This case asks us to decide whether the highway exception to governmental immunity1 encompasses a concrete bridge abutment and adjoining guardrail adjacent to, but beyond the shoulder of, a state trunk line entrance ramp and overpass. The Court of Appeals relied upon our plurality opinion in Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), to reverse the Court of Claims denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition. While we agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, we do not fully endorse its rationale. 198 Mich *152App 728; 499 NW2d 29 (1993). We hold that because the abutment and guardrail are neither part of "the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,” nor installations integrally and directly affecting safe vehicular travel upon the improved portion, governmental immunity bars the cause of action set forth in plaintiff’s complaint.
i
Plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle left the roadway of a highway entrance ramp and overpass, crossed the shoulder, and struck either a metal guardrail or concrete abutment2 immediately adjacent to, but beyond, the shoulder. Plaintiff was thrown over the bridge railing and landed next to a median barrier on the highway below, incurring a number of injuries.
Plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Claims, alleging that the entrance ramp was owned by the state and under the jurisdiction and control of defendant who, plaintiff maintained, had responsibility for the design, construction, and maintenance of those bridge railings on the entrance ramp. Plaintiff’s complaint specifically alleged that defendant had failed to properly design and *153construct the bridge railing, failed to inspect the entrance ramp for dangerous conditions, and failed to provide adequate warnings of dangers on the entrance ramp. The complaint further alleged that these negligent acts and omissions were the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
Defendant moved for summary disposition and, relying upon our decision in Scheurman, supra, argued that because of governmental immunity it was under no duty to maintain bridge railings "which fall outside the traveled and paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” The Court of Claims denied summary disposition, concluding that guardrails are "designed to affect the way vehicles travel down the road.” Invoking stare decisis and explaining that it was bound to "follow” our holding in Scheurman, the Court of Appeals reversed in a per curiam opinion.3 Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded that because the bridge railing "was neither 'roadbed’ nor 'designed for vehicular travel,’ governmental immunity applies and defendant should not be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries” (citing Scheurman).
ii
A
As a general rule, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability for actions taken in furtherance of a governmental function. MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The Legislature has articulated limited exceptions to this general rule, including the highway exception, which mandates *154that a governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway
shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. [MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102X1).]
Notably, for activities undertaken to fulfill this mandate, both the government’s duty and its liability are limited to that "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” It is this limiting language which we interpret and apply in the instant case.
As this Court explained in Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), the statutory grant of governmental immunity is broad, and its exceptions are narrowly drawn. We are mindful, however, that like all judicial interpretations of statutory provisions, this Court is bound by the well-established rule that our primary goal is to give effect to the controlling intent of the Legislature. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Accordingly, while we address our efforts in the shadow of a narrowly drawn statutory exception, our analysis inextricably proceeds toward the light of legislative intent.
The legislative purpose for the highway exception is, we believe, a clear one: to enhance the safety of public travel upon state-owned highways. This interpretation of the highway exception was first articulated in Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 341; 408 NW2d 783 (1987), and was most recently reaffirmed in Gregg v Dep’t of State Hwys, 435 Mich 307, 316; 458 NW2d 619 (1990). We expressly reiterate and adopt it today.
As was first explained in Roy, the legislative purpose underlying the highway exception is ful*155filled by requiring certain governmental agencies to "repair and maintain the highway so that the improved portion designed for vehicular travel is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” Roy, supra at 341. Although this duty to "repair and maintain” is a limited one—extending only to that "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel”—within this conceptual boundary the statutory goal of maintaining safe highways is clear and unambiguous. Because we are obligated to give effect to the controlling legislative intent of this exception, it. is against the backdrop of this statutory purpose that we today interpret and apply the limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).
B
1. ROY v dep’t OF TRANSPORTATION
The highway exception, and its limiting language, was first examined by this Court in Roy. There we held that a bicycle path adjacent to, but separate and detached from, a highway was not part of the improved portion of that highway designed for vehicular travel. Id. at 340. In reaching this conclusion, we focused primarily on the location of the allegedly defective installation. Specifically, we explained that "the [highway exception] does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location,” and that "[t]he criterion used by the Legislature was not based on the class of travelers, but the road on which they travel.” Id. at 341 (emphasis added). Because the bicycle path in Roy was located beyond the improved portion designed for vehicular travel, we concluded that governmental immunity from suit was not abrogated by the highway exception.
*1562. SCHEURMAN v DEP’t OF TRANSPORTATION
The location of allegedly defective installations was again emphasized by this Court in Scheurman. There we held that the failure to install lighting along a state trunk line did not subject the government to potential liability because "the physical structure of the lights falls outside the traveled or paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” Id. at 633.4 Notably, while four justices in Scheurman joined in the rationale and result of the lead opinion, only three justices expressly subscribed to its holding that the limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) "refers only to the traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel.” Id. at 623.5 Con-versely, four justices specifically expressed their desire for an interpretation of the limiting language that would include installations—even those located outside the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel—that integrally affected safe travel on the improved portion.6
*157We interpret Scheurman as reiterating the general rule, first articulated by this Court in Roy, that the highway exception does not normally include installations physically separate and detached from the paved or traveled portion of a highway. As is explained below, this interpretation is consistent with Gregg, supra, this Court’s most recent majority interpretation of the highway exception. This interpretation of Scheurman is also consistent with the position we take in the instant case.
3. GREGG v dep’t OF STATE HWYS
In Gregg, supra, a majority of this Court again affirmed that location is a key determinant for properly defining and applying the highway exception. There we held that a bicycle path running between the traveled portion of a highway and its paved shoulder comprised part of the improved highway "designed for vehicular travel.” In reaching this conclusion, we explained that highway shoulders, while not part of the normally traveled roadbed, were nevertheless intended and designed *158for vehicular travel. Id. at 314, citing Johnson v Michigan, 32 Mich App 37; 188 NW2d 33 (1971). We held that the highway exception must be tempered by common experience, and that certain installations located beyond the traveled or paved roadway "are essential to a safe modern highway” so as not to be excluded from the highway exception. Id. at 315. This interpretation of the highway exception, we concluded, was more consistent with the exception’s express purpose of protecting vehicular travelers by mandating the safe repair and maintenance of highways. Id. at 316.
c
The rule that can be derived from these decisions is clear, and we confirm it today: The limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), creating liability only for "the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel,” encompasses (1) installations physically located within that traveled or paved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel, or (2) some installations, even those physically located beyond the traveled or paved portion of a highway, that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on this improved portion.
This conclusion is consistent with our prior interpretations of the highway exception articulated in Roy and Gregg, supra. Furthermore, this conclusion incorporates the position, advocated by a majority of the justices in Scheurman, that the highway exception should not preclude potential governmental liability in "cases alleging a failure to 'repair and maintain’ installations that are integral to, if not part of, the 'improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,’ such as traffic lights and signs.” Id. at 637 (opinion of *159Boyle, J., and dissenting opinion of Brickley, J., joined by Levin and Archer, JJ.).
More importantly, this interpretation of the highway exception is consistent with the overriding legislative intent that guides our inquiry today, namely, the assurance of safe, reliable highways to protect public vehicular travel. As we recognized in Roy and Gregg, this intent is manifestly evident from the plain language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), which commands highway authorities to repair and maintain highways for safe public travel.
Defendant asks us to adopt an interpretation of the highway exception that would limit liability exclusively to alleged defects arising on "part of the physical structure of the roadbed” or "relat[ing] to conditions arising out of the roadbed.” While we conclude in this case that a physical installation off the improved portion does not escape immunity, in view of the expressions of a majority of this Court in the above-referenced opinions, we respectfully decline defendant’s request for such a limited interpretation of the highway exception. Even the most minimalist assurances of vehicular safety demand more than simply decreeing that potholes be repaired, and proper striping applied, to those state-owned highway's so greatly relied upon by both citizens and guests of this state. We do not interpret the limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) in a manner so clearly inconsistent with, and damaging to, the highway exceptibn’s clear and overriding legislative mandate demanding safe highways.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the scope of liability under the highway exception is not all-encompassing. Indeed, potential liability is expressly limited to that "improved portion of a *160highway designed for vehicular travel.” MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). This limiting phrase, of course, necessarily defines the scope of duties and liabilities sanctioned by the highway exception. In this respect, the restrictive phrase is a spatial limitation: all duties, and all liabilities, must accomplish the purpose of promoting safe vehicular travel on the improved portion.
To summarize: in light of the clear legislative purpose that we must uphold, we interpret the limiting language of the highway exception as including only installations physically located on, or deemed to integrally affect, those properties comprising "the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel.” This interpretation adequately fulfills the legislative goals of the provision, while recognizing that it is also a narrowly defined exception to a broad grant of immunity.
m
Turning now to the facts of this instant case we conclude, albeit for different reasons, that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Court of Claims denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals read our decision in Scheurman as having interpreted the statutory phrase "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” to encompass only "the traveled portion of a roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” Chaney, supra at 730. We note that this narrow reading does not comport with our interpretation of the limiting language. Rather, and as explained above, we have interpreted this statutory phrase as including installations physically located within that traveled or *161paved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel (including that "traveled portion of a roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel”), as well as, in some narrowly defined circumstances, installations located beyond this improved portion that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on the highway.
Applying this interpretation of the limiting language, we conclude that governmental immunity precludes liability for the bridge railing at issue in this instant case. First, it is clear that this bridge railing—lying outside both the curb and the shoulder of the highway—is not physically located within that improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Unlike the bicycle path in Gregg, this bridge railing is not part of the highway shoulder. Rather, like the bike path in Roy, this bridge railing is physically separate and "detached” from the improved portion of this highway.
Second, the bridge railing does not directly and integrally affect vehicular travel along the improved portion of this highway. Neither a guardrail nor a concrete abutment, located beyond the shoulder of a highway, has any effect upon the safe and convenient passage of vehicles while on the improved portion. In this respect, the bridge railing here is markedly different from the traffic lights and signs alluded to by Justice Boyle in Scheurman, supra. Traffic signals and signs are purposely designed to directly affect the flow of vehicular traffic on the improved portion of a highway. If these installations fail, traffic on the improved portion of a highway is directly and integrally affected: the likelihood of accidents increases, as does the related probability of injury to vehicular passengers.
In contrast, a guardrail or concrete abutment *162permanently located beyond the shoulder of a highway simply cannot cause an accident that originates on the improved portion of a highway. Indeed, the sole purpose and effect of the bridge railing here—i.e., to prevent vehicles from accidentally leaving the highway—is only implicated after a vehicle has left the improved portion. Accordingly, barriers such as guardrails and concrete abutments are not directly and integrally related to safe travel along the highway—the barrier is simply not necessary for safe vehicular travel on and along the improved portion.
iv
Because the bridge railing at issue here was not physically located within the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel, and because it did not directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on the improved portion of the highway, we conclude that the highway exception is inapplicable and that governmental immunity is available to defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.7
MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. . . . The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
Plaintiff does not recall whether he struck the metal guardrail or concrete abutment. Plaintiff’s original complaint and the brief filed with this Court describe the guardrail and abutment collectively as a "bridge railing.” It appears from a photograph included in both plaintiff’s and defendant’s appendices that the guardrail merges into the concrete abutment at that point where the entrance ramp becomes a bridge overpass spanning the highway below. Plaintiff has not contested the accuracy of this photograph.
Because any distinction between the guardrail and abutment is irrelevant for purposes of our decision, like the plaintiff, we will, unless otherwise noted, hereinafter refer to this guardrail and abutment collectively as a "bridge railing.” Additionally, and unless otherwise noted, we will refer to both the entrance ramp and the overpass as an "entrance ramp.”
198 Mich App 728; 499 NW2d 29 (1993), lv gtd 444 Mich 900 (1993).
Similarly, in a companion case decided with Scheurman, this Court held that a hedge growing on private property that obstructed the view of highway travelers "cannot be categorized as a defective condition upon 'the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel ....’” Id. at 635. Accordingly, it concluded that liability could not be imposed, per the highway exception, upon the defendant road commission because of the hedge.
Chief Justice Riley authored, and Justices Griffin and Cavanagh joined, the plurality opinion in Scheurman.
Specifically, three dissenting justices concluded that the plurality opinion, by limiting liability to the traveled or paved portion of a roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel, "negate[d] the fundamental legislative purpose underlying the highway exception to immunity”: "a clear legislative purpose and policy to compensate persons injured because of a governmental agency’s failure to maintain highways in a condition safe for public travel.” Id. at 640 (Brickley, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Levin and Archer); see also id. at 648 (the dissent’s argument that the majority holding "seriously undermines the legislative mandate of § 2 to maintain safe high*157ways”). The dissenting justices would have held that
the "improved portion” language of [MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102)] does not distinguish the surface of the highway as opposed to conditions other than the surface of the highway which may well foreclose the highway from being "reasonably safe.” [Id. at 641.]
Additionally, while concurring in both the rationale and result of the lead opinion, Justice Boyle also indicated a preference for interpreting the limiting language to include installations "integral to” safe passage along the improved portion of a highway. Specifically, Justice Boyle expressly concurred in the lead opinion:
[W]ith the understanding that it does not preclude the application of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) in cases alleging a failure to "repair and maintain” installations that are integral to, if not part of, the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,” such as traffic lights and signs. [Id. at 637.]
Because I stand alone on my position concerning the highway exception to governmental immunity, and thus have contributed to this Court’s badly fractured view of what the Legislature has divined in its effort to provide this exception, I wish to offer—for whatever value it might be to the bench and bar—my individual view of where I think the fracture lines are formed.
.There are, in my view, three basic positions represented by the various opinions in this and previous cases. The first viewpoint is that because the state’s liability is limited to the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,” and because the plain meaning of this statutory language can only be interpreted to encompass the roadbed on which vehicles travel, only those accidents that are caused by a condition directly on this roadbed qualify for the exception to immunity. Post at 168, Riley, J. Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990).
Another viewpoint, represented by Justice Levin’s writings, is that any accident that results from the use of the improved portion of the highway, whether or not it occurs thereon or is caused by a condition thereon, is subject to potential liability. Post at 196-198, Levin, J.
*163I distinguish my position from the foregoing views in that I read the statute as creating liability for an accident that occurs on the improved portion of the highway caused by a condition that affects that improved portion, regardless of the ultimate location of that cause. Hence, this and my prior decisions allow for recovery when, and only when, the occurrence is on the improved portion and is caused by a condition directly affecting vehicular travel on the improved portion, even though that condition may have been occasioned by an act or an omission outside the improved portion of the highway.
As expressed herein, it is my view that this latter interpretation best captures the essence of a statute that provides liability for mishaps occurring on the improved portion of the highway, but which does so without any direct reference to the location of their causality. This interpretation also protects the stated purpose of the statute to avoid liability for accidents that occur outside the improved portion of the highway, regardless of their cause.