Defendants and appellants present but one question in this appeal from a,workmen’s compensation award, namely: Was the injury sustained by plaintiff an accidental injury compensable under part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act? .
Plaintiff, a man 68 years of age, was employed by defendant Mt. Pleasant State Home and Training School for over 20 years in a supervisory capacity. The first 18 years of said employment he was farm superintendent and the last 2 years he was an assistant to the farm superintendent.
The injury complained of occurred on December 31, 1953, when a log approximately 12 feet long and 10 inches in diameter, weighing approximately 200 pounds, rolled off of a burning fire, and plaintiff, who was present at the time, endeavored, with his superior, the farm superintendent, to throw the log back on an adjoining fire a few feet away.
The farm superintendent, who was with plaintiff at the time of the injury, testified that the log rolled 3 or 4 feet, and when asked: “You picked it up and laid it on the fire?” he answered, “Well, no, we didn’t lay it on the fire because it was a hot fire—we threw it on the fire.”
Plaintiff immediately complained to his superior of a sharp pain in his back. He was hospitalized for 15 days and was released with his back in a plaster cast. The testimony discloses that plaintiff will have *496to continue wearing a steel back support; that he must avoid bending over to pick up anything, and that he can do no physical labor.
The facts of the case justify the following finding of the workmen’s compensation appeal board:
“Plaintiff’s usual duties for defendant did not require the lifting of logs such as described above. In addition to being required to perform unusual work he was also required to perform this work in an unusual manner. He could not walk up to the fire and lay the log down easily, instead he was required to throw the log on the fire because of the heat from the fire. The proofs submitted show that the log fell from the fire and plaintiff clearly was injured as the result of having to place this log back upon the fire.”
Shortly after the workmen’s compensation act was enacted (1912) this Court decided the case of Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works (July, 1914), 182 Mich 157 (LRA1916A, 283, 6 NCCA 482, Ann Cas 1916D, 689). In this case our Court for the first time defined the word “accident” and, also, for the first time' used the word “fortuitous,” a word which is not found in the legislative enactment, but has been repeatedly, since the Adams Case, used by this Court. In defining “accident” the Court (p 160) quoted from Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed) as follows:
“ ‘Accident. An unforeseen event, occurring without the will or design of the person whose mere act causes it; an unexpected, unusual, or undesigned occurrence; the effect of an unknown cause, or, the cause being known, an unprecedented consequence of it; a casualty;’ ”
and, also, quoted (p 164) from Hensey v. White, [1900] 1 QB 481, 485 (69 LJQB 188, 81 LT 767): “ ‘I think the idea of something fortuitous and unexpected is involved in both words “peril” or “accident.” ’ ” The Court (p 164) also used a quota*497tion from Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., Ltd., [1903] AC 443 (72 LJKB 787, 790, 89 LT 314), as follows: “ ‘The expression “accident” is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlookedfor mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed.’ ”
To determine the popular and ordinary sense of the expression “accident” we turn to Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed, Unabridged) where we find “accident” defined as: “Literally, a befalling. An event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event.” And where we also find the word “fortuitous” defined as, “Happening by chance or accident; occurring unexpectedly, or without known cause; chance.”
In Twork v. Munising Paper Co., 275 Mich 174, 178, this Court commented upon the Corpus Juris definition (1 CJ, pp 390-392) of the word “accident” as follows: ' . ■ .
“ ‘In its most- commonly-accepted meaning, the word denotes an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown .cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected;-chance, casualty, contingency, an event happening without any human agency, or, if happening through human agency, an event which, under the . -circumstances, is unusual and unexpécted by thé person to whom it happens; * * * something unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things; an unusual or unexpected result attending the operation or performance of a usual or necessary act or event; something happening by chance; a mishap.’ ” -
The Court then stated (pp 178, 179):
“ ‘This definition, is in accord with the decisions of ■this Court .which, has not; accepted a.narrow defini*498tion of the word as applied to the workmen’s compensation act (CL 1929, § 8407 et seq.).
“ ‘ “The statute seems to contemplate that an accidental injury may result by mere mischance; that accidental injuries may be due to carelessness, not wilful, to fatigue, and to miscalculation of the effects of voluntary action.” Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich 122, 129.’ Watson v. Publix Riviera Theatre, 255 Mich 115, 116.”
In Rainko v. Webster-Eisenlohr, Inc., 306 Mich 328, 332, this Court said:
“What constitutes an accidental injury within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation statutes has been so definitely stated in former decisions as to obviate the necessity of repetition. See Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich 157 (LRA1916A, 283, 6 NCCA 482, Ann Cas 1916D, 689); and Twork v. Munising Paper Co., 275 Mich 174.”
In Nichols v. Central Crate & Box Co., 340 Mich 232, this Court stated that the test of the existence of an accident or fortuitous event was whether an unusual or excessive strain was imposed on plaintiff’s physique or that he exerted himself in a manner unusual to or greater than is ordinarily the case in the general field of labor which plaintiff was employed to perform.
The record in this case proves that an event took place without plaintiff’s foresight or expectation and, further, that the rolling of the large log off the fire and the strenuous effort made by plaintiff to help his superior throw the log back on the fire constituted an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event. The severe injury he suffered cannot be connected up with a mere change in the human system incident to the general processes of nature,' or existing disease, or wéakened physical condition: The event took place without plaintiff’s foresight or ex*499pectation and the close relationship of. the log suddenly rolling off the fire and the effort to throw it back onto the fire created an event which unexpectedly took place, and certainly was not according to the usual course of events for plaintiff, whose activities for 20 years had been confined to and directed toward supervisory duties.
Our Court has said that the definition of “accident” could not be accepted by it as “a narrow definition of the word as applied to the workmen’s compensation act,” and has further stated that where something unusual occurs in the course of employment causing an injury that could even be said to be brought about through a “miscalculation off the effects of voluntary action,” that such injury is compensable under the workmen’s compensation act.
The record sustains the finding of the appeal board that “the falling of the log from the fire was an unforeseen or fortuitous happening and plaintiff’s back injury was the end result of this happening. Plaintiff’s personal injury clearly arose out of and in the course of his employment and we hold it to be compensable.”
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
Boyles, J., concurred with Kelly, J.