals board in Burton was designed to address a specific need of the populace in the organization of the school system, a concept which furthered the intent of the framers of the 1902 constitutional amendment.6 Perhaps more significant *709is what the court did not say. The court did not state that the plenary power of the legislature to create other officers was applicable only in limited circumstances, as suggested by the majority. Rather, the holding supports the Petitioner's contention that the "other officer" language cannot be construed to render such officials completely inferior at the state level absent a constitutional amendment.
The legislature's authority to allocate supervision of the educational system in this state was recently clarified by this court in Fortney v. School Dist. of West Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 321 N.W.2d 225 (1982). The school board in West Salem had sued to vacate an arbitration award, arguing that the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement at issue was unenforceable because Article X, § 1 had reserved all power over hiring and firing in the school board. West Salem, 108 Wis. 2d at 174-75.
This court rejected that position, holding that the powers and duties of the SPI and school boards (i.e., *710"other officers") were only those as expressly granted by the legislature, stating:
Public instruction and its governance had no longstanding common law history at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was enacted. Furthermore, Article X, section 1, explicitly provides that the powers and duties of the school superintendent and other officers charged by the legislature with governing school systems "shall he prescribed by law." Because the constitution explicitly authorized the legislature to set the powers and duties of the public instruction officers, Article X, section 1 confers no more authority upon those officers than that delineated by statute. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 182.
The legislature has consistently stated that the governance and supervision of public instruction is to be vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as they may provide. Neither the plain language of Article X, § 1, nor the 1902 constitutional amendment specifically provides that the SPI is to be the sole authority over public instruction in this state. The majority opinion, however, has come to this conclusion.7
This result significantly restricts the ability of the legislature to address pressing issues of educational reform. Today's holding undermines the flexibility articulated by the framers of the 1902 amendment and SPI Harvey, incorporating a rigidity into the process of *711educational development which effectively preserves the present status of the SPI as the functional head of education in the state of Wisconsin.
In order to give significant meaning to the language in both Article X, § 1, and this court's decisions in Burton and West Salem,, the 1902 constitutional amendment must be interpreted as providing the legislature with the innovative flexibility to identify and address issues involving reform. By providing for the ability to make meaningful change at the state level, the legislature is best able to effectuate the progressive will of the electorate. Moreover, allowing legislative innovation ensures that the state constitution will endure as a living document. As this court recognized in Payne v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437 (1935):
A constitution usually announces certain basic principles to serve as the perpetual foundation of the state. It is not intended to be a limitation on its helpful development, nor an obstruction to its progress .... It has also been said that a constitution is to be interpreted by the spirit which vivifies, and not by the letter which killeth, and that a written constitution is to be interpreted by the same spirit in which it was produced.
Id. at 555-56. The majority opinion has overlooked the spirit which compelled the framers of the 1902 constitutional amendment, and in doing so, has impaired the ability of the legislature to improve the institution of public instruction in this state.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE DONALD W. STEINMETZ joins this concurring opinion.
Cosmetic changes to Article X, § 1 effectuated by amendment in 1982 did not alter the meaning or intent of the article, and are not relevant to this discussion.
Although the changes envisioned by Harvey may have included the movement toward the Massachusetts township system of supervision, I am mindful of the constitutional limitations placed upon the legislature. The organization of a school system which places superior authority over the supervision of public instruction in "other officers," as does 1995 Wis. Act 27, or in local officials rather than the SPI, as did Massachusetts, would exceed the acceptable boundaries of a legislative enactment, and would require a constitutional amendment.
The reference to equal as an apparent position in the hierarchy of supervision is somewhat confusing. In light of the majority's holding, it does not appear to be possible for the legislature to create a position at the state level in which an "other officer" could share equal power with the SPI, as he or she is to be superior to any such person, according to the majority's reading of the 1902 constitutional amendment. Practically speaking, such an arrangement would require one party to have final authority over decisions regarding educational reform. The majority has decided that that power will indefinitely remain with the SPI, absent a constitutional amendment.
The majority recognizes the validity of the Petitioner's interpretation of this language when it states that the section is ambiguous, in "that it can be read either as granting the power of supervision solely to the SPI, or as granting power to both the SPI and the 'other officers' referred to in the section." See majority op. at 684. Despite this concession, the majority concludes that the "other officers" may not be given supervisory power equal or superior to the SPI. According to the reasoning of the majority, the "other officers" may be given the power to supervise education at the local level as long as it does not usurp that of the SPI, a reading which is unsupported by the plain language of the article.
As noted, Harvey stressed the importance of the adaptable nature of the 1902 amendment, an instrument for future development of the educational system in this state. It would defy logic to suggest that the legislature would be bound to a system of education currently in place, simply because it was unable to foresee a future need, and did not immediately act in furtherance following the passage of the constitutional amendment in 1902.
The restructuring of the educational system in this state, as envisioned by 1995 Wis. Act 27, follows a long history of legislative effort to evaluate and improve the nature of public instruction. In 1909 the legislature appointed a committee to investigate whether the public schools and all other state educational institutions should be placed under the control of a single board or commission. See 1909 Jt. Res. 56; Conrad Patzer, Public Education in Wisconsin (1924), at 304-05. In 1915, the legislature created a State Board of Education to review the financial requirements of the public schools and other state educational institutions, and to oversee and improve the distri*709bution of public funds to those institutions. The work of the Board was completed in 1923. See L. 1915, c. 497; L. 1923, c. 179; Patzer at 222-24. The recommendation of the Commission on Improvement of the Educational System in 1949 was to channel the functions then delegated to the SPI to a central policy-making board. See L. 1947, c. 573; Report of the Commission on Improvement of the Educational System (Nov. 1948) at 16-17. Similarly, the Kellet Commission, created in 1969 by Governor Warren Knowles, recommended that a State Board of Education be created to manage all Wisconsin educational institutions. Such action by the legislature throughout the development of the educational system reflects the integral role it plays in evaluating and improving the institution of public instruction. Today's majority opinion has crippled the ability of the legislature to incorporate educational reform at the state level.
Despite this deduction, it is somewhat ironic that the majority would, in alluding to the legislature's apparent ability to strip the SPI of his supervisory authority, specify a particular manner in which the legislature might proceed while claiming to reserve judgment. Majority op. at 700.