(concurring).
I would not darken the lamp of justice by recognizing a de minimis violation as being jurisdictional or prejudicial error. Rather, I would that the lamp of common sense illuminate the proceedings below. There is the letter of the law and the spirit of the law. Truly, the spirit of the law, but not the letter of the law, was fulfilled.
There is no doubt that South Dakota is guilty of sloppy procedure. However, Appellants have been treated fundamentally fair. All state’s attorneys of this state should, in the future, make absolutely sure that a deputy has taken an oath, signed his contract, been duly appointed as a deputy prosecutor and has been licensed by the South Dakota Supreme Court to practice law before that deputy embarks on his official duties.
As recently as 1986 in Smejkal, this Court approved the use of the “de facto officer” doctrine. In Smejkal, a search warrant was issued by a non-law trained magistrate who had not been appointed by the presiding circuit court judge and no certification of appointment had been made to the South Dakota Supreme Court. The trial court found that since the warrant was not issued by an appointed magistrate, the warrant was void from the beginning. This Court reversed the trial court by holding that the magistrate was a “de facto” judicial officer, and the search warrant was, therefore, valid.
People v. Pizzaro, 552 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1990), is a similar case to the one presently before us. In Pizzaro, the defendant moved to set aside a felony jury verdict which was obtained by a prosecutor, who was a law school graduate and had passed the bar examination but had not further completed application for admission to practice law. The court, in Pizzaro, denied defendant’s motion, stating that the prosecutor was acting in a “de facto” status.
In the present case, both Miller and So-koll had attributes enabling them to achieve “de facto” status, as that concept has long been understood: “One whose title is not good in law but who is, in fact, in unobstructed possession of [a public] office and who is discharging the duties thereof in such a manner as not to present the appearance of an intruder or usurper.” See generally, 67 C.J.S. Officers § 264.
Recognizing Miller and Sokoll as “de fac-to officers,” their acts may not be collat*792erally attacked or questioned by third parties affected. Smejkal, supra.