(dissenting). Recently, we emphasized again in Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), that the duty and liability created by § 2, the highway exception to the governmental immunity act, 1 extends "only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.”2
In this appeal, we are called upon to decide whether a bicycle path, contiguous to the main traveled portion of a highway and separating that *318portion of the highway from its shoulder, is within the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” Because a strict construction of the highway exception is required, not only by the plain language of the statute but also by the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature as well as the prior decisions of this Court, I must dissent from the majority’s holding which expands the reach of liability beyond the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.”
i
Repeatedly, this Court has stressed that the governmental immunity act is a "broad grant of immunity” with "four narrowly drawn statutory exceptions . . . .”3 When the Legislature adopted the definition of "governmental function” set forth in Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 594, n 5; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), "the Legislature put its imprimatur on the broad scope of immunity . . . and, by implication, the narrow scope of the exception.”4 As Chief Justice Riley reiterated most recently in Scheurman, §2 is a *319"narrowly drawn exception to a broad grant of immunity,” and as such
there must be strict compliance with the conditions and restrictions of the statute. No action may be maintained under the highway exception unless it is clearly within the scope and meaning of the statute. [Id., p 630. Citations omitted.]
In its opinion today, the majority broadly interprets the phrase "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” to encompass a bicycle path as part of the shoulder of the highway and cites several Court of Appeals decisions5 issued prior to our opinion in Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330; 408 NW2d 783 (1987).6
As I see it, the plain wording of § 2, the highway exception, as well as this Court’s holding in Roy, compel the conclusion that the shoulder of a highway is not designed for vehicular travel; rather, it is designed for the temporary accommodation of *320disabled or stopped vehicles. While the word "highway” includes that portion of the highway referred to as the "shoulder,” the language of § 2, so carefully and deliberately chosen by the Legislature, makes very clear that the duty and liability imposed by this statutory exception is limited, and does not reach across the full breadth of the highway. It extends only to a portion of the highway — that portion "designed for vehicular travel.”
ii
In determining that the bicycle path in Roy was not within the highway exception, this Court relied on indications in the governmental immunity act that "the Legislature intended to use applicable terms in that act with the same meaning as they have in . . . the Motor Vehicle Code.”7 Id. at 338. For example, the Roy Court pointed to § 5 of the governmental immunity act which specifically incorporates by reference certain definitions provided in the Motor Vehicle Code.
After noting that both acts employ the term "vehicular travel,” and after reviewing the common usage and definitions in the Motor Vehicle Code of such words as "highway” and "vehicle,” the Roy Court concluded:
The careful tailoring of terms in the governmental immunity act to the definitions in the Motor Vehicle Code convinces us that the Legislature intended these terms of the governmental immunity act to be understood in light of the definitions of the Motor Vehicle Code. [Id. at 340.][8]
Applying definitions found, in the Motor Vehicle *321Code, this Court concluded in Roy that a bicycle is not a "vehicle,” and that a "bicycle path is not designed for vehicular travel” within the meaning of the governmental immunity act. Id.
In light of our decision in Roy, it could hardly be said in this case that the bicycle path, as such, comes within the scope of the highway exception. However, the majority seeks to avoid the Roy holding by focusing instead upon the allegation in plaintiff’s complaint that he was injured on a " 'designated bicycle path on the west shoulder of said highway.’ ”9
Until today this Court has never held that the shoulder is within the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” Such a construction ignores the teaching of Roy that, absent a valid reason, the definitions provided in the Motor Vehicle Code are to be used in construing the highway exception to governmental immunity.
The term "shoulder” is defined in the Motor Vehicle Code:
"Shoulder” means that portion of the highway contiguous to the roadway generally extending the contour of the roadway, not designed for vehicular travel but maintained for the temporary accommodation of disabled or stopped vehicles otherwise permitted on the roadway. [MCL 257.59a; MSA 9.1859(1). Emphasis added.]
Obviously, this definition of "shoulder” requires the conclusion that the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” does not include the shoulder. Because it is designed only for "temporary accommodation,” rather than "vehicular travel,” the duty and liability imposed by *322the highway exception do not extend to the shoulder.10
This interpretation is consistent with other provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code. For example, it provides that the driver of a vehicle "shall drive the vehicle upon the right half of the roadway,”11 and that a driver who overtakes or passes another vehicle "upon the right by driving off the pavement or main-traveled portion of the roadway” is responsible for a civil infraction.12
Moreover, the Motor Vehicle Code makes it unlawful, outside the limits of any city or village, for a vehicle to "be stopped, parked, or left standing, attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of a highway, when it is possible to stop, park, or to leave the vehicle off the paved or main traveled part of the highway.”13 Needless to say, the words "stop, park, or to leave” standing are not the equivalent of "travel.” In construing a statute, words and phrases are to be given their ordinary and common-sense meaning.14 *323In the ordinary sense, a shoulder is not designed for travel; it is designed for interruption of travel.
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that this Court has previously ruled that the shoulder of a highway is not designed for vehicular travel. In Goodrich v Kalamazoo Co, 304 Mich 442; 8 NW2d 130 (1943), the plaintiff was injured when his motor vehicle left the main traveled portion of the highway and struck a tree located within the shoulder. Referring to the statute then in effect, this Court said:
The responsibility of the defendant ... is only that the highway be kept "reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.”
It is quite uniformly held that the above-noted duty . . . applies to the traveled portion of the road and not to the entire width of the highway.
The shoulder of the road has been held not to be a part of the "wrought” or "traveled” portion of the road.
It is not within the statutory duty of the [defendant] to maintain shoulders of improved . . . highways so that such shoulders will be "reasonably safe and convenient for public travel” in the same sense that the [defendant] is required to so maintain the paved or improved portion which is designed for ordinary or normal travel. Instead the shoulders are constructed and maintained for other and restricted uses; and the requisite condition of maintenance varies accordingly. [Id. at 445-448. Emphasis added.]
To be sure, the language of the governing statute at the time of Goodrich varied from the stat*324ute in effect today. However, the authority of Goodrich is all the more persuasive because legislative changes made since then have moved in the direction of narrowing and limiting the scope of the duty.15
Prior to enactment of the governmental immunity act, 1964 PA 170, the duty required of governmental units applied broadly and without qualification to "roads” and "public highways.” The duty then imposed was not expressly limited, as it is now, to the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” As we recognized in Roy, the obvious purpose of the Legislature in choosing the words in the current highway exception, was to "focus on a more tightly drawn duty reflected in the departure . . . from the more in-*325elusive tone of predecessor legislation.” Roy, supra at 341.16
Furthermore, since the Legislature is presumed to know the existing law when it enacts or amends a statute,17 it is significant that the Legislature, subsequent to Goodrich, narrowed the scope of the duty from "highway” to that "portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” In light of this Court’s determination in Goodrich that shoulders are not designed for vehicular travel, the adoption subsequently of such limiting language lends strong support to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exclude the shoulder of a highway from the scope of the duty imposed.
in
Clearly, under Roy, a bicycle path, in and of itself, is not within the highway exception. The majority’s sole basis for distinguishing Roy is that in this case the bicycle path is part of the highway’s shoulder. However, under the instruction of Roy that the highway exception is to be read in light of definitions supplied by the Motor Vehicle Code, it is clear that the shoulder is not within the scope of that portion of the highway "designed for vehicular travel.”
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.18
MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq.
MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) (emphasis added).
Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). See also Scheurman, supra, p 627; Reardon v Dep’t of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 411; 424 NW2d 248 (1988); HadSeld v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 146; 422 NW2d 205 (1988); Smith v Public Health Dep’t, 428 Mich 540, 591-592; 410 NW2d 749 (1987); Thomas v State Hwy Dep’t, 398 Mich 1, 9, n 3; 247 NW2d 530 (1976); Pittman v Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 62; 247 NW2d 512 (1976) (Coleman, J.); Pichette v Manistique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268, 277; 269 NW2d 143 (1978).
The four statutory exceptions are MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) (highway repair); MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) (negligent operation of government-owned motor vehicle); MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) (public buildings); MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113) (proprietary function).
A fifth statutory exception was added by 1986 PA 175, MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4) (ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical care facility).
Reardon, n 3 supra, p 412 (emphasis added).
Johnson v Michigan, 32 Mich App 37; 188 NW2d 33 (1971); Van Liere v State Hwy Dep’t, 59 Mich App 133; 229 NW2d 369 (1975); McKee v Dep’t of Transportation, 132 Mich App 714; 349 NW2d 798 (1984).
It is noteworthy that the Legislature has acted to restrict the effect of several Court of Appeals decisions which broadly interpreted the highway exception. See, e.g., Moerman v Kalamazoo Co Rd Comm, 129 Mich App 584; 341 NW2d 829 (1983), and Carney v Dep’t of Transportation, 145 Mich App 690; 378 NW2d 574 (1985) (holding that there is a duty to maintain a tree along the road if the tree is positioned so that the average vehicle could strike the tree without any of its wheels leaving the shoulder); McMillan v State Hwy Comm, 130 Mich App 630; 344 NW2d 26 (1983), and Davis v Chrysler Corp, 151 Mich App 463; 391 NW2d 376 (1986) (holding that there is a duty to maintain a utility pole located on or in proximity to the traveled portion of a highway). Prior to the enactment of 1986 PA 175, the term "highway,” for purposes of the governmental tort liability act, was defined as "every public highway, road and street which is open for public travel and shall include bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks and culverts on any highway. The term 'highway’ shall not be deemed to include alleys.” MCL 691.1401; MSA 3.996(101). The definition, as amended, now provides in part: "The term 'highway’ does not include alleys, trees, and utility poles.” (Emphasis added.)
MCL 257.1 et seq.; MSA 9.1801 et seq.
In a footnote the Court stated, "Terms not under consideration in this opinion might not have been subject to the same legislative intent.” Id., n 17.
Ante, p 310. (Emphasis added.)
Without challenging the position that definitions provided in the Motor Vehicle Code are applicable in construing the governmental immunity, the majority seeks to avoid the effect of MCL 257.59a; MSA 9.1859(1) by pointing to another section of the code: “ 'Shoulder’ means that portion of the highway or street on either side of the roadway which is normally snowplowed for the safety and convenience of vehicular traffic.” MCL 257.1501(k); MSA 9.3200(l)(k), ante, p 315.
We find nothing in the latter provision to be inconsistent. Both sections recognize that the shoulder is not designed for vehicular travel. For "safety and convenience” sake, of course, snowplowing is required during winter periods to make the shoulder available for the "temporary accommodation of disabled or stopped vehicles.” However, that does not say or mean that the shoulder is designed for "vehicular travel.”
MCL 257.634; MSA 9.2334 (emphasis added). The Motor Vehicle Code defines "roadway” as "that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel.” MCL 257.55; MSA 9.1855.
MCL 257.637(c)(2); MSA 9.2337(c)(2).
MCL 257.672; MSA 9.2372.
Stadle v Battle Creek Twp, 346 Mich 64, 68; 77 NW2d 329 (1956); *323MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1).
When Goodrich was decided, the statute applicable to counties provided:
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to public travel. [1929 CL 3996; MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121.]
The statute then applicable to townships, villages and cities provided:
[A]ny person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets ... in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, city or corporation whose corporate authority extends over such public highway [or] street . . . and whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair, such township, village, city or corporation shall be liable to and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled just damages .... [1897 CL 3441, as amended by 1951 PA 19, MCL 242.1; MSA 9.591 repealed by 1964 PA 170 (current provision MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996[102]).]
See also Scheurman, supra at 629, n 2.
Jeruzal v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 350 Mich 527, 534; 87 NW2d 122 (1957).
In light of the expansive construction of the highway exception provided by the Court today, I join in the Chief Justice’s suggestion that the Legislature should consider further amendment of the statute to clarify the extent to which governmental immunity is waived by MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). Post, p 326 (Riley, C.J.).