{dissenting).
¶ 47. The majority concludes that TIS-II's reduced maximum confinement for the same TIS-I felony does not constitute a new factor when a defendant moves for a modification of a sentence imposed under TIS-I. The majority reasons that the legislature has not mandated the retroactive application of the reduced penalties, but has instead provided an adequate remedy by enacting Wis. Stat. § 973.195. Accordingly, the majority reaffirms this court's decision in State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983). Because Hegwood was wrongly decided, and because the change in the penalty structure from TIS-I to TIS-II could constitute a new factor, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 48. This court in Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 102, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970), held that sound public policy favors the exercise by a trial court of its power to amend, modify, and correct a judgment of sentencing, even though the service of the sentence has been commenced. The trial court's authority to change and modify its judgments was based on its "inherent power." Id. at 101. The court noted that the trial court should correct an unjust sentence within reasonable limits. Id. at 101-03. The inherent power to modify a sentence "must be exercised within the limits of sound sentencing discretion." Id. at 106.
¶ 49. The reasonable limits specified in Hayes were clarified by this court in State v. Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572, 205 N.W.2d 144 (1973), when this court adopted the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, Part VI, § 6.1 (approved draft, 1968). That section provided:
*7386.1 Authority to reduce: general.
(a) It may be appropriate to authorize the sentencing court to reduce or modify a sentence within a specified time after its imposition or the final resolution of an appeal if new factors bearing on the sentence are made known. . ..
Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 581. Thus, this court made clear that any modification of sentence could not be based on reflection alone but must be based on a new factor brought to the trial court's attention.1 Id. at 582.
¶ 50. In Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975), this court defined "new factor" as "a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because, even though it was in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties." A knowing failure to provide the information does not constitute a new factor. Id. at 288.
¶ 51. In Hegwood, this court decided that a reduction in the maximum statutory penalty is not a new *739factor justifying a modification of sentence. The court's analysis, however, was incorrect. The court based its decision on Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285, 310-311, 265 N.W.2d 540 (1978), which correctly determined that Wis. Stat. § 990.04 precludes an automatic reduction of a sentence because of the change in the maximum penalty for a particular offense. See Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 548. The court then jumped to the conclusion that since an automatic reduction was not authorized under the statute, "the reduction in the maximum penalty ... shall not operate to reduce the sentence for a previously committed offense." Id. But in Hegwood, the defendant was not asking for automatic reduction of his sentence. He was arguing that the change in penalty structure constituted a new factor under Rosado. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 549 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). By missing the point of the defendant's argument, the court arrived at an erroneous conclusion. I would not follow Hegwood's precedent.
¶ 52. Instead, I would conclude that whether a change in the statutory maximum constituted a new factor depends on whether the trial court determined that the change was "highly relevant" to the imposition of the sentence.2 If it was not, then no new factor would be shown. If it was, however, then the court would have to determine whether relief was appropriate. There is no logical reason or overriding public policy concern that justifies restricting the trial courts' inherent power in this fashion. As the court stated in Hayes, "[i]t is more important to be able to settle a matter right with a little uncertainty than to settle it wrong irrevocably." Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 105.
*740¶ 53. The Truth in Sentencing bill was originally planned as one package. Michael B. Brennan, et al., Fully Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, 75 Wisconsin Lawyer No. 11, 10-12 (Nov. 2002). TIS-I went into effect on December 31, 1999. Unfortunately, TIS-II did not become effective until February 1, 2003. TIS was not designed to increase the penalties for criminal offenses. See id. at 10; Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and Arduous Journey to Truth-in-Sentencing in Wisconsin, 15 Fed. Sent. R. 15 (2002); see also State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee Final Report, at 22 (August 31, 1999), available at http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=42 (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). Yet, during the TIS-I phase, penalties were indeed increased so that the period of initial confinement under TIS-I would approximate the maximum penalties under the old indeterminate structure. See Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1997 Assembly Bill 351 at 4-5. When TIS-II took effect, penalties were reduced to their appropriate level, based in large part on the work of the Criminal Penalties Study Committee (CPSC). Brennan, 75 Wisconsin Lawyer No. 11, at 12. Defendants who were sentenced under TIS-I were thus subject to greater maximum penalties than those sentenced under either indeterminate sentencing laws or TIS-II, even though the parties agree that the purposes in adopting TIS did not include increasing the penalty structure for criminal offenses.
¶ 54. People sentenced under TIS-I are not entitled to an automatic reduction of their sentences. See Moore, 83 Wis. 2d at 310-11. This is also true for people who were previously sentenced under indeterminate sentencing laws. If the trial court in a TIS-I case determines, however, that the change in the penalty structure created by the passage of TIS-II is highly *741relevant to the imposition of a particular TIS-I sentence, then that court should, as part of its inherent power, have the opportunity to decide whether relief should be granted. If, on the other hand, the trial court were to conclude that the change in penalties was not highly relevant to the imposition of a particular sentence, then it is not a new factor and not a basis for sentence modification. I would overrule Hegwood and its progeny,3 and reverse and remand this action to the trial court for a determination of whether the change in penalty structure constitutes a new factor in this proceeding.
¶ 55. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Chief Justice Hallows believed that requiring new factors as a prerequisite to modifying a sentence is too restrictive of the power of a judge and a step backward in the criminal process. State v. Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572, 585-86, 205 N.W.2d 144 (1973) (Hallows, C.J. concurring). According to Chief Justice Hallows, on reconsideration, if the trial court judge felt that he or she had been too harsh or had failed to give due weight to mitigating factors which should have been properly taken into account, then the judge should have the power to re-examine the sentence and modify it accordingly. Id. at 586.
I respectfully disagree with Chief Justice Hallows, as I fully embrace the new factor concept as stated in Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975). His sentiment is correct, however, when applied to Hegwood.
The second prong of the Rosado analysis would already be met in this situation, as a new penalty structure would not be in existence until after the effective date of the new law, after the sentence was imposed.
See, e.g., State v. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90, 272 Wis. 2d 759, 681 N.W.2d 534 and State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, 267 Wis. 2d 213, 670 N.W.2d 400.