dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. As the majority states, Frasco recognizes the distinction between cohabitation which, absent confession, requires an evidentiary hearing and remarriage, which is an easily determined proposition.
I find the “agreement” of the parties does not trump the plain language of section 510(c) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 2002)). I agree the parties stipulated to the language of the provision in the judgment order that provided “[t]he amount of support shall be reviewable” upon petitioner’s cohabitation or remarriage. I disagree as to the effect of that language or that it should bar the application of the statute that dictates the effective date of the termination of maintenance due to remarriage.
The “support” referenced in the October 3, 2000, order encompassed an amount of unallocated child support and maintenance. I would find the “reviewable” language (which explicitly refers to reviewing the amount) was included by the parties as an agreement to return to court upon one of the listed conditions for the purpose of untangling the amount of support from maintenance. In essence, the parties agreed that at the time of petitioner’s remarriage or cohabitation, a hearing would be necessary to specifically allocate that which was previously unallocated. This language does not evidence an agreement to meet again after petitioner’s remarriage to review whether maintenance should continue. The only sensible interpretation of the agreed order is that the parties knew petitioner’s remarriage would automatically terminate maintenance and, because of that, the amount of support needed to be reviewed at that time. I would find the trial court erred in terminating maintenance effective as of the date of respondent’s petition. In accordance with section 510(c), maintenance should have terminated effective June 27, 2002, the date of petitioner’s remarriage. ”