¶ 93. (concurring) . I join Justice Butler's concurrence. I, too, am concerned that the majority opinion might be misinterpreted as merging our law for withdrawing a plea of guilty or no contest before sentencing with our law for withdrawing such a plea after sentencing. The State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and *202State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996), lines of cases are postsentencing cases. Reliance on them in the instant case, which involves a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, is misplaced. The standards governing plea withdrawal before sentencing and after sentencing remain distinct.
¶ 94. It is well established that a circuit court exercises discretion in freely allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing for any fair and just reason, unless the prosecution would be substantially prejudiced. I concur with the majority opinion because I believe that the circuit court's order denying the plea withdrawal was within its discretion.
¶ 95. I write separately, however, to raise an issue that is buried in the discussion of whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion: the wheeling- and-dealing that may occur during plea negotiations and the "loose" plea "deals" that sometimes result.
¶ 96. The circuit court concluded that the defendant did not have a plea agreement premised on cooperation with law enforcement, but rather had only a hope for a deal on cooperation and leniency in sentencing.
¶ 97. There was more going on between the lines than appears in the plea colloquy. Apparently the unwritten understanding was as follows: The defendant had to plead guilty to the charges. If he did so, then state or federal law enforcement officials might try to use the defendant to make controlled drug buys or use the information the defendant provided to set up drug dealers to be caught and prosecuted. If the defendant performed as contemplated, the State's sentencing recommendation might be considerably more lenient. The key was that the defendant had to plead guilty before he would be allowed to go to the next step, that is, to meet *203with the law enforcement officials to arrange cooperation. The defendant pled guilty after being advised of this scenario.
¶ 98. Unfortunately for the defendant, he was not able to cooperate as he had planned. No arrangements with law enforcement panned out. The defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 99. My sense is that the court of appeals took the realities of the criminal justice system, not legal fictions, into account. The court of appeals reasoned that "the trial court believed that the State and defense counsel may not have considered working with law enforcement a specific component of the plea agreement [but that the defendant asserts] that he believed it was part of the agreement. . . . Jenkins's belief that he would be working with law enforcement was not unreasonable under the circumstances, and provided a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal." State v. Jenkins, 2006 WI App 28, ¶¶ 25, 30, 289 Wis. 2d 523, 710 N.W.2d 502 (emphasis in original).
¶ 100. Had the court of appeals sat as the circuit court and allowed the withdrawal of the plea that order would have been affirmed on appeal as an appropriate exercise of discretion. But the test is not what an appellate court would have done had it been the circuit court. The test is whether the circuit court's order denying the plea withdrawal is within the circuit court's range of discretion. The circuit court's refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶ 101. My problem with this case, and the reason I write, is that the instant case highlights a situation that is troublesome for a circuit court both in accepting a guilty plea or plea of no contest and in ruling on a motion for plea withdrawal before sentencing. My un*204derstanding is that the kind of "deal" the State and defense counsel arranged for the defendant is not unusual. It appears to be a common arrangement that the plea agreement struck between the parties is not expressly premised on the defendant's cooperation with law enforcement officials, but that there is nonetheless the "strong suggestion" that the sentence recommendation will be more favorable if the defendant pleads guilty and then cooperates.
¶ 102. Cooperation with law enforcement is vital and these "deals" help make such cooperation with law enforcement possible. These "deals" are left largely unwritten and "loose" in a number of respects because the needs of law enforcement officials and circumstances may change. There is also reluctance to announce in open court that the defendant will be "of service" to law enforcement officials. The "deal" is not placed on the record because any public record would render the defendant useless to law enforcement, might endanger the defendant's life on the street, and might compromise the defendant as a witness in any drug prosecution that he might help bring about.
¶ 103. As a result, a defendant may not fully understand "all the ifs, ands, and buts" of the "deal" that may be explained to him. The defendant does understand, however, that before anything can be done for him, he must plead guilty.
¶ 104. All hope, however, may not be lost for the defendant in this situation. The State asserted before this court that the court of appeals had wrongly assumed that postsentencing cooperation by a defendant sentenced under Truth-in-Sentencing principles cannot yield benefits in the form of sentence modification. The State's brief points out that the circuit court, despite denying plea withdrawal, concluded that the "defendant *205is not precluded from providing information after sentencing and applying for a sentence modification in the future based on his actions." The State argues that the defendant may still get the benefit he had hoped for — sentence modification based on postconviction cooperation. The State asserts that such cooperation may be a new factor warranting modification under the right circumstances, citing State v. Doe, 2005 WI App 68, ¶¶ 5, 7, 10, 280 Wis. 2d 731, 697 N.W.2d 101.
¶ 105. I remain concerned, however, about the secretive nature of the "deals" and worry that because of them, circuit courts may not be able to ensure that pleas are constitutionally sound. Circuit courts must be on their guard to ensure that a defendant fully understands the circumstances under which a guilty plea "for the possibility of cooperation with law enforcement" is taken.
¶ 106. I nonetheless conclude that in the instant case the denial of the plea withdrawal was within the circuit court's discretion.
¶ 107. For the reasons set forth, I concur.
¶ 108. I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. joins this opinion.